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Note on L anguage
The official languages of Afghanistan—and those most widely spoken—are Dari 
(a dialect of Persian) and Pashto. Both contain a number of Arabic loanwords. For 
words that have become common in English, such as sharia, ulema, and mullah, 
I have used the established form. Words less common in English appear in italics 
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In the early summer of 2012, another case of sexual abuse reached Afghan tele-
vision screens and the international press. Lal Bibi, an eighteen-year-old nomad 
woman from the province of Kunduz, came forward in Afghan media recounting 
how, on May 17, 2012, she was seized by men linked to a local armed group. She 
was held captive for five days and sexually assaulted as revenge for her cousin’s 
elopement with a woman from the family of one of the kidnappers. Lal Bibi’s fam-
ily declared to journalists that unless justice was done, they would have no option 
but to kill her. However, Afghanistan’s women’s right activists quickly mobilized 
in support, and pressure mounted on the government to arrest the perpetrators.
But back in Kunduz, the man accused of the rape protested that no such thing 
had taken place. He argued that there had been an agreement of baad—a practice 
in which a woman or girl is given in marriage as a form of compensation for a 
crime or an affront. A mullah had married Lal Bibi to him just before intercourse, 
and “once the marriage contract is done, any sexual intercourse is not considered 
rape” (A.  J. Rubin 2012). In present-day Afghanistan, this version of events did 
not necessarily exonerate him from having committed a crime. Women’s rights 
activists pointed out that forced marriage was also an offense, according to  Afghan 
law and particularly the new Elimination of Violence against Women law (EVAW 
law), which had become a cornerstone of gender activism in the country. More-
over, his attempt to justify his actions with reference to a framework of baad impli-
cated others. A friend of mine, who happened to be in Kunduz on fieldwork at the 
time, told me upon his return that the elders who had sanctioned the kidnapping 
(as an appropriate redress for the affront to the honor of the eloped girl’s father) 
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now found themselves being investigated for crimes against the EVAW law on the 
grounds that they had facilitated a baad.
Lal Bibi was one of several Afghan women and girls who have appeared in 
 national media in recent years with harrowing stories of sexual abuse, accompa-
nied by relatives demanding justice from the Afghan government. Yet the role of 
the government, as well as other powers, in intervening in abuses against women 
was fiercely contested during the first fifteen years following the United States–led 
overthrow of the Taliban in 2001. The questions of whether, to what extent, and 
how central authorities should intervene in different forms of gender violence—
and the very questions of what exactly constituted violations and who was the 
violated party—were matters that went to the core of Afghan society. How was 
rape to be understood—as a crime against the woman herself or primarily as an 
affront against her family? Was “forced marriage” a crime, or should parents (par-
ticularly fathers) be left in peace to arrange their daughters’ marriages as they saw 
fit? Could adulterous women call upon the protection of the state? Was beating 
disobedient wives the prerogative of husbands or something that the government 
should jail men for? The answers to questions such as these had—and continue 
to have—great implications for women’s lives in Afghanistan. But there were also 
other issues at stake—where to draw the boundaries between private and public 
domains; which and whose notions of justice, rights, and obligations should pre-
vail; and, ultimately, how the answers to these questions affected competing claims 
to exercise supreme political power in the country.
The terrain on which these battles were fought out was extraordinarily fluid 
and fragmented. A beleaguered group of women’s rights activists in the capital, 
many of them recently returned from exile, made tenuous alliances with parts of 
the international donor community, but this turned out to be a difficult balancing 
act between concessions to conservative adversaries and dependence on external 
actors. An alliance of women’s rights activists, personnel from foreign embassies, 
and progressive justice officials succeeded in getting the new EVAW law promul-
gated. But the process revealed bitter divisions within women’s groups and diffi-
culty in gaining wider acceptance for their ideas. It also exposed their dependence 
on a friendly executive branch and a degree of isolation from broader political 
constituencies. In courts and prosecution offices, some officials refused to apply 
the EVAW law altogether, saying that its legal status was unclear—the law had 
been passed as a presidential decree and had not been approved in Parliament. At 
the same time, Western aid donors made the implementation of the EVAW law a 
central condition for aid disbursements, and a massive internationally supported 
apparatus was mobilized to disseminate and enforce the law.
The unpredictability produced by these competing legal regimes was acutely felt 
by numerous women and girls who fled unwanted marriages or family abuse and 
sought the assistance of the courts and the protection of shelters. These institutions 
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were a testing ground for what kind of gender relations would be officially sanc-
tioned. In some cases, they upheld women’s claims. On many other occasions, how-
ever, they sided with the families’ counterclaims, sending the women back to their 
families or even to jail, which signaled that public regulation in this domain would 
reinforce kinship and conjugal claims over women rather than support a transfor-
mation that granted women full legal personhood. Meanwhile, the shelters housing 
many of the “runaway” women faced a conservative backlash, stirred up by media 
campaigns that drew upon popular discontent with a prolonged and dysfunctional 
Western intervention and denounced the shelters as a foreign implant.
Even the outrage surrounding rape cases like Lal Bibi’s contained ambiguous 
agendas. To many people, the popular demand for state intervention in cases of 
rape was a significant shift that signaled support for women’s rights over family 
privacy. However, a closer look at the campaigns for justice suggested that they 
were driven by many different concerns, some of which had little to do with wom-
en’s rights. In other words, whether this new “openness” surrounding rape would 
constitute progress for women was, like many aspects of gender violence in post-
2001 Afghanistan, still an open question.
These contestations are at the center of this book. I explore the struggles over 
the meaning of violence against women during the first fifteen years of the post-
Taliban order in Afghanistan and their implications for gender and power. The 
rest of the introduction lays out the analytical departure points of the book. I start 
by showing how definitions of violence against women in a given context serve as 
windows into gender relations and how the construction of certain abuses against 
women as private—and therefore beyond the law and political intervention— 
establishes a hierarchical gendered relationship in which women are placed under 
the sovereign power of male family members. I then argue that attempts to define 
and govern gender violence also illuminate broader fields of power, such as the 
regulatory power of the state. However, I suggest that the separate, discreet units of 
analysis in much of the literature on gender and governance—whether “the state,” 
“the global,” or “the tribal”—is misleading in the Afghan case. Instead, I present 
transnational assemblages of rule as a more useful concept to capture the forms of 
power at work in contemporary Afghanistan. The final sections of the introduc-
tion provide the reader with an account of methodological choices and fieldwork 
trajectories and finally a discussion of some of the ethical pitfalls of doing research 
in post-2001 Afghanistan.
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AS ANALY TICAL  
ENTRY POINT S
This book is filled with people who sought in various ways to have their ideas 
about gender violence accepted by others. For some it was a matter of immediacy. 
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Young women would stand before a judge hoping to avoid a jail sentence—or 
even execution—by asserting that what had happened to them was rape or that 
they had acted within the limits of the law when escaping with a man or from an 
unwanted marriage. Grandmothers would make anxious calls to the local police, 
trying to convince them that they should arrest a runaway granddaughter. Fathers 
would look into a television camera, demanding to know where the honor of the 
country’s leaders had gone, since they were incapable of stopping the violation of 
schoolgirls. Other men would defend their right to conduct a marriage without 
the consent of the bride’s family, and yet others their right to kill a rebellious niece 
or to be compensated for a runaway wife.
For some of the people in this book, the issue of gender violence was a ques-
tion of principle rather than personal circumstance. In order to convince their 
colleagues that wife beating should be a punishable crime, some members of Par-
liament urged a less literalist interpretation of the Quran, while their opponents 
countered with warnings against the implications of straying away from the holy 
scriptures. As controversies over women’s shelters peaked, a journalist convinced 
of the self-serving ways of the NGO women who ran the shelters would attempt 
to discredit shelter residents as dangerous seductresses. Some shelter managers, in 
order to ensure their institutions’ independence from the government, appealed 
to Western fears of the Taliban, depicting a government takeover of the shelters as 
a first step toward conceding defeat to terrorism.
The structuring theme of this book is that whatever acts people consider or call 
violence (khoshonat in Dari, the Afghan dialect of Farsi) is always specific to and 
situated within a particular context. Violence, in English and in many other lan-
guages, connotes transgression and illegitimacy. Describing something as an act of 
violence suggests that it is a threat to the social, sexual, and political order and that 
it must be stopped, punished, or avenged. On the other hand, the nonrecognition 
of violent acts renders them unproblematic—or even, in some cases, necessary—
thereby permitting or sanctioning their continuation. Naming violence is there-
fore invested with great political importance, and it follows that categorizations of 
violence are not fixed; they are sites of contestation (Merry 2009).
Applied specifically to gender, this perspective means that delineations or defi-
nitions of violence against women in a given historical context are entry points to 
the gender relations in that context. Feminist analysis has long pointed out how 
the construction of a private/public dichotomy in which certain abuses against 
women are considered private (and therefore beyond the law and political inter-
vention) in effect establishes a hierarchical gendered relationship (Schneider 1991). 
I propose that the concept of sovereignty is useful for appreciating this relation-
ship. As Comaroff and Comaroff write, “We take the word sovereignty to connote 
the more or less effective claims on the part of any agent, community, cadre or 
collectivity to exercise autonomous, exclusive control over the lives, deaths, and 
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conditions of existence of those who fall within a given purview, and to extend 
over them the jurisdiction of some kind of law” (2006: 35).
When violence and even murder of women at the hands of their husband or 
family are considered permissible, women are effectively placed under their sover-
eignty, rather than under the sovereignty of public authorities, such as the state. In 
this sense, a form of what Humphrey calls a “localized sovereignty, nested within 
higher sovereignties” but “nevertheless retaining a domain within which control 
over life and death is operational” is granted to the household head (2004: 420). 
The feminist analysis and activism aimed at making violence against women a 
public issue have thereby been mounting a challenge to the sovereign claim of 
families over women. Indeed, the very act of naming an act as a violation against 
someone other than the family sovereign signifies a challenge to absolute sover-
eignty, as it names other people as holders, or partial holders, of rights. This is also 
the case with violations carried out by people outside the family. The framing of 
sexual violence as an offense against a woman, as opposed to an offense against 
her husband or father, constitutes women as legal persons to whom other sover-
eigns hold obligations, and it potentially signifies a radical transformation of gen-
der relations. As we shall see, the contestations over gender violence taking place 
in Afghanistan embodied these competing claims of sovereignty at their heart. 
Families claimed sovereign rights over women—to preside over their marriage 
and sexuality and to sanction insubordination, sometimes through violent means. 
Counterclaims asserted women’s autonomous status and their right to make in-
dependent decisions and to make claims of damage against their own families or 
against others.
At this point in the discussion, however, it seems necessary to deal with the 
fact that the term violence against women carries a historical baggage of its own. 
Since it moved to the center of transnational women’s activism in the early 1990s, 
violence against women (VAW) has become an established term and a particular 
discursive frame underpinning a global apparatus of action, intervention, and 
regulation. The emergence of VAW as an established phrase happened after femi-
nist activists around the world—who had set up shelters, counseling centers, and 
treatment programs for batterers (Merry 2009: 76) and launched antirape cam-
paigns—formed an international campaign to have violence against women de-
fined as a human rights violation. Their demand proved phenomenally successful. 
It resulted in a series of U.N. resolutions and declarations, the creation of a spe-
cial rapporteur on violence against women, the enumeration of certain kinds of 
sexual violence as serious crimes in international law, and the articulation of the 
principle of due diligence, which went some way in making states accountable for 
human rights violations inflicted on women by non-state actors, such as family 
and community groups (Saghal 2006). As Merry points out, within this universe, 
the meaning of VAW has expanded from “male violence against their partners in 
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the form of rape, assault and murder” to include “female genital mutilation/cut-
ting/excisions, gender-based violence by police and military forces in armed con-
flict as well as everyday life, violence against refugee women and asylum seekers, 
trafficking in sex workers, sexual harassment, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, 
forced sterilization, female foeticide and infanticide, early and forced marriage, 
honour killings and widowhood violations” (Merry 2009: 82). And as we will see 
later, the Afghan EVAW law decreed in 2009 listed many of these acts as violence 
and added a number of other acts more particular to Afghanistan, which many 
Afghan women considered a violation of their rights, entitlements, or persons, 
such as the cursing of a woman or even the denial of an existing familial or mari-
tal relationship that would absolve obligations toward a woman.1 In other words, 
the Afghan EVAW law was developed at the intersection of transnational and 
national registers.
As the global campaign against VAW moved to the center stage of international 
politics, it also, perhaps unsurprisingly, became entangled in existing global power 
structures. With the shift from national to global advocacy came a more profes-
sionalized, bureaucratic mode of operation, standardized programs and compli-
ance mechanisms, and the arrival of international “VAW experts.” In an influential 
article, Kapur (2002) scrutinizes the political effects of this global VAW discourse, 
noting that it rose to international prominence through the obfuscation of the 
power relations positioning Westerners, white women, and feminists differently 
from ethnic minorities and women in the Global South. It constructed women 
of the Global South and nonwhite women who are subjected to violence or abuse 
as victims of their culture and in need of (outside) protection. Kapur argues that 
this effectively amounts to a kind of gender and cultural essentialism that can-
not  accommodate the different positions that nonwhite women and women in 
the Global South inhabit, or take into account the historically specific forms that 
violence against them assume. It is difficult to think of an example of this more 
glaring than Afghanistan since 2001. Western claims to “liberate Afghan women” 
while entangled in the geopolitical interests driving the war on terror, exhibited 
many of the traits that Kapur warns against. Afghan women were frequently rep-
resented as victims in need of outside saving, trapped in a backward state, and 
suffering what the West knew to be violence and abuse—violence that occurred as 
part of Islam or Afghan culture.
Examining the employment and effects of such “victimisation rhetoric” ( Kapur 
2002) is integral to the analysis in this book, but a clarification nonetheless feels 
necessary. Stating that the book is about “violence against women” does not mean 
it places itself uncritically into the VAW discourse. I do not assume the existence 
of a fixed or absolute set of practices that await recognition as violence against 
women. This would suggest an endpoint of liberation and inevitably place coun-
tries along an axis of development or civilization, enabling the kind of global 
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hierarchies Kapur draws to our attention. Instead, my aim is to examine compet-
ing claims made during a particular historical setting about the nature of certain 
practices and to examine whether they are regarded as violence or transgressions 
and, if so, against whom and with what consequences.
But while the book is not an attempt to uncritically reproduce the VAW dis-
course, it is also not a bid for relativism. I recognize the hierarchies generated 
by the VAW discourse and also believe that it is neither possible nor desirable to 
define, once and for all, out of context, and somehow prior to power relations, the 
exact register of actions that would constitute violence against women. I neverthe-
less maintain that this insight should not make us blind to the fact that, in a given 
context, the nonrecognition of certain practices as violence can become a blue-
print for impunity and can be a symptom of unequal gender relations. Thus, it is 
the struggle over the meanings of violence against women in a specific period and 
context—and their implications for gender and power—that this book explores.
A final clarification. Throughout the book, I use the terms violence against 
women and gender violence interchangeably when referring to the empirical fo-
cus of my research—abuses committed against women. However, I recognize that 
each term is imprecise. As I have argued, violence against women is a categoriza-
tion of an event or practice connoting transgression or violation, but it is also an 
established activist and policy discourse with particular political logics and effects. 
Gender violence, on the other hand, has come to delimit a field that comprises 
violence against women plus sexual violence against men. This is problematic in 
so far as it suggests that only certain forms of violence are gendered, when, in real-
ity, all social practices have gendered dimensions (although some acts and events 
might have starker gender dimensions than others). In this book I use gender vio-
lence to refer to injuries inflicted only on women, but this usage is merely a practi-
cal matter—I do not wish to suggest that men cannot be on the receiving end of 
violence enabled by, or in response to violations of, gender orders.
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND BROADER  
FIELDS OF POWER
As the discussion has already hinted at, definitions of and negotiations over vio-
lence against women are not just entry points to looking at gender relations. They 
also illuminate other fields of power. As Hajjar points out, struggles over women’s 
rights are also contestations over jurisdiction and authority (2004). Attempts to 
make gender violence a public issue could signify an important shift in the demar-
cation between the private domain of family and kinship on one hand and public 
authorities on the other. For instance, if a rape case is adjudicated in a state court 
rather than settled between the families involved or by a local leader or kinship 
group that traditionally settles disputes, this expands (or attempts to expand) the 
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domain of the state—whether by conscious political strategy or as an unintended 
by-product. A large body of literature on the Middle East has, in fact, emphasized 
how rulers and states have attempted to break up kinship structures and assert 
state power by, for instance, promulgating family laws (Noelle-Karimi 2002;  Joseph 
2000; Kandiyoti 1991; Charrad 2001) or by taking over the policing of  female sexu-
ality from relatives and communities (Baron 2006). The attempts by successive 
Afghan rulers to curtail bride-price2 and forbid child marriage  espoused similar 
agendas (see chapter 1).
Yet, what exactly does it mean to say that gender violence is transferred from 
a private or non-state realm to a “state domain”? As legal anthropologists, in par-
ticular, have reminded us, state power or “the state” is a tricky concept. Claims to 
act on behalf of the state should not lead us to assume the actual existence of a 
monolithic, unitary state (T. Mitchell 1999). And in sites of global intervention like 
Afghanistan, stark transnational aspects to statehood mean that the notion of the 
“state” as a unitary actor wielding ultimate sovereign power over a territory makes 
even less sense. As is clear to even a casual observer of post-2001 Afghanistan, 
Western powers played a fundamental role in structuring Afghan statehood—to 
the extent that international actors explicitly tasked themselves with the wholesale 
building of the Afghan state. With this in mind, it is far from certain that the power 
exercised in a government court—for instance, if an Afghan man is prosecuted for 
rape or wife beating—is that of the Afghan state. As I will discuss in some detail 
in the chapters that follow, the ways in which the Afghan state intervened in cases 
of gender violence was often underwritten, funded, and even designed by global, 
mostly Western actors, suggesting that the sovereign power exercised in Afghan 
courts was partly global. At the same time, the economic and political resources 
flowing from the international interventions often constituted opportunities for 
local actors to exercise and consolidate power in ways unintended by the interna-
tional “state builders.”
It makes sense, then, to understand sites of international peace-building in-
terventions as “fields of power where sovereignty is constantly contested and ne-
gotiated among global, elite and local actors” (Heathershaw and Lambach 2008: 
269). In this vein, challenges to and negations of the nation-state (the sovereign) 
in (post-)conflict settings are best conceived not as from below or above (that is, 
from local or global sources), but as parallel or alternative alignments that often 
are transnationally woven. In order to make sense of the ways the global, the na-
tional, and what might be termed the tribal are entangled in Afghanistan, I draw 
upon Saskia Sassen’s concept of assemblages (Sassen 2008: 67; Heathershaw 2011). 
She argues that thinking in terms of assemblages allows us to appreciate that the 
global can be “dressed in the clothes of the national” (Sassen 2011). In other words, 
Sassen underlines how national institutional capabilities are reassembled to serve 
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global projects. Rather than an image of national versus supranational sovereignty 
as a zero-sum game in which globalization means the “withdrawal of the state 
at the hands of the global system” (Sassen 2008: 65), Sassen advocates thinking 
in terms of specialized orderings—assemblages that produce a standardized, but 
partial, global domain through national institutions. As I try to show in this book, 
this “partialness” of global influence was both a resource for and a constraint to 
local women’s rights activists.
Claims about gender violence can do more than reveal gender relations and 
sovereign domains. They also constitute maps to broader ideological and political 
fields. The actors who made the claims and counterclaims about gender violence 
in Afghanistan articulated rights, entitlements, and obligations with reference 
to larger political narratives and ideological resources in ways that they thought 
would resonate with their audiences.
I suggest that these discursive strategies—and to what extent they gained 
 traction—reveal broader fields of power—constituted by established social prac-
tices and repertoires of meaning, as well as more temporal political alignments. 
When, for instance, women in Parliament made careful attempts to boost their 
defense of the EVAW law by referring to sharia, their strategy revealed not only the 
enduring prominence of Islamic jurisprudence in the legal landscape of Afghani-
stan but also the current political dominance of the mujahedin,3 whose creden-
tials were closely linked to Afghanistan’s foremost identity being an Islamic one. 
Similarly, the ability of a local journalist to discredit women’s shelters by conjuring 
up images of corrupt and self-serving female activists who invoked the plight of 
poor women for their own financial benefit reflected an overall disillusion with 
the international aid industry and a skepticism toward “Westernized” women and 
their foreign allies, all of it given political force by the experience of a prolonged 
but ineffective external aid and military presence.
Often, however, the strategy in matters of gender violence was not one pursued 
by making daring public claims, but by calling in favors, discreet lobbying, and 
personal connections. Officials at the Afghan Independent Human Rights Com-
mission (AIHRC), having failed to build up domestic human rights constituency 
that could have been mobilized in individual cases, often chose to develop close 
relationships with government officials so that they could at least extract certain 
favors.4 Its international ally, the United Nations, often chose similarly discreet 
tactics. When a high-ranking government official seemed destined to be acquitted 
of the rape of a young girl who had fled her family and had been under his protec-
tion, UN staff chose to make a quiet phone call to the local governor rather than 
a public appeal for justice. These discursive and tactical maneuvers, and the level 
of their success, chart the political and ideological landscapes in  Afghanistan and 
show the space that various actors perceived was at their disposal.
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STUDYING POWER THROUGH THE  
“AFGHAN WOMAN”
One of the chief aims of the book is to make a contribution to the field of Afghan 
gender studies by demonstrating that the study of gender in Afghanistan illumi-
nates central questions pertaining to governance, sovereignty, and power. Perhaps 
one of the most politicized figures of global affairs in the last two decades, the 
“Afghan woman” is saturated with connotations. In a series of homogenizing rep-
resentations, she has been invoked both as a victim whose circumstances necessi-
tated bombing raids and military operations and as a haunting symbol of Western 
imperialism.5 Her circumstances and appearance are constantly noted and made 
to serve as an indicator of diverse political assertions—the hypocritical hollowness 
of Western rhetoric, the backwardness of Afghan culture, or Afghanistan’s foreign 
contamination. Funds are raised in her name, and numerous reports are devoted 
to give her a voice and uncover her true views. Those who can claim this identity 
have also learned to utilize its potential for mobilizing power. Claiming to speak as 
an “Afghan woman” to international media outlets can be a shortcut to influence 
in a setting where most other political channels have been closed off by violence 
and militarization.
Yet despite the many ways in which the “Afghan woman” has become a pur-
veyor of broader political claims, the scholarly literature on the intersections of 
gender, power, and politics in Afghanistan is scarce. More recent literature tends 
to be based on textual examination of Western discourses in which the situation 
of Afghan women serves to legitimate domination or invasion (Schueller 2011; 
 Stabile 2005; Ayotte and Husain 2005; Abu-Lughod 2002). On the other hand, 
contributions that elaborate on more localized relations of gender and power typi-
cally do so only as a side pursuit and often subscribe to a conceptualization of 
 Afghan society as consisting of separate orders locked into a perpetual struggle 
over the control of women. For instance: “Rural Afghanistan is the root of tribally 
powers that have frequently doomed Kabul-based modernization efforts. Social 
traditionalism and economic underdevelopment of rural Afghanistan have repeat-
edly contested the center (Kabul), thus a better understanding of tribal controlled 
areas is essential to empower women in these regions. For women in rural Af-
ghanistan, control over their lives and gender roles is determined by patriarchal 
kinship arrangements” (Ahmed-Ghosh 2003).
Quotes like this conjure up a spatial map of gender and power in Afghani-
stan. The central state resides in the capital and urban centers—enclaves of female 
emancipation—whereas the majority of women are hidden away in the deepest 
corners of tribalism in faraway villages and forts, kept out of reach by their men-
folk and shielded from the grasp of government, modern law, and individualism. 
There is also an evolutionary dimension to this spatial optic; the gender order of 
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the tribe is expected to gradually wither away as it comes into contact with the 
more modern state. Such notions reflect a tendency in studies of Afghanistan to 
infer from separate realms (in the sense of boundaries made, and thus in need of 
constant, active maintenance) the existence of separate, discreet “logics,” or in the 
terminology of Edwards, different “moral systems” (Edwards 1996).6 More  recent 
work has slowly started to discard this framework (Coburn 2011; Green 2008; 
Sharan and Heathershaw 2011; Edwards 2002), instead approaching power and 
governance as hybrid and contingent on context. However, as the Ahmed-Ghosh 
quote above shows, notions of self-contained and insulated governance and politi-
cal orders continue to hold sway in the limited scholarship on gender and politics 
in Afghanistan (for exceptions, see Kandiyoti 2007; and Billaud 2015).
This book attempts to address this gap by carrying out a study of women and 
power in Afghanistan that applies an open-ended, practice-oriented perspective 
through ethnographic examinations on statehood and authority—an approach that 
has especially been seen in studies on sub-Saharan Africa (Lund 2006;  Bertelsen 
2009; Comaroff and Comaroff 2006; Comaroff and Comaroff 2009; Hansen and 
Stepputat 2006; Hagmann and Péclard 2010). This open-ended  approach enables 
me to make transnationally constituted assemblages of rule visible and available 
for analysis, and it allows me to accommodate complex governance orders that 
transcend dichotomies of tradition and modernity, or of the global and the local. 
For instance, the need to go beyond the binary of tradition and modernity is il-
lustrated by the many incidences in this book where ideas of personal or family 
honor are seen to have affected government processes within the state apparatus—
as opposed to honor being a tribal value incongruent with modern state gover-
nance. Similarly, I go beyond dichotomies of the global versus the local by showing 
how global templates and agendas did not simply displace local ones but instead 
created unique and new dynamics in which, for instance, international diplomatic 
pressure and Afghan personalized politics reinforced each other.
The book also aims to add to the comparative feminist scholarship on women, 
law, and power, a field in which Afghanistan has received little, if any, systematic 
consideration.7 Rather than taking the field of family law as the starting point, the 
book centers on criminal law by making definitions of gender violence the topic 
of inquiry. In this sense, this book is also a contribution to feminist analysis of 
criminal law, which has been relatively sparse in the area of countries with Islamic 
legal traditions (Zuhur 2005).8 More generally, I have sought to bring the issue of 
gender in Afghanistan into closer dialogue with the rich literature on gender in the 
Middle East, which, over the last three decades, has illuminated the great varieties 
of gender relations and government practices across time and space in Muslim-
majority countries, and which has made important points about the imperative 
of seeing gender relations as historically specific, rather than as derivatives of 
religion or culture (Abu-Lughod 1998; Meriwether and Tucker 1999; Kandiyoti 
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1996; Tucker 2008; Kandiyoti 1991; Keddie and Baron 1991). In addition, a vibrant 
scholarship on gender justice and the limits of law as a tool of empowerment has 
emerged from South Asia in recent years (Basu 2015; Agnes and Ghosh 2012; 
 Roychowdhury 2016; Roychowdhury 2015; Vatuk 2013). I apply the insights of this 
literature to place the efforts against gender violence in Afghanistan in a compara-
tive perspective, again seeking to counter the exceptional status often  bestowed on 
the country in academic discourse.
Finally, this book has also, in many ways, heeded Abu-Lughod’s call to explore 
“the social life of Muslim women’s rights” in order to “track carefully, across mul-
tiple terrains, the way both practices and talk of rights organize social and political 
fields, producing organizations, projects, and forms of governing as much as being 
produced by them” (2010: 32–33).
Given the enormous attention they have been afforded over the last decade, it is 
not at all surprising that Afghan women’s rights have been pressed into the service 
of international and local agendas of various kinds: war, careers, and the accumu-
lation of aid money, to mention a few. But the relationship between the “Afghan 
woman” question and practices of power need not always be so obvious or instru-
mental. In attempts to secure women in Afghanistan protection against gender 
violence, ambiguous victories, curious alliances, and novel hierarchies  often ma-
terialized. These more subtle and mostly unspoken dynamics, which Abu-Lughod 
(2010) calls attention to, form part of the discussion in the book.
RESEARCH TR AJECTORIES
Afghanistan during the first decade and a half after the fall of Taliban in 2001 
was a place of sharp fault lines and cleavages; of constant contest over the criteria 
through which power, authority, and the control over resources could be claimed; 
and of much anxiety about carving out a place in the new order. Moral universes, 
political repertoires, and hierarchies of knowledge and skills were of uncertain 
validity as old elites and newly assertive groups vied for position. Many Afghans 
returned from exile, including members of the former ruling classes, royalists, and 
old business and landowning families who had fled to neighboring countries, as 
well as Western-based diasporas armed with academic qualifications and bilin-
gual fluency that suddenly were hugely marketable. The returnees were faced with 
newly powerful military commanders backed up with Western cash and arms 
and their self-assured young followers—and with an Islamic clergy who had seen 
their unprecedented influence and prestige under the Taliban government turn to 
dust with the new post-2001 order (Giustozzi 2008). By the middle of the decade, 
war was regaining pace. Explosions, assassinations, and raids fractured everyday 
life, throwing up uncertainty about the daring official declarations of a new be-
ginning and the future shape and direction of the country. As NATO countries 
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gradually realized that the country they had invaded in 2001 was sliding off the 
course they had staked out, their response was basically to accelerate everything. 
Money, troops, diplomats, and military operations flowed into Afghanistan in spi-
raling numbers, typically intensifying conflict lines, incentivizing the pillaging of 
resources, and increasing the devastation of war.
The research for this book started out as a PhD project. I arrived in Afghanistan 
for my initial fourteen months of fieldwork in the summer of 2009, in what prom-
ised to be a turbulent context for research. Like many of my informants, I would 
often get the feeling that at any moment, the rug could be pulled from underneath 
the universe we were inhabiting. It was clear that the country would not be an 
appropriate setting for bounded ethnography, in which much time is spent devel-
oping intimate relationships with a limited group of people in a small locality. In-
stead, my research would take the form of “mobile ethnography” (Marcus 1995). In 
pursuit of answers to how gender violence were defined, contested, and regulated 
in Afghanistan, I intended to trace a range of different cases and processes as they 
moved from one site to the next: court rooms, Parliament, official meetings and 
conferences, local councils, shelters, media forums, and a host of other settings.
My decision to draw upon the extended case method as a framework for data 
collection was partly influenced by my intention to follow processes from site to 
site. The extended case method, developed by the so-called Manchester school of 
anthropology, uses a case (a case being defined as an event or a process) as a way 
of casting light upon a particular society—or, more accurately, upon the social 
relations that are actualized in a particular context (Gluckman 1965; Velsen 1964; 
J. C. Mitchell 1956; Handelman 2005; Burawoy 2000). A case is a departure point 
from which one can “extend out”—bring social relations into view and available 
for analysis. This method, whose script was to follow events over time from one 
setting to another, resonated with my approach to use contestations over violence 
against women as windows into relations of gender, governance, and politics. 
Moreover, the extended case method provides a lens suitable for capturing the 
transnational dimensions of local practices. At a time when ethnography was of-
ten preoccupied with unearthing the underlying structure of what was assumed 
to be self-contained local communities, the 1950s anthropologists who pioneered 
the extended case method distinguished themselves from their contemporaries 
by looking at events as both locally and globally constituted. As Burawoy pro-
claims when explaining how the Manchester school would make global class rela-
tions and colonial history integral to their analysis of the practices of Zulu chiefs: 
“There never was any isolated tribe here!” (Burawoy 2000: 16). The importance of 
exploring both local and transnational aspects of the events and processes I was 
 studying—whether debates over a new law, controversies over women “running 
away” from home, or the trajectory of an individual episode of gender violence—
became one of my guiding principles.
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As I began fieldwork in 2009, I started by establishing how cases of gender 
violence typically encountered the legal system and how they traveled through 
it. Little in-depth literature on the practices of the Afghan legal system existed, 
and developments over the previous two decades were particularly hazy.9 Through 
these efforts, I also hoped to be able to eventually identify the cases of gender vio-
lence that would serve as the cornerstone of my material. I had thought that U.N. 
organizations in the human rights field might serve as a useful entry to cases that 
I could study, but they proved reluctant to discuss concrete episodes. At the time, 
there were good reasons for this. Much of the human rights community was shak-
en by the recent murder of Dilawar, the husband of the victim in a high- profile 
rape case. In a horrifying ordeal, his wife, Sarah, had been sexually abused and 
made to walk half-naked through her village after questioning a local commander 
and government ally about the disappearance of her son. Although the perpetra-
tors of the abuse had been convicted, two of them were quickly freed through a 
presidential pardon. Sarah and Dilawar went to Kabul to pursue the case, and the 
local office of the U.N. human rights section played an important role in the public 
outcry that had followed, which had forced President Karzai to review the pardon. 
But the case took another sinister turn when Dilawar was murdered. The local 
U.N. human rights section realized they were becoming increasingly marginalized 
in a political climate where—both internally in the U.N. mission and externally 
in the country—realpolitik increasingly overrode accountability and legal proce-
dures. In such a situation, it was not surprising that they were reluctant to share 
information with me.
However, in the summer of 2009, women’s rights activists in Kabul and their 
international colleagues were preoccupied with two new pieces of legislation: the 
Shia Personal Status Law and the EVAW law. The Shia law, as it was widely called, 
had created an uproar among many women activists and politicians, as well as 
among Western embassies and public opinion, when it was ratified by the presi-
dent in March 2009. Presented as a recognition of the Shia minority’s right to ad-
judicate according to the sect’s jurisprudence, the law contained what was widely 
felt to be an excessive codification of personal life, in many ways representing a 
rolling back of the rights in the existing Civil Code and certainly reversing the 
momentum in women’s rights since the 2001 invasion. Despite protests both in 
Afghanistan and abroad, a revised version of the law (with many of its problematic 
provisions remaining) was signed into force by the president on July 19, 2009. A 
few days later, this setback was the subject of heated debate at a meeting of Kabul-
based women’s activists, both Afghan and foreign, that was called in response to 
the new law, and which I observed.
The discussions and atmosphere at the meeting appeared to reveal a women’s 
movement fractured by diverging discursive reference points, by multiple modes 
of organizing and ideas about advocacy or lobbying, and by parallel reporting lines 
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and constituencies. Most striking was the confusion and uncertainty regarding the 
legal framework. The participants at the meeting were trying to establish which 
law took precedence: the Constitution, the existing Civil Code, the newly decreed 
Shia law, or the EVAW law, which had been signed by the president on the same 
day. These laws contained contradictory implications for, among other things, re-
strictions on polygamy and the legal age of marriage. It took me some time to 
realize that the confusion I witnessed was not due to lack of preparation for the 
meeting, due to how hastily it had been organized, but it reflected two important 
aspects of the post-2001 legal reform process: a great opaqueness in the legislative 
process and contradictions within the rapidly expanding body of law itself.
The EVAW law, which many of the activists pinned their hopes on, enumerated 
twenty-two crimes as violence against women, stipulated their punishments, and 
outlined government responsibility (see chapter 2). It was to be introduced for 
ratification in Parliament that autumn. With my Afghan colleague Orzala Ashraf 
Nemat, with whom I was working on another project, I attended the initial debates 
in the Joint Commission meetings in Parliament, where the law was being dis-
cussed before being introduced in the plenary. This required considerable effort, 
and the help and goodwill of many members of Parliament (MPs). Parliamentary 
debates were generally not transcribed, not even plenary debates, and the pro-
ceedings of the Joint Commission were certainly not. In order to be present in 
Joint Commission discussions, we were dependent on MPs to sign us in as visitors 
and—equally crucial—to inform us of when and where the meetings would be 
scheduled. Often, meetings were called at the last minute, as a deliberate strategy 
to ensure that certain people were there (and that certain others were not). There 
was always a chance that we could be told to leave the room. MPs had the oppor-
tunity to invite guests, and many of them did, but this sometimes led to contro-
versies, when the guests intervened in discussions. Although the parliamentary 
process for the EVAW law was eventually abandoned, I continued to follow the 
law by attending various conferences in which it was debated and by tracing how it 
entered the agenda of the numerous workshops and training courses that made up 
the extensive network of donor-driven gender activism (Kandiyoti 2009), which 
was by then fairly institutionalized in the country.
Meanwhile, I found a very useful source of information in a handful of legal aid 
organizations, whose staff generously shared information about how they worked 
on incidents of violence against women and the typical trajectories of such cases—
from police investigations through to the courts. They also alerted me to cases 
they themselves thought were significant or interesting, and I started to follow 
these up. At this point, I was fortunate to have a research assistant, Mohammad 
Jawad  Shahabi, who was then a student in the Faculty of Law at Kabul University 
and who would later become a long-term research partner. In pursuit of these 
individual cases, Jawad and I traveled, certainly not across the country, but to a 
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good portion of the provinces that were considered stable enough for us to visit. 
Two of the cases I eventually decided to include in this book were from Taliban-
controlled districts out of reach for the Afghan government as well as for me. Here 
I sought the help of two local researchers, who carried out some of the interviews. 
The material they gathered was then crosschecked and supplemented by other 
interviews, largely by phone, to local government officials, journalists, and others.
Few of the women at the center of the individual cases discussed in chapters 5 
and 6 were interviewed. Some of them were dead, and others were imprisoned 
or had male family members who insisted on speaking on their behalf. It is the 
stories narrated by those around them, a web of information often contradictory 
and certainly disputed, that constitutes the material for my analysis in this sec-
tion of the book. The focus of the interviews was to try to reconstruct particular 
events retrospectively, to establish what had taken place and what had been said. 
These accounts of what had happened were narrated by various informants and 
were therefore shaped by their particular views, but because data was triangulated 
through the interviewing of multiple informants, it was possible to establish some 
kind of chronology of events (the sequence of what had happened and what was 
said when) and to sort out the multiple readings of what had taken place (what was 
contested and what was generally or universally agreed upon).
From one perspective, the exclusion of the women themselves as informants 
can be seen as a weakness in the analysis of these cases. On the other hand, it 
would have been problematic to ask about—and reveal—intimate material from 
the women themselves in episodes that had already gained widespread publicity. It 
was also this publicity that generated so many divergent claims and narratives, and 
which made for a richer material to draw upon for analysis. After a while, I also 
developed some skepticism about the way in which certain women were offered 
to me as interview objects. Some shelter staff, for instance, would, on their own 
initiative, offer visitors, including me, free access to their residents, accompanied 
by the encouragement: “ask her whatever you want.” While making use of some 
of these “opportunities” might make for captivating stories (A. J. Rubin 2015), it 
would also raise some questions about consent and voyeuristic writing.
It was a stay in the city of Herat, after some months of fieldwork in Kabul, that 
alerted me to the maneuverings by women’s shelters, a new institution in Afghani-
stan. The shelters provided temporary accommodation for women who, for vari-
ous reasons, could not or did not want to live with their families. These shelters 
were under constant scrutiny for allegedly undermining family and morality by 
encouraging women to leave their families and husbands. For women to live in 
a nonfamilial setting—except for arrangements like university dormitories—was 
generally unheard-of in Afghanistan. The shelters were a radical development. 
However, because adultery—and, according to some legal interpretations, “run-
ning away from home”—was criminalized in Afghanistan, the shelters were not 
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only facing the outrage of conservative groups. They were also accused of hous-
ing criminals. In Herat, I was informed that, on this basis, women who could not 
prove that they had not committed adultery (i.e., women who had not come di-
rectly from their family homes to the shelters or government authorities—perhaps 
because they spent one or more nights with more distant relatives or in a hotel) 
would not be admitted to the shelter in the city. Attempts on my part to find out 
whether this was a universal policy among the dozen or so shelters across the 
country led me to probe them further as institutions, which revealed how they 
operated in a curious transnational space, navigating between international sup-
port and local skepticism.
Some months after my initial departure from Afghanistan, a controversy erupt-
ed that brought these tensions into sharp relief. The minister of women’s affairs de-
clared her intention to put all shelters, currently run by NGOs, under government 
control and to establish committees at the provincial level to decide whether indi-
vidual women were qualified to enter the shelters. The NGOs and women’s rights 
activists who ran the shelters protested, outraged by what they saw as government 
encroachment on their territory, with severe consequences for women’s protec-
tion. During another visit to Kabul, in the spring of 2011, I retraced this chapter in 
the ongoing controversy around the shelters. By then, a well-organized campaign 
carried out by Afghan activists and international supporters had succeeded in re-
versing the minister’s decision, and it appeared as if the shelters would be able to 
continue their tenuous existence for the time being.
Doing research in “official” Afghanistan was not straightforward. My efforts to 
contact the Supreme Court in order to obtain statistics on convictions and similar 
documentation bore little fruit. Sometimes even setting up interviews with judg-
es was a challenge. Then, in 2013, after a research project commissioned by the 
World Bank had revealed systemic corruption in the courts, the Supreme Court 
proceeded to ban all Afghan judges from talking to researchers without a written 
permission from its top officials. Legal documents and rulings were generally not 
made available to the public and were frequently little more than loose notes in an 
official’s drawer, if they existed at all. It often appeared as if information was a re-
source to be carefully guarded and to be given away only in a transaction of mutual 
benefit, whether in the form of other information or promises of future favors. As I 
sought to speak to specific individuals connected to a particular case or process— 
whether these individuals were family members, journalists, legal and government 
officials, aid workers, or politicians, many of whom were very busy—it sometimes 
took weeks, even months, and long chains of introductions to set up a particu-
lar interview. Appointments could be repeatedly cancelled, especially when ex-
plosions, attacks, or other security threats temporarily closed down government 
buildings, led to road closures, or resulted in staff in international organizations 
being ordered into several days of lock down. A few people declined to meet me 
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altogether, such as certain high-ranking government officials like the speaker of 
Parliament and the chief justice. On the other hand, many people were extremely 
generous with their time and often agreed to multiple interviews.
Upon completing my PhD, I returned to Afghanistan with regular intervals. 
Then, in 2014, I embarked upon a two-year stay in Kabul to work on a project 
funded by the Norwegian Research Council on the prosecution of violence against 
women. The project was a collaboration between my home institution, the Chr. 
Michelsen Institute, and the Kabul-based Research Institute for Women, Peace, 
and Security. Two Afghan researchers and I formed a core team of three. Our task 
was to produce more precise data on the numbers and types of cases of violence 
against women exiting the criminal justice system, which we hoped would lead 
to a better understanding of why so few cases resulted in a criminal conviction. 
Although my two Afghan colleagues, Mohammad Jawad Shahabi and Farangis 
Elyassi, did much of the day-to-day data collection, upon which our joint publi-
cations are based (Shahabi and Wimpelmann 2015; Shahabi, Wimpelmann, and 
Elyassi 2016), they have generously allowed me to use some of the material for 
chapter 3 of this book.
That chapter details the everyday workings of the specialized unit for prosecu-
tion of violence against women in Kabul, based on long-term observation in the 
unit over seven months in 2015. The unit had been set up through donor funds 
and with the intention of strengthening the implementation of the EVAW law, 
although its achievement in this regard would prove quite ambiguous. Farangis 
Elyassi, a recent law graduate, sat for months in the special prosecution units for 
violence against women in Kabul, among the constant comings and goings of 
complainants and their families. Most of the time she would be in one of the two 
investigators’ offices, where several groups of complainants, suspects, and witness-
es would be interviewed by the prosecutors at any one time. Together we would 
review her field notes on a weekly and sometimes daily basis, producing a gradual 
understanding of the workings of the prosecution unit and whether it could be 
said to be functioning according to its official purpose.
In this period, I also undertook some additional research on the gendered 
workings of the justice system during two periods about which there is very little 
documentation: the years of Soviet and Taliban rule. Covering these periods com-
prehensively would be worthy of several separate book projects. The material I 
collected by interviewing former judges, prosecutors, and scholars forms part of 
chapter 1 in the book and amounts to a very modest contribution.
ETHICAL PITFALLS OF RESEARCH IN AFGHANISTAN
When I started my fieldwork in the summer of 2009, NATO’s warfare in  Afghanistan 
was about to reach its most intensive period, and the country occupied a prime 
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place in the foreign policy agenda of most Western countries. The Obama admin-
istration was coming to terms with the fact that it had inherited a costly and dete-
riorating war, and it reinvigorated its efforts to “understand” Afghanistan and the 
conflict. Western media interest in the country was intense, and research reports 
and commentary were produced in abundance. As a foreign researcher in the 
midst of—and, to a certain extent, operating on the back of—the Western military 
operation in Afghanistan, I was also implicated in this knowledge-intervention 
nexus.
Research in a setting like contemporary Afghanistan, where so many careers 
have emerged out of a sudden imperial rush to understand, map, and transform 
the country, can quickly appear exploitative. An obvious aspect of this is that 
much, if not most, of the scholarly work has been produced by foreign research-
ers, often with limited linguistic skills and during brief fieldwork. I myself only 
speak and read Dari with some level of fluency, and I still prefer to use an inter-
preter for more abstract or technical conversations. Like many of my non-Afghan 
colleagues, I have relied extensively on Afghan colleagues for translation and for 
company when traveling outside of Kabul. As more Afghans obtain PhDs—like 
several of my close colleagues over the years—the relationship between Afghan 
and non-Afghan researchers might become somewhat more balanced. Yet the dis-
parities of global knowledge production, at the heart of which is unequal access 
to higher education and funds, look to remain in place for the foreseeable future.
At the same time, like Julie Billaud (2015), I do not see my research as an attempt 
at representing or giving voice to Afghan women or to provide a definite account 
of “Afghan reality.” That would, indeed, put questions of positionality and the right 
to speak for “the other” into even sharper relief. Rather, this book is a study of the 
particular dynamics and contradictions that emerged at the intersections of lo-
cal and transnational attempts to define and address gender violence, which were 
situated within a larger context of highly conflictual politics. But as I proceeded 
with my data collection, a dilemma nonetheless made itself felt. It was between, on 
the one hand, a position of solidarity to the victims of violence and those work-
ing to support them and on the other hand, a more problematizing stance toward 
the power relations that they were enmeshed in. For instance, when researching 
and writing about the controversies around the shelters (chapter 4)—and explor-
ing the hierarchies that their constitution as “transnational entities” dependent on 
Western support entailed—I sometimes felt uneasy about the way I was subjecting 
them to such critical examination. These were, after all, organizations providing an 
important service. As this book describes, shelters were often the only place where 
women fleeing abuse or an unwanted marriage could go. At times, it seemed petty 
to question their mobilization of Western funds and support when this obviously 
enabled them to offer shelter to women who had very few options. The uncompro-
mising stand of some of the shelters—enabled by the relative autonomy from the 
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government and Afghan society that their external support afforded them—also 
allowed them to accommodate a wider range of women, including women who 
might be excluded (as they were considered unworthy of protection) from shelters 
that were more in line with government policy. Refusing to compromise and push-
ing the boundaries of female propriety is an act of feminism, at least at face value. 
Should I not place myself squarely in solidarity with such a position?
Pointing out the trade-offs and shortcuts involved in the EVAW law accentuat-
ed similar ethical dilemmas. The EVAW law, as chapter 2 details, was promulgated 
and implemented in ways that were largely dependent on Western pressure and 
funds and that undermined the parliamentary process. The law was also technical-
ly flawed; in places it contradicted the rest of the legal framework, and it contained 
unclear legal terminology that would make it difficult for judges to implement it. 
Yet, as some women passionately argued, the EVAW law was a big achievement 
in many ways. Indeed, one high-level official in the Ministry of Women’s Affairs 
told me directly to “leave the EVAW law alone” and avoid drawing attention to the 
questions around its legal status—or even to the law’s existence. (The law had not 
been ratified by Parliament, and some of the law’s supporters felt that conservative 
MPs would never approve it anyway, so the best strategy would be to discretely 
withdraw the law from Parliament in order to avoid its explicit repeal.)
Both cases brought to the forefront the tension between examining gender vio-
lence and scrutinizing the broader power relations that activists, shelter manag-
ers, and others operated within. I did not want to belittle the gender violence in 
Afghanistan—or the sense of urgency and outrage that activists were trying to 
generate around it. But at the same time, I thought it important to problematize 
the choices and compromises made by the women’s rights advocates and the local 
and global power relations produced and maintained as a result. Of course, the 
latter can be a productive exercise also for activists—in the sense of engaging in 
reflective praxis. But I was not a fellow activist. I did not have a background as a 
feminist activist anywhere, certainly not in Afghanistan. I was a foreign researcher. 
In fact, I arrived to the field unprepared for the politics of feminism; I had not 
engaged much in conscious thinking about the different coalitions, imaginaries, 
and tactics that feminists employ—and disagree over—in the pursuit of women’s 
rights. Instead, the main fault line that I expected to encounter was between femi-
nists and their adversaries—those who sought to define gender violence in ways 
that reinforced patriarchal privileges or to explain it as a regrettable part of Afghan 
“culture.” I had not given much thought to the more internal dilemmas of feminist 
political praxis: the tensions between the immediate and the long run, between 
making broader coalitions or seizing the moment, even if it meant forming un-
comfortable alliances. But it was these questions around political strategy that in-
creasingly would come to occupy my thoughts.
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I found myself agonizing over an emerging conviction that real feminist gains 
could only be anchored in democratic political relations, but, at the same time, I 
could not see much possibility of this happening in Afghanistan. And at times I saw 
little interest among women in broader political mobilization or gaining indepen-
dence from external support. For many of my female informants, the important 
thing was to get the infrastructure in place that could ensure women a measure of 
protection from violence—and to do it immediately—even if this meant relying on 
Western pressure and funds. They sometimes pointed to the difficulties of more 
directly confronting the conservatives in their country, who commanded signifi-
cant power of intimidation. Although political violence against women was not 
all that widespread compared to settings such as U.S.-occupied Iraq, outspoken 
women always risked being labeled immoral or worse, which could cost them the 
support of their families and make them feel insecure.
To me—a citizen of a country where weighing your physical security against out-
spokenness and assertiveness was fairly inconceivable—taking a more critical ap-
proach to the strategies that the activists were using to further their goals sometimes 
felt like an exercise in academic indulgence. Up to a point, I have sought to resolve 
the dilemma I experienced between apolitical-ethical commitment and critical anal-
ysis by striving to be empathetic in my critique. As I elaborate in the conclusion, I 
cannot see any easy choices or infallible positions in the struggles that I write about. 
I have experienced for myself in Afghanistan how quickly and easily fear can make 
you conform. I recall how—especially during the first months of my research—my 
own anxiety was sometimes set in motion just by walking by myself for short stretch-
es in Kabul, and how my main strategy for overcoming this was to dress modestly 
and sometimes (often quite subconsciously) to adopt a posture of feminine deference 
when walking around, so as to signal respectability and conformance.
My own feelings of insecurity were, of course, rooted in a different kind of 
positionality than that of my Afghan informants. It was generated by my formal 
identity as a war-waging Westerner, a kind of occupiers’ or colonial paranoia, fu-
elled by rumors of kidnappings and attack plots. My endeavors to make myself as 
inconspicuous as possible by dressing modestly and acting discreetly was, in fact, 
mostly an attempt to set myself aside from the bad Westerners rather than from 
bad women. My point here is that the courage I sometimes needed to sum up 
to overcome such everyday apprehensions was miniscule compared to the fear-
lessness that many Afghans displayed when engaging in politics, travel, or just 
daily life. Therefore, if this book is to engage in critical analysis of Afghan femi-
nist politics, then it must do so with the acknowledgment that in contemporary 
 Afghanistan, the actors involved (and perhaps the author as well) were faced with 
a number of difficult dilemmas. No infallible choice was available—all options 
contained flaws of one kind or another.
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ORGANIZ ATION OF THE B O OK
The main body of the book is divided into three parts, each consisting of two 
chapters. The first part, “Legal Regimes,” examines the historical and contempo-
rary struggles over laws and legal regimes governing gender violence. It analyzes 
contestations over the substance and processes through which laws regulating 
gender violence were promoted, and the political projects in which these efforts 
were entangled.
Chapter 1 traces past attempts to achieve closer public regulation of sexuality 
and of abuses committed within the family and how these attempts were shaped by 
larger political agendas. It briefly introduces the reader to the first reforms, made 
by Afghan kings in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The  chapter 
then draws upon interviews with former leaders, judges, and other  officials to 
provide an account of how the issue of gender has been addressed in Afghani-
stan’s more recent history, especially during the communist (1978–92) and Taliban 
(1996–2001) eras. In the final part of the chapter, I dissect the contemporary legal 
landscape. I show how its fragmentary nature can be traced back to the multiple 
intersections of politics, justice, and gender of the past, while at the same time be-
ing a product of the political settlement of the post-2001 order.
Chapter 2 focuses on the law that would take center stage in gender politics 
in contemporary Afghanistan: the Elimination of Violence against Women law 
(EVAW law), decreed in the summer of 2009. The chapter explores the origins of 
the law, the tactics used to promote it, and the opposition it encountered in Parlia-
ment. Drawing upon several hundred interviews, observations of parliamentary 
sessions, activists’ meetings, and other fora, as well as unpublished legal drafts 
and written correspondence, it shows how the EVAW law was promoted through 
a transnational coalition in which global gender expertise and institutions inter-
sected with personalized and patrimonial local politics. The chapter shows how 
the partial status the law achieved—signed as presidential decree but never ap-
proved in Parliament—reflected the constant tension between three key aspects of 
the post-2001 order: foreign military operations, the rehabilitation of the mujahe-
din, and external attempts to promote Afghan women’s rights. Supporters of the 
law nonetheless mobilized a massive apparatus to see it implemented. As the next 
chapter of the book shows, however, the impact was limited.
The second part of the book, “New Protection Mechanisms,” examines how the 
novel protection infrastructure operated in practice, with a focus on the special-
ized prosecution units for violence against women and the women’s shelters. The 
analysis explores the type of alliances their supporters entered into, what kind of 
protection they could offer as a result, and to what extent these institutions chal-
lenged predominant gender relations.
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Chapter 3 describes how the specialized prosecution units were initially set up, 
with donor support, in the hope that they would prioritize cases of violence against 
women. Drawing upon a wealth of observational data, the chapter documents the 
everyday working of the prosecution unit in Kabul. It argues that, by and large, the 
unit did not function as donors intended. Many cases were closed prior to trial, 
sometimes because prosecutors were reluctant to pursue them, but sometimes 
because the victims or their families had other agendas altogether. Prosecutors, 
women, and their families bargained within a paradigm of gender norms in which 
women’s rehabilitation into the family unit and restoring sexual transgressions 
into the framework of marriage transactions were key reference points. In these 
cases, the special unit served to reaffirm the notion that acts of gender violence 
were family problems—not criminal cases belonging in the formal justice system. 
I suggest that this was a predictable outcome, given how the special prosecution 
units operated at the intersection of donor pressure, government indifference, and 
a lack of attention to (or disinterest in destabilizing) broader social relations that 
cast women’s existence outside of the family setting as deeply subversive.
Chapter 4 investigates a series of public controversies over women’s shelters. 
The shelters, by opening up a space where conventional forms of social regulation 
of women’s conduct could not reach, were seen as undermining family control 
over female sexuality. They encountered and sometimes collided with government 
practices that upheld family claims over women, such as the practice of detaining 
women who had “escaped from the house.” Eventually, amid a growing populist 
backlash that depicted the NGO-run shelters as part of a Western plot against fam-
ily, religion, and morality, the Afghan government made a bid to nationalize them. 
I argue that the shelters provide a stark example of how women served, on the one 
hand, as a marker for national sovereignty and religious purity and, on the other, 
as a litmus test of Western commitments to Afghan women. As Western acquies-
cence to the proposed nationalization of the shelters was equated with capitulat-
ing to the Taliban, the shelter issue was made into a question of military resolve, 
mobilizing an international outcry that eventually led the Afghan government to 
back down. Yet international support was a double-edged sword; it exposed the 
vulnerability of shelters as transnational entities. Western support gave the shelters 
considerable room to maneuver but, at the same time, left them with limited local 
anchorage and vulnerable to shifts in Western priorities.
The final part of the book, “Individual Cases,” explores the complex avenues of 
intervention and protection in Afghanistan through the trajectories of individual 
cases of gender violence. I probe the fault lines revealed in these episodes by asking: 
What exactly was acknowledged as violations or transgressions? Just as important-
ly, what was not? How did public institutions of various kinds become involved 
in dealing with these incidents? The answers to these questions reveal whether 
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gender violence has increasingly become a public issue in Afghanistan—and, if so, 
in what ways and with what consequences.
Chapter 5 details the stories of three women inhabiting the contested position 
that had implicated the shelters in so much controversy—that of the “runaway” 
woman. All the women discussed in this chapter had fled their families and the 
abuse inflicted on them. Based on more than hundred interviews with family and 
community members, local officials, journalists, and aid workers, the chapter 
traces the women’s fates and the many actors seeking to intervene in their cases. 
The chapter documents how justice institutions often became mechanisms for re-
inforcing kinship control over female sexuality but in tenuous ways, forged out of 
contingent struggles and alliances. The stories of the three runaways show how dif-
ficult it was for individual women to escape family abuse in a setting where female 
subversion of family control featured as a principal transgression. Even if it was 
possible for some women to receive a sympathetic hearing in a government court, 
the paths they had to take to escape from abusive situations typically involved dif-
ficult choices that left them irrevocably tainted in the eyes of their communities 
and the law itself.
Chapter 6 examines how the justice system dealt with cases of rape. Specifically, 
it looks at what appeared to be an unprecedented willingness by families to take 
rape cases to court, inquiring whether this meant a redrawing of relations of gen-
der and governance in Afghanistan, a redrawing brought upon a reluctant govern-
ment by mobilization from “below.” By examining a handful of highly publicized 
cases of rape—which were widely regarded as momentous in the way that they 
generated public demands for government action—I ask whether the new “open-
ness” surrounding rape in Afghanistan signaled a changed position for women. 
Would rape mean a violation of women’s bodily integrity—as opposed to an af-
front to their male relatives’ honor? I further ask whether we can gauge from these 
cases the contours of a stronger Afghan state. My answer to both questions is a 
qualified no. The chapter argues that the public claims in these cases were articu-
lated within “stable categories of gender” and sometimes directly as infringements 
of male honor. Moreover, through a detailed discussion of the aftermath of a rape 
case from northern Afghanistan, I show that the demands that the state punish 
the rapists were not necessarily a call for a stronger government role in regulating 
sexual violence. By situating the case in local and national power struggles, I dem-
onstrate how discourses of affronted honor can instead function as a vocabulary in 
struggles over access to state power, and in this case, in fact, they were implicated 





Afghanistan during the Karzai presidency (2001–14)—the setting of the greater 
part of the events in this book—evolved into a fairly extreme example of legal 
pluralism, with a number of legal systems functioning side by side. This plural-
ism was by design as well as by default and, in part, reflected the country’s tur-
bulent history of “state building.” The official legal framework was a patchwork 
of codified laws derived from sharia, secular laws, and uncodified Islamic juris-
prudence. Often, judges, prosecutors, and lawyers were uncertain about which 
laws took precedence, and at other times, they simply applied whatever applicable 
law they preferred. Naturally, this had great bearings on how gender violence was 
regulated. The meeting referred to in the introduction, at which local women’s 
rights activists and international aid workers attempted to get clarity on which 
laws trumped which after the president had signed the controversial Shia Personal 
Status Law, is a case in point. Not only did the meeting reveal an acute confu-
sion about which of the statutory laws—the 1970s Civil Code, the Shia law, or the 
EVAW law— overrode the others, but participants in the meeting also disagreed 
on the reference points for their arguments. Was it possible to counter the prob-
lematic provisions of the Shia law by reference to the human rights commitments 
in the new Constitution? Or would only arguments based on sharia suffice? The 
disagreement among expatriates was as strong as that between Afghans and in-
ternationals. When a Canadian advisor to the Ministry of Justice and advocate 
of feminist reinterpretations of sharia gave a lengthy explanation on why it was 
possible to make the case that the Shia law represented a regressive understanding 
of Islamic law, she was eventually interrupted by a senior U.N. official. This of-
ficial, with more than a hint of impatience and frustration, stated, “But it’s human 
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rights that must be foundational. Human rights are sufficient [to make an argu-
ment], and they’re inalienable. And that’s there in the Constitution, in article 22.”1 
Few in the audience seemed convinced by her intervention, and the conversation 
returned to a hither-and-thither discussion about which channel would be most 
effective for getting their views on the Shia law heard and making sure that the 
EVAW law would neutralize it. One woman, an Afghan activist working for an 
international NGO, offered to approach President Karzai personally, claiming that 
she currently had the ear of the president. Others argued that Parliament would 
be the most appropriate target of lobbying, although everyone agreed that this had 
to be done in an inconspicuous way, without any overt involvement of foreigners.
The multiplicity of legal frameworks and channels for influencing them was, 
in many ways, a mirror image of the fragmented politics of the Karzai era. The 
sharp ideological shifts of the preceding decades—from the authoritarian, secu-
lar socialism of the Soviet period to the (at least) equally intrusive reign of the 
Islamists—had left behind traces in the country’s judiciary and laws that were 
constantly pulling in very different directions. Upon the installment of the Karzai 
administration, female judges who had started their professional life during the 
socialist period (only to be cast out by the Islamists) were reinstated and found 
themselves working side by side with Taliban-era judges who felt that referring to 
the country’ statutory laws was optional and less important than their knowledge 
of uncodified fiqh—traditional Islamic jurisprudence.2 Combined with the strong 
international interference in the justice sector during the post-2001 period, this 
made for a legal landscape that—much like the politics of the country itself—was 
extremely heterogeneous.
Even within the Western community, there were strong dividing lines. One, 
as shown above, was over whether the promotion of women’s rights had to be 
anchored in Islamic law. Another disagreement was perhaps more fundamen-
tal. Around the same time that part of the international community in Kabul— 
primarily U.N. human rights staff, NGOs in the gender field, and sections of the 
NATO embassies—were working to support the EVAW law and the infrastructure 
of formal courts to implement it, another part of the expatriate community was 
promoting the country’s informal legal practices based on customs. This initiative, 
which I have discussed in some detail elsewhere (Wimpelmann 2013), generated 
strong reactions among local women’s rights advocates. They felt it was an attempt 
to return Afghanistan to the unequal and unaccountable rule of patriarchs and 
tribal strongmen, with problematic consequences for women. Although those 
who favored giving formal recognition to the informal justice processes argued 
that safeguards for women would be incorporated, in making their argument 
they certainly drew upon political symbols and ideas that differed starkly from 
those employed by the international supporters of the EVAW law. Whereas the 
latter advocated formal “state building,” the supporters of a larger role for informal 
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justice invoked notions of Afghanistan as a stateless, traditional society where rec-
onciliation between parties, rather than the imposition of standardized laws, was 
true to local culture and therefore appropriate policy. These arguments did not 
come from nowhere; they drew upon established historical and political notions of 
 Afghanistan’s presumed unique statelessness and tribal nature that had roots going 
back to colonial times. The image gained prominence at a time during the NATO 
operation when military leaders, frustrated with the slow progress of the formal 
state-building process, turned to what they saw as traditional leaders for political 
allies. The result alienated a large part of the women’s rights community.
This chapter provides crucial context to the contestations over gender violence 
analyzed in the rest of the book by dissecting the contemporary legal system in Af-
ghanistan. It shows how its fragmentary nature can be traced back to the multiple 
intersections of politics, justice, and gender of the past while, at the same time, be-
ing a product of the political settlement of the post-2001 order. It also shows that 
the post-2001 era was not in any way unique in the way that particular political 
agendas were reflected in, and sometimes fought through, the regulation of gender 
relations. Since Afghanistan’s inception as a modern state, the country’s gender 
policies have mirrored—and have often been at the heart of—broader political 
fault lines.
MODERNIZING KINGS
In the historical chronicle Siraj al Tawarikh (Torch of Histories), Qazi (Judge) Abd 
al Shakur in Kandahar receives a royal reprimand for having “impulsively sen-
tenced to death by stoning” an adulterous couple. The issue at hand is the failure 
of the qazi to have asked witnesses to testify twice, once on account of the act of 
adultery by the man, Qamar al-Din, and once on account of his unnamed female 
accomplice. Instead, the qazi had ordered both Qamar al-Din and the woman to 
be stoned on the basis of testimony by witnesses of the adultery of Qamar al-Din 
alone. This made the stoning of the woman illegal, and, “since from the current 
authoritative books of jurisprudence it is abundantly clear and understood that 
the act of adultery is a singular act as far as men and women are concerned,” the 
stoning sentence of Qamar al-Din was also “completely irregular and totally un-
acceptable” (Kātib 2013: 1427–28). In other words, if there was to be a stoning, 
both parties must be stoned, and since the stoning of the woman was not just, the 
stoning of the man was not just either. Moreover, the letter continues, the qazi 
had failed in other requirements promulgated by royal decree, such as giving an 
account of a proper investigation of the witnesses’ integrity. Unless the qazi could 
present “reasonable and citable evidence and proof ” that his actions had been 
within the commands of the Lord and the Prophet, he was liable to pay blood 
money to the relatives of the executed Qamar al-Din.
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The year of the execution of Qamar al-Din and the unnamed woman was 1895, 
when Amir Abdul Rahman Khan, ruler of Afghanistan since 1880, was fifteen 
years into an unprecedented and often brutal project to consolidate the power 
in the country into a central state. Pivotal to his centralization efforts was the 
 development of a unified justice system (Tarzi 2003; Ghani 1983). The ulema—the 
 Muslim clergy—who previously had adjudicated in a semiautonomous fashion, 
were turned into salaried bureaucrats subject to standardized rules and royal over-
sight. As the story of Qazi Abd al Shakur shows, they could no longer rely on their 
own knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) to arrive at judicial decisions. In-
stead, they were instructed to apply government manuals in which preestablished 
and government-authorized rulings of law and procedures were set out (Ahmed 
2015: 286). This was, in effect, a first attempt at “codifying Islamic jurisprudence of 
the Hanafi school as the official law of the state,” quite possibly modeled on similar 
modernist efforts by Ottoman rulers (287). At the same time, a network of courts 
was set up throughout the country for the purpose of establishing a government 
monopoly on the dispensation of justice.
Olesen points out that enlisting religious clerics in the administration of justice 
had less to do with a desire to foster closer adherence to religious doctrine and 
more to do with the amir’s drive to consolidate power (1995: 66), which he did by 
claiming divine right to rule—and through the application of considerable coer-
cive force. Abdul Rahman Khan’s appointments of the ulema as state-employed 
justice officials were also part of his agenda to curb their influence. Having played 
an important political role by inciting the population to jihad against British in-
vasions during the nineteenth century (Kamali 1985), the religious leaders had 
become powerful political actors. This had further increased their role in legiti-
mizing the ruler (Nawid 1999).
As other Afghan rulers had attempted before him, Abdul Rahman Khan as-
sumed jurisdiction over serious criminal cases—offenses against the state and 
whatever other cases he felt it pertinent to preside over—thus asserting the mon-
arch’s supremacy in the dispensation of justice (Olesen 1995: 65). He operated as an 
absolute ruler. Unencumbered by a constitution, the amir could proclaim laws and 
issue verdicts as he deemed necessary. Numerous laws were promulgated, some of 
which attempted to bring women and family under closer government regulation 
(Ghani 1983; M. M. S. M. Khan 1980). All marriages were to be registered with 
the authorities, a ceiling was placed on bride-price, and underage (prepuberty) 
marriage (when against the will of the girl) and levirate (marrying a widow to 
her deceased husband’s brother) were prohibited. It is difficult to assess to what 
extent these laws were implemented, although the work of Ghani (1983) suggests 
that they were systematically enforced in courts in at least some provinces. Abdul 
Rahman Khan’s attempt at judicial centralization also had a sectarian dimension. 
Mobilization for his conquest of Hazarajat, the central highlands where the Shia 
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Hazaras lived largely autonomously, took place through a call for jihad to force-
fully convert the Hazaras to Sunni Islam. As part of this campaign, he appointed 
Sunni judges to all Hazara areas and instructed them to apply Sunni Hanafi juris-
prudence (Ibrahami 2009).
Unlike Abdul Rahman Khan, the next great reformer, his grandson Amanul-
lah (reigned 1919–29) had neither the backing and subsidies of the British nor a 
strong army to enforce his visions. Revered as national hero by some and ridi-
culed as pompous dreamer by others, Amanullah’s failed attempt to modernize 
 Afghanistan—particularly its women—continues to figure as a key moment in 
 Afghan historiography. At first, Amanullah gained great popularity among both 
nationalist and religious groups when he could claim to have defeated the  British 
in 1919 during the Third Anglo-Afghan War. The brief confrontation, which 
had started when Amanullah proclaimed a war of independence in a bid to rid 
 Afghanistan of its status as a British protectorate, ended with a treaty between the 
two countries that recognized Afghanistan as a sovereign state (Barfield 2010). 
Emboldened by his newly attained status as a defender of nation and religion 
against imperial forces, Amanullah embarked upon a series of ambitious legal and 
social reforms. At that point, splits between the modernizing monarch, inspired 
by Ataturk’s Turkey and anti-imperial nationalism and an ulema concerned with 
defending Islam against infidel rule and Westernization became apparent.3
During his reign, Amanullah promulgated 140 regulations known as nizam-
namas, as well as Afghanistan’s first Constitution.4 Among the nizam-namas were 
several versions of a new marriage code, first published in 1920. A more exhaus-
tive version was published in 1923, requiring the registration of all marriages. Po-
lygamous marriage was made subject to the court’s permission, and marriages in 
which the bride had not yet reached puberty were banned outright (Nawid 1999; 
Gregorian 1969). Compared to subsequent legislation in the decades that followed, 
these were radical steps.
The Constitution of 1923 placed few limits on the power of the king, although 
it had some modest provisions for consultative government. It named Islam as 
the official religion but made no mention of the Sunni Hanafi school—an omis-
sion designed to appeal to the Shia minority, which Amanullah had also released 
from slavery by decree. The Constitution recognized both secular and religious 
law and made no specification as to the authority of one versus the other (Olesen 
1995: 122). It also bestowed equal rights on all citizens, a significant breach of ear-
lier practices. The Pashtun Durrani elite would no longer be granted privileges, 
and non-Muslim minorities would no longer be treated differently (Olesen 1995; 
Nawid 1999). Amanullah also set out to codify Islamic criminal law and prescribe 
set punishments, resulting in the first Afghan criminal code (1924–25). The code 
classified crimes based on the four categories of classic Islamic criminal law: hadd, 
diat, qisas, and tazir.5 The crimes covered by hadd prescriptions6 and major crimes 
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such as murder and bodily harm were to receive set punishments, whereas for 
lesser crimes, the judges were to give discretionary punishments (tazir) (Gregori-
an 1969; Kamali 1985). The ulema were deeply unhappy with Amanullah’s reforms 
in the field of criminal law, as they reduced the number of crimes for which the 
Islamic judges could impose their own discretionary (tazir) punishments based 
on their knowledge of Hanafi fiqh. Moreover, the very specification of set punish-
ments beyond those set by God (in crimes of hadd) was seen as contrary to sharia 
(Kamali 1985).
Many of Amanullah’s female family members, including his wife, Queen Soraya, 
were instrumental to his reform program, which went beyond legal changes to the 
transformation of women’s public and private roles. Queen Soraya gave speeches 
calling upon Afghan women to educate themselves so they could serve their newly 
independent nation, and she oversaw the establishment of girls’ schools, a govern-
ment-published women’s magazine, and a new association through which women 
could petition for lawful treatment by their husbands (Majrooh 1989).  Arbabzadah 
(2011) emphasizes that the queen’s efforts were rooted in anticolonial and pan- 
Islamic ideology prominent throughout the Muslim world at the time and should 
not be understand merely as an attempt at Westernization. Nonetheless, photographs 
of the queen appearing unveiled and in sleeveless Western dresses, particularly in the 
company of male European leaders, became a central rallying point for the growing 
opposition against Amanullah among the country’s religious leaders.
With the government facing a rebellion instigated, in part, by the conserva-
tive rural mullahs, who perceived Amanullah as an adversary to their values and 
positions,7 the urban ulema seized the opportunity to assert themselves. A 1924 
Loya Jirga (grand assembly) confirmed them as important power brokers. Upon 
the ulema’s insistence, Amanullah was forced to retract many of his legal reforms. 
The Constitution was revised to reintroduce the discriminatory tax for religious 
minorities and to reestablish Hanafi fiqh as the official and sole religious law. A 
new criminal code in Arabic and based exclusively on Hanafi fiqh was to be com-
piled, and the right to determine tazir punishments was returned to the judges 
(Nawid 1999).
But upon successfully defeating the rebellion, Amanullah turned to face 
down the ulema with another attempt at legal reform. This time, he tried to 
sideline the ulema completely, perceiving them as an obstacle to the progress of 
the nation. In the end, however, Amanullah’s confrontational stance toward the 
ulema—combined with the announcement a new series of reforms, his increas-
ingly authoritarian style, and his lack of coercive resources to back it all up—led to 
his overthrow (Nawid 1999).
The next king, Nadir Shah, who rose to power following a brief interregnum, 
was beholden to eastern tribes and showed less personal disposition toward radi-
cal reforms. He made significant concessions to the ulema and tribal powers. The 
Intrusions, Invasions, and Interventions    33
Constitution of 1931 reinstated the Hanafi fiqh as the official religious doctrine and, 
in general, gave precedence to sharia over statutory law (Moschtaghi 2006). In ad-
dition, the clergy was given influence through the governmental Jamiat-al Ulema 
(literally, the society of religious scholars, the ulema council), who were entrusted 
with reviewing laws and government policies for adherence with Islam (Olesen 
1995: 184). Not only were religious scholars now partly co-opted by the state, but 
Sufi networks also moved closer to state power with pir (spiritual leaders) taking 
up government positions such as minister of justice.
Nadir Shah was assassinated in 1933. His only son, Zahir Shah, ascended to 
the throne, but executive power was largely in the hands of his paternal uncles 
in the first three decades that followed. In this period of “limited guided mod-
ernization” (Sharani 1986), wide-ranging developments in education took place. 
Secular education was expanded, and a number of the government madrassas was 
established in order to formalize higher religious education and train judges in 
sharia. “The new modus vivendi which was established between the state and the 
traditional groups whose economic and political interests were being observed 
while the gradual reform measures (educational, administrative etc.) catered for 
the interests of the new elite of bureaucrats and educated middle class. A gradual 
transformation of Afghan society hereby took place which above all was charac-
terized by its outward form of continuity but laid the basis of power political and 
ideological confrontations among the state supporting groups” (Olesen 1995: 172).
The legal system became increasingly bifurcated. Civil and criminal cases 
were adjudicated in sharia courts, whereas a number of statutory courts in each 
province had special jurisdiction over fields such as administration and business 
(Weinbaum 1980). This division also manifested itself in legal education. Two fac-
ulties at the newly established Kabul University taught law: the secular Law and 
Politics Faculty and the Faculty of Sharia. The Faculty of Law was based on the 
French model and supplied many of the civil servants. The Faculty of Sharia was 
influenced by Egypt’s Al-Azhar University, where many of its lecturers had been 
educated. Then, as now, a degree from either faculty was not a requirement for 
appointment as a judge, who could also be appointed if he held a license from a 
government madrassa (Moschtaghi 2006). From the late 1960s onward, however, 
the government actively recruited graduates from the Faculty of Law for the ju-
diciary, and, in line with the expansion of secular education more generally, the 
religious establishment gradually lost its monopoly on the state judiciary (Kamali 
1985: 207).
In the 1960s Zahir Shah assumed full power for himself, resulting in the 1964 
Constitution. A comprehensive and relatively liberal document (which was to 
serve as the model for the 2004 Constitution), the 1964 Constitution confirmed 
the dual court system that had been evolving since Amanullah’s time.8 The pri-
mary courts (mahkama-ye ibtidaya) continued to be staffed by scholars trained 
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in Islamic law and had general jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases. In addi-
tion, there was a number of statutory courts in each province with special jurisdic-
tion over fields such as administration and business (Weinbaum 1980). Provincial 
courts (mahkama-ye murafia) had original jurisdiction and also functioned as ap-
pellate courts for the primary courts. What was new in the 1964 Constitution was 
the establishment of an independent Supreme Court (Stera Mahkama) in Kabul, 
with authority to review all lower-level decisions as well as administrative power 
over the courts. The move toward an independent judiciary reflected the relatively 
liberal period in Afghan history under Zahir Shah.
The 1964 Constitution introduced another new institution, that of the attorney 
general (Loy Saranwol) to investigate and prosecute crimes. The attorney general’s 
office was to be independent of the executive power of the government, reporting 
only to the executive. The judicial branch was not to interfere in its activities ( Yassari 
and Saboory 2010). Compared to previous legal provisions, the 1964  Constitution 
also favored statutory law over Hanafi sharia. Only when no  provisions in the 
 Constitution or law existed for a case under consideration could the courts apply 
Hanafi jurisprudence, and then only within the limitations set forth in the Consti-
tution. In the view of some, this effectively made Afghanistan a secular state, even 
while paying lip service to Islam (Dupree, quoted in Saikal 2004: 148).
The 1964 Constitution also made the cabinet accountable to an elected parlia-
ment. Two parliamentary elections were held, in 1965 and 1969. Voter participa-
tion was low and the intelligentsia could not compete with the traditional power 
holders, who formed the majority of those elected. As a result, Parliament and the 
elections functioned mostly according to patronage politics. There were no formal 
political parties (the King had refused to ratify a bill that would have permitted 
them), and this hampered the emergence of a political opposition, which contin-
ued to operate clandestinely, setting the stage for political developments in the 
years to come. Rather than the Parliament, it was Kabul University that emerged as 
the arena for oppositional politics (Dorronsoro 2005). Here, leftist student groups 
clashed with Islamic radicals over the path to modernization most appropriate to 
their society.
AUTHORITARIAN EMANCIPATORS
In 1973, political liberalization came to a halt when Zahir Shah was overthrown by 
his cousin (and former prime minister), Mohammad Daoud, in a military coup. 
Daoud, who had come to power with the backing of pro-Soviet communists, pro-
claimed Afghanistan a republic, dismantled the nascent gains in representative 
government, and took the country in an authoritarian direction. Despite its au-
thoritarianism, the Daoud period nonetheless left some enduring footprints when 
it came to women’s legal status and protection.
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Prior to the Daoud period, urban women had been entering the workforce 
and higher education in increasing numbers for more than three decades. Ini-
tially working as teachers, nurses, and secretaries, by the mid-1970s, women were 
employed in public administration, at the universities, in Parliament, and in the 
courts, though they were few in numbers and rarely held high positions. Largely, 
the changes that had come about—such as the right of women to vote, in the 1964 
Constitution—were the result of top-down initiatives led by men, as opposed to 
being the result of an organized women’s rights movement (Dupree 1984). How-
ever, toward the end Zahir Shah’s reign, a few events foreshadowed the more sub-
stantial mobilization of women that was to follow during the years of socialist 
rule. For instance, in 1968 hundreds of women took to the streets to protest a 
proposal by conservative members of Parliament to prohibit unmarried women 
from pursuing studies abroad (Zulfacar 2006). Two years later, several thousand 
women demonstrated in front of government ministries after a series of assaults 
on schoolgirls by a man opposed to the nascent changes to women’s position in 
urban areas (Ehmadi 2002).
Reforms in the legal field went some way in supporting this change. In the 
 Afghan year of 1354 (1975), separate family courts were established in Kabul, Kunduz, 
and Kandahar to deal with issues related to family law. They were intended to give 
women and female judges (most of whom worked in the field of family law) easier 
physical access to the courts. It appears that the main objective of this change 
was to uphold propriety rather than to radically alter gender relations. The regu-
lar courts were located within the governors’ compounds, together with pretrial 
detention centers and security staff, and were considered masculine places where 
women would be uncomfortable.9 Then, in 1976 and 1977, respectively, Daoud en-
acted new criminal and civil codes by decree. These remain in force today. The 
codes had been in the making for some time. The Civil Code included a section on 
family law, based mainly on Hanafi fiqh (Etling 2004). In some respects, the 1977 
Civil Code was Afghanistan’s most modernist legislation in this field since the time 
of Amanullah. It abolished child marriage of girls under the age of fifteen, intro-
duced some restrictions on polygamy, and specified provisions for divorce, which 
had previously been regulated by reference to uncodified Hanafi fiqh.10
The Penal Code also proceeded from Islamic law. Its enactment, in 1976, followed 
decades of vacillation over whether hadd punishments (the set punishments such as 
amputation, lashing, and stoning for specific crimes, including adultery) should be 
included in the penal law. According to Kamali (1985), a 1971 version of the law had 
been discarded by the cabinet because it detailed such punishments. By contrast, the 
1976 version merely referred to hadd without spelling them out. In its introduction, 
the Penal Code says, “This law regulates the Tazir crimes and penalties. Those com-
mitting crimes of Hudood, Qassas and Diat11 shall be punished in accordance with 
the provisions of Islamic religious law [Hanafi religious jurisprudence].”
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The criminal code thus recognized hadd punishments, but also provided set 
tazir punishments for crimes that are included under hadd, such as adultery and 
theft.12 This conformed with legal practice at the time—during the decades leading 
up to the 1976 code, adultery had not been punished by stoning or lashing, but 
by imprisonment (Kamali 1985). The code did not, however, distinguish clearly 
between adultery and rape, but used one word, zina, to apply to both. Neverthe-
less, in some ways, the law introduced new protections for women; it made forced 
marriage a punishable offense (for men and women of majority age—eighteen 
and sixteen, respectively), with an increased punishment if the marriage was an 
arrangement of baad (a woman or girl given in marriage as a compensation for an 
infringement).
A new 1977 Constitution consolidated power in the hands of the executive and 
effectively made Afghanistan a one-party state. It was a prelude to Daoud’s purge 
of his erstwhile allies, members of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan 
(PDPA), but the competing factions in the PDPA then united in a bloody military 
coup against Daoud in April 1978. The junior officers who had carried out the 
coup handed power to a revolutionary council and Afghanistan was proclaimed 
a democratic people’s republic. Intending to transform the country socially and 
economically along socialist lines, the revolutionary council enacted a number of 
decrees, most notably regarding land reform, compulsory education, and women’s 
emancipation. Decree number 7, “Dowry and Marriage Expenses,” banned under-
age and forced marriage, as well as excessive wedding celebrations and dowries, 
and it specified a punishment of six months to three years in prison for viola-
tors. The decree gained notoriety as a particular provocation to religious and tribal 
groups and as the cause of large-scale public outcry and the galvanization of sup-
port for the mujahedin insurgency (Malikyar 1997).
The PDPA’s revolutionary zeal proved short-lived, and the Western-backed in-
surgency led by the mujahedin mounted. Fearing chaos on its southern border, the 
Soviet Union invaded the country in December 1979. By that time, at least twelve 
thousand people had been killed in political purges. The Soviets installed a more 
moderate government and another Constitution was promulgated in 1980. The new 
Constitution upheld the Supreme Court and provided for a Parliament, but its for-
mation was to be decided by subsequent laws. “Less and less was said about Decree 
number 7” (Dupree 1984: 325), which faded into the background. In fact, women’s 
legal rights came to be of relatively low priority for the PDPA government and party 
cadres. Women’s emancipation was a central goal both to the leadership of the party 
and to its many female members, but the focus was on women’s labor participation 
and education. The strategy appeared to have emerged out of a combination of the 
bitter experience of decree number 7 and a socialist inclination toward material em-
powerment. A former female PDPA member spoke with me, drawing comparisons 
between the PDPA era and the present period of American dominance.
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Taraki [a PDPA leader deposed and killed in 1979] introduced some progressive leg-
islation, but it was imposed too quickly. It was done in a rush, without preparing the 
ground, [and] imposed on a traditionalist society. So decree number 7 backfired. . . . 
It would have been better to do it slowly and prepare society for it.
Today there is a free market economy. There is no focus on poverty or economic 
opportunities. The talk about “women’s rights.”  .  .  . It’s formal; it’s about violence 
against women, about legislation. But what about removing constraints [on women]: 
income, access to jobs, access to education? . . . The PDPA had an ideological com-
mitment to change. Women were to have equal status. We focused on the work en-
vironment, on women’s salaries and on childcare so that women could stay in the 
workforce. Children would be fed in the kindergartens, and a teacher would be pro-
vided for them. We even had subsidies on diapers and on clothing for children up 
to five years old. There were special shops for this. We focused on the foundational 
issues; we had five-year plans and so on. Compare the time of the Soviets with that of 
the United States. The Russians built factories, but the Americans are leaving nothing 
behind; there is nothing visible from them. Even their military bases they are taking 
back with them!13
Women party members and government officials were reluctant to attempt to 
reform the 1977 Civil Code, which was based on Hanafi fiqh and therefore seen as 
unassailable. They did, however, begin a systematic campaign to strip party mem-
bership from polygamous husbands and women who had married as second wives.
On the whole, the PDPA era saw limited progress in terms of how the justice 
system treated women. The family courts founded in 1975 were in operation until 
1987, when they were merged with the district city courts under a new court sys-
tem based on the Soviet model. There are few indications that the family courts 
took particularly revolutionary or even reformist positions during the PDPA. 
Cases reported in the weekly column “Women, Society and Life” in the Kabul 
Times suggests that most of the caseload was made up of women seeking a di-
vorce. Interestingly, the women who approached the courts for divorce generally 
had independent means of income, and many were already living separate from 
their husbands. Nevertheless, unless the husband agreed to the divorce, the courts 
tended to turn down the woman’s request, even if beating and violence were al-
leged. Despite that lingering conservatism, women who worked as justice officials 
at the time recall a justice system much less interested in pursuing moral crimes 
than was the case under subsequent regimes. No women were prosecuted for run-
ning away from home, as they would be during the mujahedin, Taliban, and Kar-
zai governments. There was also a cautious approach to prosecuting adultery. In 
the large cities, at least, adultery would be prosecuted only if a couple was caught 
red-handed or if one party had been deceived—typically a woman entering a re-
lationship upon a promise of marriage that did not eventuate. In cases like that, 
the courts would normally use an adultery charge to pressure the man to uphold 
his promise.14
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As the Soviet leadership lost faith in the possibility of defeating the mujahedin 
militarily, they engineered a transfer of power to Dr. Najibullah, who was tasked 
with overseeing a process of national reconciliation under which the Soviets could 
withdraw. Najibullah set out to downplay the party’s Marxist ideology, reverting to 
more conventional frameworks of nationalism and Islam. Another Constitution, 
one that made no reference to Marxism and made Islam the official religion, was 
ratified in 1987. The Soviet military completed their withdrawal in 1989. Najibul-
lah’s government managed to stay afloat until 1992, when a sudden cut off of funds 
led to fatal defections and the takeover of the capital by mujahedin factions. It 
would mean a radically different gender regime. As one woman recalled, “Our 
generation was free and open. We went to the office in miniskirts. But in the last 
days of Najib [Najibullah], we heard that the mujahedin would punish those with-
out [long] pants, so we kept a pair with us in our bags whenever [we were] going 
out. The day when the mujahedin came to Kabul, a woman called out, “Ladies, put 
on your trousers! The mujahedin are coming.”15
ISL AMIST RULE
Seizing control over Kabul in April 1992, a loose coalition of mujahedin leaders 
formed a government and declared Afghanistan an Islamic republic for the first 
time in its history. The new government, under Burhanuddin Rabbani, issued an 
edict: “Now that . . . our Islamic country is free from the bondage of atheist rule, 
we urge that God’s ordinances be carried out immediately, particularly those per-
taining to the veiling of women. Women should be banned from working in offices 
and radio and television stations, and schools for women, which are in effect the 
hub of debauchery and adulterous practices, must be closed down.”16 This was fol-
lowed by a decree by the Supreme Court in 1994, which stated that women should 
not leave their houses unless absolutely necessary and should not wear attractive 
or revealing clothing.17 It was during the mujahedin government that the practice 
of incarcerating “runaway” women first started. As the capital collapsed into in-
fighting, however, there were few possibilities to implement judicial administra-
tion of any kind.
By contrast, the Taliban—who rapidly established control over much of the 
country, which was fractured by rival mujahedin fighters and banditry—made 
 Islamic justice and order the cornerstone of their claim to legitimacy to rule (1996–
2001). The exact composition and workings of the Taliban government remains 
opaque. At its core were Pashtun rural mullahs and men—former refugee boys—
educated in conservative madrassas in Pakistan. Although unevenly applied, their 
restrictions on women’s movements and visibility were so extreme as to impose a 
virtual state of curfew on women (Kandiyoti 2007: 175). Apart from health work-
ers, who were allowed to treat only female patients, women were banned from 
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working, and girls were largely excluded from school. Women were only permit-
ted to venture outside dressed in the all-enveloping chadari (known as burka in 
the West) and escorted by a male relative.
The restrictions were intended to prevent immorality and adultery and revealed 
an obsession with female sexuality as a danger to be contained at all costs.18 In 
the 1996 Ordinance Concerning Women’s Rights and Duties, issued by the Supreme 
Court in Kabul, the government concluded that “in brief, it is obscene and unlaw-
ful for women to go to school.” Even if women were fully veiled and their teachers 
were Muslim, the edict continued, “experience has proved that such deeds have had 
evil effects on women and have resulted in corrupted morality.” The edict stated 
that women were even forbidden from learning to write, “for writing is a tool for 
sedition and corruption. Literate women write about their unlawful wishes and de-
sires to strangers.” It was concluded that while there were some benefits to women 
becoming literate, the seditious effects far outweighed them. The edict also pre-
scribed, in great detail, the manner in which women should appear in public. They 
were to be veiled in a manner that made the contours of their bodies undetectable, 
and they were to refrain from using perfume, makeup, or any kind of adornment; 
from speaking loudly or to strange men and from a number of other actions pre-
sented as offensive or even threatening to public order. In any case, women were 
not to go out at all, unless they were obliged by religion to do so.
While the Taliban’s gender policies bore similarities with those of the rural 
Pashtun milieu many of them hailed from, they also differed in important re-
spects. As Cole argues, the Taliban’s policy constituted a counter-modernity vision 
rather than a return to the past (2008). Their Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan envi-
sioned itself as instituting an Islamic order, novel in Afghanistan’s history, taking 
inspiration from the Taliban’s notions of an Islamic golden age rather than a rein-
statement of Afghan traditions. Their use of state technologies to violently enforce 
infractions against this order was similarly a novel thing. Another rupture was the 
ban on baad and levirate (Cole 2008), which signaled that the Taliban, like Afghan 
rulers before them, attempted to subordinate tribal power to central control to 
some degree.
The Taliban never promulgated a new Constitution but declared their com-
mitment to sharia and decreed a number of laws, particularly in the later phase 
of their rule. They established a notorious “vice and virtue” religious police mod-
eled on and reportedly funded by Saudi Arabia (HRW 2001), who enforced, often 
violently and arbitrarily, the government’s prescriptions for religious observance 
and the complete seclusion of women. The preexisting three-tier court system 
remained in place, but the Taliban eliminated the independent function of the 
Attorney General and ignored many aspects of the Penal Code (Tondini 2009; 
Hartmann and Klonowiecka-Milart 2011). Often, cases would be decided on the 
basis of testimony only, without the use of any other evidence. Sentences were 
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typically meted out on the basis of the judge’s knowledge of sharia, without refer-
ence to statutory law. The arbitrariness of the application of justice was shocking 
to many—and not just those who had supported the PDPA government. In Herat, 
members of the ulema council repeatedly tried to get the Taliban government to 
enforce due process,19 according to which executions and corporal punishment 
such as amputations and lashing were to be approved by the primary court and 
two higher courts, as well as the supreme leader of the country, Mullah Omar 
(United Nations Commission on Human Rights 1998). This pressure had no effect, 
and implementations of those punishments continued to be carried out upon the 
orders of local judges, some of whom were military commanders with no judicial 
background. These punishments generally took place on Fridays as a public spec-
tacle and included the flogging and execution of women, unprecedented in recent 
Afghan history (Coomaraswamy 2000).20 In addition, the Taliban accelerated the 
practice of detaining women for running away, a practice that was to be upheld 
during the next government, with severe consequences for women’s relationship 
with the law.
Despite all this, in some aspects, the Taliban did uphold women’s legal rights. 
Compared to the mujahedin period, rape was severely punished, and public safety 
increased. Moreover, one judge reported that the Taliban would sometimes enforce 
women’s inheritance rights. Her mother had obtained her inheritance from her fa-
ther through the support of a Talib justice official, who stated it was in accordance 
with sharia.21 Nonetheless, to a great number of Afghan women, the segregation 
imposed by the Taliban was unprecedented. Overt resistance was unfeasible, but 
many circumvented the new gender regime as best they could, most prominently 
by attending the substantial number of home schools set up in response to the ban 
on female education. Outside the country, members of the Afghan diaspora in 
France, the United States and beyond mobilized against Taliban’s gender policies, 
thus contributing to the government’s increasing international isolation during 
the final years of its rule.
GENDER AND JUSTICE IN THE NEW ORDER
In 2001, once again, a novel order ushered in a new set of conditions under which 
negotiations over women’s positions and their protection against abuses took place. 
In the following, I sketch out the political alignments and fault lines of the post-
Taliban period, and how they came to shape legal frameworks and infrastructure. 
This account forms the backdrop to the more detailed discussions of contempo-
rary public regulation of gender violence discussed in the rest of the book.
When the collection of material for this book commenced, in the summer of 
2009, Afghanistan was almost ten years into a radical disjuncture set in motion 
by the attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001. The U.S.-led military 
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invasion that followed produced a drastic realignment of political forces in the 
country, which until then had been almost completely under the control of the 
Taliban. To remove the Taliban, the U.S.-led military coalition relied on a bombing 
campaign plus Afghan militia forces grouped in the so-called Northern Alliance. 
As the name suggest, this alliance was a collection of military factions from the 
northern parts of Afghanistan, who had their constituencies among the northern 
ethnic groups that had formed a temporary alliance against the Taliban when the 
latter first emerged in the mid-1990s (Pohly 2002). Members of these factions, 
particularly the Shura-ye Nazar (supervisory council), dominated by Tajiks from 
the Panjshir Valley, came to feature prominently in the political settlement that 
emerged after the invasion (Giustozzi 2009). This was a reversal of the historical 
dominance of the Pashtuns. The Pashtun aristocracy had ruled Afghanistan al-
most continually until the outbreak of war in 1978, and Pashtuns had also formed 
the backbone of the Taliban, though they were not from the traditional Pashtun 
ruling class.
The blueprint for Afghanistan’s new political landscape was drawn up at the 
Bonn conference in December 2001, where a power-sharing agreement set out a 
political framework for the transition that was to follow. In an attempt to broaden 
the base of the settlement beyond the Northern Alliance, the chief intervening 
power, the United States, wanted to install a Pashtun head of state, and the choice 
fell on Hamid Karzai, who belonged to the Pashtun aristocracy and diaspora. Ab-
sent in the new coalition were members of the Taliban (Dorronsoro 2012).
In significant ways, the new order was shaped by the expanding international 
presence in the country, on which the Karzai government was militarily and finan-
cially dependent. Initially, Western military operations were focused on capturing 
and killing members of Al Qaida and the Taliban, who had melted away or fled. 
The United States mobilized a number of its allies, who gradually deployed troops 
across the country, some aiding the U.S. hunt for Taliban and Al Qaida members 
and others forming part of an U.N.-mandated stabilization force, the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Alongside the military engagement, a broad 
state-building agenda was pursued in line with an evolving international state- 
and peace-building blueprint overseen by the United Nations (Chesterman 2004). 
This blueprint entailed ambitious transformation of politics, the economy, and 
society more generally. In Afghanistan, the transformative agenda would famous-
ly include the liberation of the country’s women. Yet the international “project” 
in Afghanistan contained within it tensions and contradictions from the outset 
(Suhrke 2011). The focus on capturing military adversaries led to alliances with 
armed commanders and so-called strongmen, alliances that ran counter to at-
tempts to monopolize the use of violence and build a unified state. Pledges to end 
corruption and to support human rights and good governance often had to cede 
ground to the demands of short-term political stability and intelligence gathering.
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These tensions also affected the reform of the legal framework and the justice 
sector, which formed a central part of the international state-building exercise. A 
number of legislative changes were undertaken, starting with a new Constitution in 
2004. In the more optimistic climate of those early years, the Constitution was ac-
claimed as a momentous achievement and decisive step forward in the Western-led 
reconstruction of post-Taliban Afghanistan, even though the process surrounding 
its drafting and promulgation was not as democratic and inclusive as was claimed at 
the time.22 The Constitution declared Afghanistan, once again, an Islamic republic. 
Article 3 stated that no law could be passed that contradicts “the beliefs and provi-
sions of the sacred religion of Islam,” and article 130 stated that Hanafi (Sunni) fiqh 
should be used in cases where there are no provisions in the law, within the limits 
set in the Constitution.23 As detailed in chapter 4 below, article 130 would frequently 
be invoked by judges who claimed that as long as their verdicts were in accordance 
with Hanafi jurisprudence, they were free to impose punishments beyond those 
prescribed in the penal laws.24 Significantly, for the first time in Afghan history, the 
Constitution recognized Shia jurisprudence, stating that members of the Shia sect 
could use Jafari (Shia) jurisprudence in personal law (article 131).
At the same time, noteworthy provisions were made to safeguard women’s rights. 
Article 22 stated that “the citizens of Afghanistan—whether man or  woman—
have equal rights and duties before the law.” In addition, quotas were set for fe-
male representation in the government—women would be guaranteed roughly 
25 percent of the seats in the lower house of Parliament and 17 percent of the seats 
in the upper house, as well as two seats in each provincial council.25 The Constitu-
tion also made frequent references to human rights. The preamble declared respect 
for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Charter of the United Na-
tions, article 7 stated that “the state shall abide by the U.N. charter, international 
treaties, international conventions that Afghanistan has signed, and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights,” and article 58 obliged the government to establish 
an independent human rights commission, although with no independent powers.
The 2004 Constitution thus contained components from across the broad 
spectrum of Afghanistan’s past legal traditions: the Islamist orientations of the 
mujahedin and Taliban period, the emancipatory goals of the communist govern-
ment, and the strong executive that had been a consistent feature of the country’s 
institutional design. Like many constitutions, it was open to contradictory inter-
pretations. It was especially ambiguous on whether Islamic jurisprudence or the 
principles of human rights—including gender equality and principles of legality—
took precedence.26 Similar questions had been a matter of debate through much of 
the nineteenth century. Then as now, the resolution of these questions had impor-
tant ramifications for whether punishments such as stoning would be permitted 
and for whether acts not defined as crimes in the statutory laws could nonetheless 
be prosecuted and punished with reference to sharia (Kamali 1985).
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The constitutional clauses providing for strong presidential powers were a vic-
tory for President Karzai. The president, who had been seen as an isolated leader 
dependent on foreign support, gradually built a substantial power base. The is-
sue of a presidential versus a parliamentary system had been bitterly contested, 
with representatives of non-Pashtun groups—the Uzbeks, Hazaras, and Tajiks— 
wanting a parliamentary system with stronger checks on executive power and 
central state power more generally, which historically were both Pashtun domains 
(B.  R. Rubin 2004). With support from the U.S. administration, which wanted 
to see a strong executive (Suhrke 2011: 163), the presidential system prevailed. 
Equipped with significant means to expand and consolidate his power, Karzai set 
out to gradually displace the dominance of northerners in the central state appa-
ratus, many of whom gravitated toward the opposition.
In 2005 the first parliamentary elections produced a legislature with almost 30 
percent female members—a percentage higher than in many Western countries, 
though this was due to the quotas established by the 2004 Constitution. As de-
tailed in the next chapter, women MPs were largely unable to establish alliances 
that could pursue gender issues—or, in some cases, they were not interested in 
doing so (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam 2006; Larson 2016). Many were beholden to 
powerful male patrons or were seeking to position themselves as the go-to cham-
pion of women’s rights for Western embassies.
Two partly overlapping groups became particularly visible in the new National 
Assembly—a northern-dominated opposition group and a group made up of for-
mer mujahedin commanders. The first group was centered around the Tajik speak-
er of Parliament, Yusus Qanooni, and Dr. Abdullah—who would be Karzai’s chief 
challengers in the 2004 and 2009 presidential elections, respectively. The former 
mujahedin commanders had originally risen to power as a result of the Cold War 
rivalry that played out in Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion of 1979. Western 
countries, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan had quickly stepped up their support to the 
anti-Soviet resistance, which coalesced under the banner of jihad, with its fighters 
calling themselves mujahedin (Dorronsoro 2005: 105). The mujahedin groups were 
subsequently discredited in the eyes of much of the Afghan population, however, 
after their failure to establish order after the collapse of the Soviet-backed gov-
ernment, descending instead into infighting, chaos, and banditry—a development 
that paved the way for the Taliban government. But their fate was not sealed by 
that failure. When the United States chose them as allies to overthrow the Taliban 
government, the mujahedin received an opportunity to restore their credentials 
and positions. The Bonn agreement in December 2001 reflected the mujahedin’s 
restored power and was an early indicator that participation in the jihad against 
the Soviets would once again constitute a key mark of legitimacy. The preface of 
the agreement stated, “Expressing their appreciation to the Afghan mujahidin who, 
over the years, have defended the independence, territorial integrity and national 
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unity of the country and have played a major role in the struggle against terror-
ism and oppression, and whose sacrifice has now made them both heroes of jihad 
and champions of peace, stability and reconstruction of their beloved homeland, 
Afghanistan.”
Their rehabilitation contributed to an ideological field where the defense of 
the nation was equated with the defense of religion, and where the mujahedin 
could stake out a claim to superiority by virtue of their status as national liberators, 
whereas an openly secular orientation was tantamount to treason. But already in 
2001, protests had been voiced against the Bonn agreement’s rehabilitation of the 
mujahedin, who had committed serious crimes, especially during the civil war of 
1992–95. At the 2003 Constitutional Loya Jirga, one of the female delegates, Malalai 
Joya, strongly denounced the proceedings for giving a platform to warlords and 
war criminals, upon which her microphone was silenced and she was temporarily 
made to leave the Loya Jirga tent (Kuovo 2011). Nonetheless, human rights actors, 
including the Afghan Independent Human Right Commission (AIHRC), invested 
much of their efforts in a campaign to investigate and prosecute war crimes. Giv-
en the dominance of war criminals in the post-2001 order, this amounted to an 
attempt to fundamentally change the political status quo. These efforts received 
a serious blow in 2007, when a number of MPs—former military commanders, 
most of them with mujahedin backgrounds, put forward a law that would grant 
themselves amnesty from prosecution of war crimes. Those who had embraced 
the vision of a new order based on human rights saw the law as a definite proof of 
the government’s real power base—and the muted protests from Western embas-
sies as evidence of the hollowness of Western pledges toward supporting a human 
rights agenda in the country (Suhrke 2011: 174). The episode also illustrated in 
stark terms that the mujahedin had solidified as a powerful political bloc. This 
was clearly expressed in a warning uttered by Abdul Rasool Sayyaf, a former com-
mander of one of the mujahedin parties, during a rally against the amnesty law: 
“Whoever is against the mujahedin is against Islam, and they are the enemies of 
this country.”
The efficiency displayed in passing the amnesty law was not representative of 
the overall workings of Parliament. Seldom did it exercise its authority to pro-
pose legislation (Ahmadi 2016). This did not mean, however, that legislation was 
not produced; over two hundred laws were promulgated between 2001 and 2010 
alone.27 Most of these laws were presented to Parliament by government agencies 
or as presidential decrees, typically drafted by small groups of actors outside the 
government, who then used their connections to get the law tabled. This led to 
an extraordinary fragmentation of the legal framework, with a number of stand-
alone pieces of criminal legislation on issues such as money laundering, terrorism, 
corruption, and violence against women. The law about violence against women 
(the EVAW law), which is the subject of the next chapter, embodied many of the 
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contradictions that this kind of fragmentary lawmaking produced, such as incon-
sistency in the legal corpus as a whole. It also illustrated an opaque legislative pro-
cess in which informal political connections took precedence over open debate.
Legal reform also entailed programs to rebuild and reform the administration 
of justice. At first, the justice sector had been somewhat neglected by the donor 
community, who instead focused their efforts on health, education, and strength-
ening the security forces. But donors soon came to believe that the justice sector 
had been overlooked and constituted a weak link in the international attempts 
to restructure the country—partly due to the pathetic efforts of the Italians who 
had been in charge in the early years after the U.S.-led invasion. A period of more 
extensive aid and a proliferation of activities intended to strengthen the rule of 
law followed, but it quickly led to Western disillusionment, as rapid results failed 
to materialize.
The 2004 Constitution had largely confirmed the three-tier court structure 
and the historical positions of the three justice institutions, the Supreme Court, 
the Attorney General, and the Ministry of Justice. The Supreme Court proved an 
assertive counterpart to the often chaotic international attempts to reform the 
justice system. As an institution, it wielded considerable power. It nominated 
judges for presidential appointment, oversaw court administration, ran the pro-
fessional training course (the stage course28) for judges, served as the final court 
of appeal, and had the right to interpret the Constitution. A high percentage of 
criminal cases was appealed to the Supreme Court. As a result, the head of its 
criminal division presided over the outcome of almost all serious criminal cases 
in the country, making the division a powerful actor and potentially a target of at-
tempts of bribery and other undue influence. During my fieldwork, I often heard 
about cases that had proceeded through due process at the lower courts, only 
to be obviously influenced at the Supreme Court level, resulting in acquittal or 
reduced sentencing.29 This was particularly obvious when a government official 
stood accused of a crime.
The Supreme Court was generally considered a bastion of conservatism, at least 
by Western reformers, and especially during the tenure of Fazal Hadi Shinwari, 
the chief justice from 2001 to 2006. As testimony to the fact that the close rela-
tionship between the justice system and the religious establishment was still in 
place, Shinwari was also the leader of the national ulema council. The council was 
generally supportive of the president, and Shinwari had close ties to Abdul Rasool 
Sayyaf, a jihadi commander and Wahabist-inspired religious scholar with consid-
erable power in the post-2001 settlement, and an important ally of Karzai. Dur-
ing his tenure, Shinwari—who had no formal qualifications beyond a madrassa 
education—established a religious council within the Supreme Court. The council 
issued a number of fatwas (binding religious opinions) that horrified liberal West-
erners and Afghan human rights advocates.30 In 2006, the donor community and 
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some of its Afghan allies succeeded in placing a more moderate person, Abdul 
Salam Azimi, in the position as the chief justice. Azimi nevertheless proved dis-
appointing to many of his backers. He spent a lot of his time abroad and was un-
able to carry out the substantive reforms his supporters had hoped for, including 
countering cronyism in judicial appointments and reorienting training and staff 
appointments in a more secular direction. It was evident that the Supreme Court 
exhibited a certain degree of esprit de corps. It was able to guard its autonomy 
against outside attempts to redesign criteria for professional requirements for its 
cadres, and it resisted encroachments on its jurisdiction. It proved less inclined to 
resist influence from the executive and proved a reliable ally to President Karzai, 
particularly in his attempts to sideline and influence Parliament. The profession 
as a whole was heavily dominated by men. In 2008, it was estimated that around 
7 percent of sitting judges were female, a number that had increased to almost 8.5 
percent by 2013 (IDLO 2014). Most female judges were presiding over family and 
juvenile courts (O’Hanlon and Sherjan 2010).
The attorney general’s office (AGO) was also a powerful institution, appointing 
and overseeing prosecutors at all levels. Under the executive arm of the govern-
ment, the office was responsible for investigating crimes, preparing them for trial, 
and prosecuting in court. The office had not undergone “restructuring” (as civil 
service reform was called)—as had the judges—and, as a consequence, had much 
lower salary levels. (An exception was the prosecutors working for the special-
ized units for crimes of violence against women (see chapter 3), some of whom 
received top-up salaries from their international supporters.)31 Of the three justice 
institutions, the Ministry of Justice was the minor actor, tasked with overseeing 
the administration of the justice system and with drafting and reviewing laws 
through its Taqnin (legislation) department. But that role of the Ministry of Jus-
tice makes it central to many of the processes analyzed in this book, as will be 
explored in chapter 2.
After 2001, defense lawyers and legal aid featured as relatively new elements of 
the justice system. A national bar association was reestablished in 2008, and an 
Advocates Law promulgated, with the support of the International Bar Associa-
tion. Numerous national and international organizations provided representation 
in court or legal advice for defenders, funded by international aid money. Al-
though lawyers often complained that they received little respect—and sometimes 
faced outright hostility—from judges and prosecutors, the idea of legal represen-
tation appeared to gain traction over time. In general, lawyers had a noticeably 
different background than the other legal professions. Most were graduates from 
the secular law faculties, and many spoke English and held positions in foreign-
funded NGOs. Some had gained reputations as fearless defenders of human rights, 
although a few of the legal aid organizations were perceived as mostly motivated 
by financial gains.
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Expatriate advisors frequently lamented the lack of coordination that charac-
terized the justice sector reform, but this state of affairs was, in large part, a prod-
uct of the proliferation of aid. As Tamanaha points out, justice sector aid is not a 
field with an internal logic; it is better understood “as an agglomeration of projects 
perpetuated by motivated actors supported by funding” (Tamanaha, cited in Ma-
son 2011b). More often than not, external support to the justice sector in Afghani-
stan took the form of what aid organizations and private contractors were able to 
secure funding for, rather than what national strategies or needs dictated. By 2010, 
Kabul was swamped with a number of short legal-training courses provided by 
various donors and organizations—many of which were criticized for being su-
perficial, supply-driven, uncoordinated, and overly focused on criminal law. This 
kind of training was rarely evaluated and was typically conducted without a base-
line, making it difficult to assess its impact. Generous per diems (daily allowances, 
ostensibly to cover travel, but in reality serving as a monetary incentive for staff 
to attend) made many institutions keen to secure training places for their staff, 
and this reinforced the appearance of a training industry. The three justice institu-
tions often competed for funds and influence and, to a certain extent, succeeded in 
playing donors against each other. Most assertive was the Supreme Court, which 
blocked an attempt to establish a joint stage course for all legal professionals and, 
instead, negotiated a bilateral agreement with one of the donor agencies.
At the same time, the entire justice system was eroded from within by the pro-
liferation of organized crime and the profitable narcotics trade—and, more gener-
ally, by a political system characterized by informality and patronage. As Giustozzi 
writes, Karzai, in expanding his power, was “not so much interested in institution 
building, as in the centralization of patronage” (Giustozzi 2009: 96). He and his 
family largely followed a kingly recipe of equating the expansion of state power 
with that of increased influence of the ruler and his inner circle (Forsberg 2010: 
21). No group was permitted to become too strong or too independent from the 
government. The government’s (or Karzai’s) tenuous control over the countryside 
was achieved through a series of deals and accommodations with local power 
holders, many of whom had initially established their position as military strong-
men in the immediate post-2001 period, often with the backing of international 
military forces.
Karzai repeatedly clashed with Western embassies and officials over appoint-
ments and policies as he worked to strengthen his own powerbase. The tech-
nocrats favored by Western donors, and who had often professed an ambitious 
reform agenda targeting nepotism and corruption, lost ground to more politi-
cal actors, particularly members of Hizb-e Islami32 and northern power brokers. 
The expansion of ISAF forces to the south of Afghanistan also brought tensions 
to the relationship between the Afghan president and his foreign allies. Karzai 
strongly condemned the civilian casualties caused by NATO military operations 
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and resented what he saw as NATO countries’ tendency to override his wishes and 
infringe upon the country’s sovereignty.
When the Obama administration took office in 2009, it was evident that the 
NATO-led military coalition was in trouble. Attacks, primarily against coalition 
and Afghan forces and government officials, had risen yearly, and by the summer 
of 2009, more than half the country—including three of the four main roads out 
of the capital—was considered unsafe. The U.S. Defense Department was argu-
ing for an expanded military operation (referred to as a “surge”), accompanied by 
higher levels of development aid to underwrite the military campaign. Others in 
Washington argued for a smaller U.S. military presence and a reduction of stated 
aims in Afghanistan—the abandonment of broader goals of development and state 
building. The outcome was a compromise, which gave the military much of its 
troop expansion, but on a limited time scale, with the U.S. president declaring that 
he wanted to start troop withdrawals after two years, in July 2011.
The military escalation took place under a particular counterinsurgency doc-
trine calling for all aspects of the international activities to support military efforts. 
As a result, international—and, in particular, United States—assistance was in-
creasingly put in the service of a security agenda of stabilization and political out-
reach. The justice sector became conceptualized as a cornerstone of the war effort, 
with the U.S. military claiming that government shortcomings in this area were an 
important driver of the insurgency. The insurgents, for their part, were targeting 
justice officials as part of an overall campaign against the government. In many 
districts, posts went unfilled, and in many provincial capitals, judges and prosecu-
tors were working under siege, holed up in fortified compounds and in fear for 
their lives. Paradoxically, it was in these areas that much of the aid agencies funded 
by the United States were told to focus their effort. One USAID official complained 
that they were instructed only to work in the south and east of the county, where 
it was impossible to get anything done because of insecurity. Judges were so afraid 
that they never left their compounds, and they spent their nights in the court-
house. Yet aid agencies had to continue to focus on these areas: “It’s the military. 
They say, ‘We want you there.’ ” Frustrated, the official said that he was hoping to 
be do something in north, but “low profile, so we don’t upset the military guys.”33
But the security situation continued to worsen, and the “state building” that 
was now considered integral to the war effort was bringing few results, at least 
not according to the military schedule. A considerable blow came with the Kabul 
Bank scandal in the autumn of 2010, when it emerged that supporters and officials 
in the Karzai administration had received close to a billion U.S. dollars in fraudu-
lent loans from one of Afghanistan’s main commercial banks. As Western frustra-
tions grew, there were calls for the abandonment of professed goals of institution 
building, democratization, and development. It was claimed that Afghan culture 
and society were inherently unsuitable to “Western” institutions of governance, 
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an argument that also absolved the West of any responsibility. The military, in 
particular, experimented with “traditional” institutions such as tribal councils. The 
urgency invested in reforming the legal system led to reinforced calls for interna-
tional support to informal justice processes, amid claims that there was simply no 
time to wait for the formal system to develop. This saw the proliferation of interna-
tional, ad hoc attempts to cultivate justice provisions through traditional councils 
and to formalize their status through a national framework. Overall, however, the 
objective of military victory was gradually replaced by one focused on enabling 
Afghan security forces to take over responsibility.
C ONCLUSIONS
In late 2014, a considerably more pro-Western government, less inclined to 
publically question NATO’s warfare, was inaugurated in Kabul—the so-called 
national unity government headed by Ashraf Ghani. The new government had 
been formed after a long and unusually disputed election process, characterized 
by high levels of fraud and uncertainty. Rather than arriving at a final result, the 
two contenders, Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, agreed to a power-sharing 
government brokered by the United States. Despite the unconstitutional nature 
of the arrangement, initial expectations of the new government were high. The 
new president, in particular, had run a campaign promising reform, economic 
development and to address corruption. Women activists found much hope in 
his rhetoric on gender issues and in the fact that his wife immediately took up a 
public role as the First Lady, whereas Karzai’s wife had been secluded from public 
life. In the justice sector, some attempts at change were made. New appointments 
to the positions of chief justice and attorney general generally found favor with 
reformists. Ghani also made an attempt to uphold his election promise to appoint 
a female Supreme Court judge, but this pledge was left unfulfilled when Parlia-
ment refused to approve his nominee, Anisa Rasouli. In general, however, much 
of the first year of the new administration was spent wrangling over appointments, 
while the economy and the security situation deteriorated drastically. As I was 
writing this book, it remained to be seen to what extent Ghani presidency would 
be substantially different from the Karzai era when it came to gender politics and 
the legal sector. Karzai’s presidency had been characterized by attempts to appease 
both conservative power bases and the demands of women’s rights advocates and 
international donors in a highly personalized and unpredictable way. The starkest 
example was President Karzai’s approach to the EVAW law, which is the subject of 
the next chapter.
One of the structuring assumptions of this book is that the ways in which gen-
der relations are publically regulated are not determined by religion, culture, or 
other fixed societal attributes but are contingent on situational politics. Indeed, the 
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historical sketch provided in this chapter shows close relations between attempts at 
sanctioning specific gender relations and broader political projects, whether it was 
the state centralization of Abdul Rahman Khan, the modernization of Amanullah, 
the socialist transformation of the PDPA, or the Islamist agenda of the Taliban. 
The infrastructure that the more routine regulation of gender relations depends 
on—the legal system—has similarly been shaped by specific historical trajectories. 
It is only by looking back at the tumultuous state-building history of Afghanistan 
that we can comprehend the origins of the unusual heterodoxy of the contem-
porary legal system, a heterodoxy that would prove to have important bearings 
on individual fates. By keeping a historical perspective, we can also more easily 
appreciate what was novel about the post-2001 order—an unprecedented interna-
tional or external interest and intervention into the detailed working of the legal 
system, including its treatment of women. That such an interest did not translate 
into absolute power and often produced paradoxical outcomes will be detailed in 
the chapters that follow.
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On July 19, 2009, President Karzai signed two laws. One was a revised version of 
the Shia Personal Status Law, which had created an uproar both in Afghanistan 
and abroad for its conservative articles on gender relations.1 Despite having un-
dergone a review triggered by the protests of women’s rights activists and inter-
national donors, the Shia law, as it was usually called, still contained a number of 
articles that these groups considered problematic. This final version appeared to 
sanction underage marriage, made women’s right to marry dependent on their 
fathers’ or grandfathers’ permission, and constructed a marital relation in which 
wives were supposed to submit to sexual relations on demand—or risk forfeit-
ing claims of maintenance from their husbands.2 The other law signed that day, 
however, was considered a triumph by many women’s rights activists. It was the 
Law on the Elimination of Violence against Women, (Qanon-e maneh khoshonat 
alie zan), normally referred to as the EVAW law in English. Four years had been 
spent drafting it. It was unprecedented in Afghan history, listing twenty-two acts 
as violence against women and mandating punishments for them. It also obliged 
the government to take specific actions to prevent violence and to support victims.
The EVAW law was regarded as important because, unlike the existing Penal 
Code, it designated rape (tajavoz-e jinsi) as a crime distinct from consensual adul-
tery, provided considerably stricter punishments for forced and underage mar-
riage, and criminalized a number of violations of women’s civil rights, such as 
the deprivation of inheritance or preventing a woman from pursuing work or 
an education. In general, the law was regarded by many as an important tool of 
advocacy, signaling that women were independent holders of rights and that the 
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Afghan state had an obligation to protect them from abuses at the hands of their 
families. Although the existing Penal Code covered crimes such as beating and 
murder, those who supported the new law argued that there was a tendency in 
legal practice and more broadly in Afghan society to view such acts as crimes only 
when they were committed by people outside the family. For its advocates, the new 
law was important because it explicitly stated that these acts were also punishable 
crimes when they took place within the family.3
In this chapter, I explore the significance of the EVAW law. I ask whether and 
to what extent the law challenged prevailing gender relations by making the state 
responsible for enforcing a new set of standards for women’s rights. Did the EVAW 
law signal a transformation whereby women were constituted as legal persons in 
their own right, under state protection, and where family sovereignty over women 
was replaced—or at least modified—by that of the state? As my analysis will make 
clear, these questions cannot be answered unequivocally, and this ambiguity is an 
essential part of the story of the EVAW law.
After explaining the complicated history of the EVAW law, the chapter explores 
the substantive debates about the law, its actual text, and its proposed and accepted 
revisions. However the key to understanding the significance of the law is in the 
processes through which it was promoted and implemented. These processes dem-
onstrate how meaningless it is to talk about a singular state authority in contempo-
rary  Afghanistan. In turn, this point carries important implications for the impact 
of both local and donor-driven women’s rights activism in the country. The fact 
that the EVAW law was contradicted on several points by the Shia law, and yet Pres-
ident Karzai signed them both on the same day and at the same gathering was an 
indication of this. That the president should almost simultaneously sign two laws 
in direct contradiction with each other was remarkable. It was one sign that, even if 
ratified, the EVAW law would only serve as a partial and ambiguous framework for 
the public regulation of gender violence in Afghanistan.
I show why and how this was the case by tracing how the EVAW law was 
conceived, promoted, contested, revised, and implemented. Important aspects 
of women’s rights activism, the logics of legal reform, and the political landscape 
in Afghanistan are revealed by chronicling and disentangling these processes. I 
find that the particular dynamics of these fields and their contingent interac-
tions gave form to a partial “EVAW law assemblage”. In the context of a polar-
ized political climate, the intimidating ascendancy of jihadi leaders who were 
able to dominate broader public debate (empowered, to a great extent, by the 
international intervention and the resentment against it), external dependence, 
the precedent of getting laws passed through informal political pressure instead 
of consensus and debate, the importance of claiming personal credit, and the 
need to produce “output,” the law’s supporters eventually chose a discreet and 
top-down strategy. The supporters of the law abandoned their earlier attempts 
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to get parliamentary approval and to rectify technical limitations in the text. 
Instead, the EVAW law was kept as a presidential decree and its technical weak-
nesses ignored for the moment. The mechanisms that were involved in the push 
for implementation of the law similarly revealed a top-down, discreet mode of 
action in which external support to some degree compensated for the lack of 
broader national anchoring.
THE TR AJECTORY OF THE EVAW L AW
At the time that the EVAW law was drafted, Afghanistan still had the civil and 
criminal codes dating from the late 1970s in place. The 1976 Penal Code included 
general provisions for murder, beating, and injury. These provisions did not dif-
ferentiate between men and women, although in practice, intra-familial violence 
was normally regarded as less serious, if considered a crime at all. However, the 
1976 Penal Code did include some provisions explicitly related to gender violence. 
Among these were an article significantly reducing punishment for “honor kill-
ings,” some rather unclear provisions on the punishments for rape and adultery, 
and articles criminalizing the forced marriage of an adult woman. Article 398, for 
example, stipulated a significant reduction of the punishment in cases of murder 
if the victim was a relative or spouse caught in the act of adultery: “A person, de-
fending his4 honor (namus), who sees his spouse, or another of his close relations, 
in the act of committing adultery or being in the same bed as another and imme-
diately kills or injures one or both of them, shall be exempted from punishment 
for laceration and murder but shall be imprisoned or punished for a period not 
exceeding two years, as a Taziri punishment.”
Section 2, chapter 8: “Adultery, Sodomy, and Violation of Honor”5 contained pro-
visions regarding rape and adultery. First of all, article 426 provided for hadd pun-
ishments (stoning or lashing) of adultery, stating that if in the crime of adultery “the 
conditions for hadd are not fulfilled6 or the charge of hadd is dropped, . . . the of-
fender shall be punished according to the provisions of this article.” Articles 427–28 
went on to set out the tazir punishments for “adultery and sodomy” (long-term 
imprisonment, i.e., no less than five years and no more than fifteen)7 and various ag-
gravating conditions. The use of the term zina (adultery) to seemingly include both 
rape and consensual sex outside of marriage (both premarital and extramarital sex), 
means that there was effectively no legal distinction between consensual adultery 
and rape in the code. In addition, article 429, perhaps referring to attempted rape or 
sexual assault, stated that a person who, “through violence, threat or deceit, violates 
the chastity (namus) of another or initiates the act” shall be sentenced to long-term 
imprisonment, not exceeding seven years. Finally, article 517 criminalized forced 
marriage (but only when the woman involved was of majority age). It also provided 
for stricter punishments if forced marriage happened under the pretext of baad.
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Rather than amending this existing legal framework, a group of women’s rights 
advocates, Afghan bureaucrats, and U.N. officials came to the conclusion that 
the most effective way to address the issue of violence against women would be 
to create a new law altogether, one that would directly criminalize a number of 
forms of violence and abuse. Most of my informants traced the first conceptions 
of the law to meetings in a commission established in 2005 by the Ministry of 
Women’s Affairs (MOWA) and UNIFEM to coordinate government responses to 
violence against women. The EVAW Commission, as it was called, was modeled 
on U.N.-directed efforts to combat violence against women elsewhere, which was, 
in turn, part of a broader global campaign against gender violence. Along with 
members from MOWA and UNIFEM, the commission also included members 
from other government officials, including female judges and prosecutors, rep-
resentatives of different U.N. agencies, and various staff working at NGOs that 
focused on women’s rights and the justice system. The commission often discussed 
reprehensible individual cases, and soon a consensus emerged that a new law that 
explicitly criminalized violence and abuses against women was needed.
Subsequently, and rather swiftly, the first version of the EVAW law was drafted 
by the legal department of MOWA. MOWA then officially submitted the draft to 
the Taqnin (“legislation”8) department in the Ministry of Justice on the Interna-
tional Women’s Day in 2006. UNIFEM (who had a large program on gender-based 
violence and also worked closely with MOWA on various issues) and many of the 
civil society organizations in Kabul had not been included in the drafting process, 
something that they viewed as an attempt by MOWA to retain control over the 
law as its own initiative. This was to be one of several incidents where MOWA’s 
complicated relationship with NGOs and women’s rights activists, often one of 
mistrust and sometimes competition, manifested itself.
Mandated in the 2001 Bonn peace agreement, MOWA was charged with main-
streaming gender into the policies and programs of other government ministries 
and quickly became a focal point for gender targeted donor assistance. The min-
istry, which had no core budget, was filled with a number of foreign advisors and 
Afghan “embeds” (Afghan staff from international organizations who were on as-
signment at the ministry), and its achievements would prove modest. It suffered 
from what was probably a deliberate strategy of ministerial appointments from 
President Karzai, who did not want a strong minister in a controversial field, and 
it was completely dependent on donor funding.9
The bulk of the implementation of the gender interventions was subcontracted 
to a myriad of international and national NGOs and private contracting compa-
nies. Some of these were staffed or led by Afghanistan’s fragmented local women’s 
rights activists, many of whom had recently returned to the country after living 
as refugees in neighboring countries, especially Pakistan. Staff at MOWA ac-
cused foreign-funded NGOs of resisting government coordination and operating 
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according to their own whims. The latter contended that MOWA attempted to 
monopolize the gender field and did little to solicit the opinions and skills of civil 
society. The tensions between MOWA and the NGOs would culminate in a 2011 
standoff over the status of the women’s shelters (detailed in chapter 4), but they 
also played a role in the development of the EVAW law. The fact that MOWA 
had drafted and submitted the EVAW law without including NGO staff, many of 
whom worked with shelters or provided legal aid to abused women, had upset 
members of this community. One of the Afghan activists later told me, “In 2005, 
MOWA started to draft a law. They invited the Supreme Court, Kabul University, 
people from the Ministry of Justice. This law was more like a code of ethics, very 
vague, a very weak law. They were hiding it from civil society. Actually civil soci-
ety only got a copy of it around [International] Women’s Day, when the draft was 
presented to the media.”10
In a bid to create a stronger law, a group of civil society activists—the  Afghan 
Women’s Network, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, Rights 
and Democracy, Humanitarian Assistance for the Women and Children of 
 Afghanistan—together with UNIFEM, started to work on a revised draft, reluc-
tantly presented by MOWA to the Taqnin in late 2007.11 Shortly thereafter, howev-
er, yet another draft was submitted, this one by the Women’s  Affairs Commission 
of Parliament. This draft, no more than four pages long, was perceived by other 
participants in the process as a blatant attempt by the female MP chairing the 
commission, Qadria Yazanpardast, to counter criticism that she could point to no 
tangible achievements so far in her role as chair. She denied this, stating that she 
had been unaware of the drafts others had produced and merely had wanted to 
give Afghan women “a gift on Women’s Day.”12
The Taqnin set out to create a single version from the three competing drafts, 
effectively discarding the third, short draft from the Women’s Affairs Commission. 
In early 2009, as the Taqnin was nearing the completion of its work on the EVAW 
law, concern over the Shia Personal Status Law was deepening and women’s rights 
activists and donors started to look to the EVAW law as a possible counterbalance. 
The Shia law had created a storm in Afghanistan and abroad when details about 
it leaked to the international press. The law had its origin in the Constitution’s 
article 131, which recognized the right of Shias to apply their own jurisprudence 
in matters of family law. This was a breakup of the monopoly that Sunni juris-
prudence had hitherto maintained in official Afghanistan, and to many Shias, it 
represented a historic recognition of their existence. Predictably, when an initia-
tive to codify a personal status law based on Shia (Jafari) jurisprudence got un-
derway, it quickly became entangled in identity politics (Oates 2009; Chaudhary, 
Nemat, and Suhrke 2011). Drafted under the supervision of prominent Shia cleric 
Asif Mohseni, seemingly on his own initiative, the law was an excessively detailed 
and conservative codification of Jafari fiqh. Among its contentious articles were 
56    Legal Regimes
provisions compelling wives to sleep with their husbands every fourth night and 
to apply makeup on their husbands’ request, articles stating that women could not 
leave the house without their husbands’ permission and that obedience and sexual 
submission were obligatory in order to receive maintenance, and a number of ar-
ticles permitting marriage with underage girls.
The Shia law passed through Parliament in obscure circumstances, prevented 
from proper distribution and discussion. Many Shia MPs were told that the impor-
tant thing was to get a separate family law for Shias and that questioning the con-
tent of the law should be avoided, because it would risk derailing the entire process. 
Conservative Sunni MPs argued that, as Sunnis, it was not right for them to debate 
the law, and MPs with a more secular outlook struggled to obtain copies of the 
draft and to find out when and where debates about it were taking place (Chaud-
hary, Nemat, and Suhrke 2011). As the law was quickly passed in both houses of 
Parliament and was signed into force by the president, details about it eventually 
appeared in the international press, creating outrage in Western countries (Boone 
2009; Gall and Rahimi 2009). At this point, human rights networks in Kabul, who 
had been trying to mobilize attention to the Shia law, received a sudden explosion 
of international support. However, by then, these networks had experienced much 
difficulty in accessing the process around the Shia law—obtaining the current ver-
sion of it, finding out where in the parliamentary system it was, and even engaging 
with the text, which was complicated and full of Arabic legal terminology. Given 
the difficulties they had faced in attempting to revise the Shia law, the networks 
had started to think of the EVAW law as a counterpoise to the Shia law. This line 
of reasoning was made possible by the fact that the EVAW law, like many laws 
promulgated at the time, contained an article stating, “The provisions of this law, if 
contradicted with provisions of other laws, shall prevail” (article 43).
That the EVAW law could prevail over the Shia law was evidently also an idea 
that President Karzai and the minister of justice found convenient. They were keen 
to placate the constituencies who had promoted the Shia law, but at the same time, 
they needed to address the anger of women’s rights activists and the donor com-
munity. Signing the EVAW law instead of revising the Shia law meant that they 
would stay clear of accusations of giving in to Western pressure. Thus the logic 
presented at the gathering on July 19, when the president had assembled a handful 
of female politicians and officials, was that the Shia law would be invalidated by the 
EVAW law. One of those present, a female MP, later told me that when she pointed 
out that the Shia law still contained problematic articles, they tried to “bribe” her 
with the EVAW law. Finding little support from the others present, she eventually 
endorsed the signing of both laws.
When I was in the office of the president, he asked me if I was happy with the [Shia] 
law. I said, “We are very happy, Mr. President, but there are some articles that we 
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would still like to change.” The Shia law had an article about orphans that seemed 
to permit child marriage, and I had suggested that to avoid this, there should be a 
minimum age of marriage at sixteen, or at least fifteen. I also raised the article that 
linked maintenance with obedience, the right of the husband to not give food if the 
woman is not obedient. [I said,] “In Iran, this article has proved difficult, because 
what exactly does it mean to be disobedient, and who can prove it? So, in the end, 
they removed the article. We should do the same in Afghanistan. Also, polygamy 
should not be unconditional, but by permission of the court.”
I spoke about these things, and the president said, Okay, I will send it back one 
more time to the [Shia] ulema. [Another woman present] then said, “No, it’s okay. 
Don’t send it back; Mosheni will be upset.” The minister of justice was saying, “Look, 
you have the EVAW law.” They were trying to bribe me with the EVAW law. All of 
them were saying that the Shia law is okay. What could I do? And [the minister in 
charge of] MOWA was there, but she did not say anything.”13
The Shia Personal Status Law had already been ratified by Parliament, but the 
signing of the EVAW law was based on article 79 of the Constitution, which al-
lowed room for the president to adopt legislation during parliamentary recess in 
“emergency situations.” Decrees signed by the president in this vein became laws 
upon signing but were to be submitted to Parliament within thirty days of the first 
session of the National Assembly, who would then have the power to reject the laws. 
Whether the circumstances at this time qualified as an “emergency situation” was 
perhaps debatable. The main motivation of the president was perceived as the need 
to placate constituencies who had protested the Shia law, and they, in turn, tended 
to see the signing of the EVAW law to be more important than procedural issues.
The EVAW law was then duly sent to the Parliament for review and ratification. 
Supporters of the law became increasingly worried that it would suffer significant 
revisions at the hands of conservative MPs that would dilute the value of the law 
or even turn it into an instrument of repression of women. Some people suggested 
that it would be better to withdraw it from Parliament and keep it as a presidential 
decree for the time being—or to arrange a deal with the speaker to quickly intro-
duce it to the plenary on a day when important conservative MPs were absent. 
But the Women’s Affairs Commission in the Lower House, tasked with preparing 
the law for plenary debate, instead sought to follow due process. Its chair, Fawzia 
Koofi, distributed the law to all the eighteen parliamentary commissions, which 
would send representatives to the Joint Commission, where the law would be dis-
cussed before it was brought to general debate.
The parliamentary proceedings were also a final opening for international legal 
professionals from the Criminal Law Reform Working Group (CLRWG) to im-
prove the EVAW law in technical terms. This was a joint Afghan and international 
group, chaired by the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and 
mandated to ensure consistency and coherence in the field of Afghan criminal law, 
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where a number of standalone pieces of legislation were being introduced. The 
group had already submitted comments on the EVAW law earlier, when Taqnin 
had forwarded them a draft, but their comments had been mostly ignored. Now, 
having—in their words—“intercepted the law” in its new version, when it had 
been discussed at one of the regular gender coordination meetings for donors and 
aid agencies in Kabul, they were unsettled when they discovered that the law still 
contained technical flaws.14 However, among the Afghan women’s rights activists 
and MPs who had supported the law from its inception, there was little interest 
in introducing revisions at this point. They argued that the chief purpose of the 
law was to make a political statement: to create awareness of the problem of vio-
lence and abuses against women and to make a stand against impunity for such 
acts. Introducing changes now—especially if they appeared to come from foreign 
quarters—was too risky and could play into the hands of conservative opponents.
After the individual committees had submitted their proposed amendments, 
the law was discussed in Joint Commission meetings. Early on, a dividing line be-
tween the liberal and mainly female MPs and a smaller group of conservative male 
MPs, led by Qazi Nazir Hanafi from Herat, who mostly had jihadi backgrounds, 
became evident. As will be described in more detail below, discussions crystallized 
around three issues: the question of beating, which some claimed was sanctioned, 
up to a point, by the Quran and was therefore beyond discussion; the right of 
fathers to marry off their underage daughters; and conditions for polygamy. The 
atmosphere in the meetings became increasingly aggressive as a larger number 
of conservative MPs started to attend. In the end, the meetings were suspended, 
after a verbal fight between a representative from the Ministry of Women’s  Affairs, 
brought in by the Committee on Women’s Affairs, and a male MP belonging to the 
jihadi group. Following an exchange of insults, the conservative MPs all walked 
out, declaring that an affront to one of them was an insult to them all. They re-
fused to return to discussions until a personal apology was offered and until their 
remaining demands were met. These demands centered on waiving the need for a 
husband to get the permission of his first wife for polygamous marriages, amend-
ing provisions that could be interpreted as limiting a husband’s prerogative in 
terms of sexual access to his wife, an exemption for fathers regarding imprison-
ment in cases of underage marriage, and the use of fines as punishments, which 
they argued was un-Islamic.15
The clashes in the Joint Commission gave ammunition to those who had 
suggested that the law was better left as a presidential decree and that the par-
liamentary process should be abandoned. They argued that the law risked being 
rejected outright, which would mean that the presidential decree that had enacted 
the EVAW law would become null and void. Even if this did not happen, the re-
visions demanded by conservative MPs could result in a much weaker law than 
what had been secured through the presidential decree. Key female MPs in the 
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Women’s Affairs Committee, who insisted that the law should remain on Parlia-
ment’s agenda, such as Fawzia Koofi and Sabrina Saqeb, were accused of using the 
parliamentary ratification process to put their stamp on the law and to claim credit 
for delivering it, even if this could mean losing the EVAW law altogether.
Western embassies were becoming similarly frustrated over the parliamentary 
process. They had lobbied parliamentarian powerbrokers such as speaker Yunus 
Qanooni to get the law approved in Parliament, but to no avail, and several mem-
bers of the diplomatic community in Kabul told me that it might perhaps be pref-
erable to leave it as a presidential decree for the time being.16 By early 2010, the 
original supporters the EVAW law had succeeded in removing it from the parlia-
mentary agenda. At this point, supportive government officials, women’s organiza-
tions, and donors were already working to support the implementation of the law 
as it had been decreed, and reports of prosecutions based on the law were starting 
to trickle in.
Yet this was not the end of the parliamentary tussles over the EVAW law. In 
2011, following the 2010 parliamentary elections, Fawzia Koofi reintroduced the 
law to the Joint Commission—many of the members of which were now newly 
elected MPs. Several of the questions over which there had been disagreement 
were reopened, such as polygamy and forced and underage marriage. As before, 
Qazi Hanafi and his legislation commission in Parliament17 were the law’s most 
ardent critics, and on some issues, fronts had hardened. Meetings were often con-
ducted solely between Fawzia Koofi and Qazi Hanafi, with other MPs unclear 
about the exact process being made. When, in the spring of 2013, Fawzia Koofi 
stated her intention to introduce the EVAW law to a plenary vote, other MPs and 
civil society groups protested that they had little sense of whether the law would 
pass or be rejected. Despite their campaign to make Fawzia Koofi change her 
mind—or in other ways remove the law from the parliamentary agenda—Fawzia 
Koofi proceeded to introduce the law to the plenary on May 18, 2013. She had 
claimed in advance that she had persuaded Qazi Hanafi to be absent,18 but if that 
was the case, she had miscalculated badly. Hanafi and like-minded MPs were there 
and made several inflammatory remarks, calling the law contrary to Islam and 
suggesting that its ratification would lead to revolution on the streets. After only 
fifteen minutes, speaker Abdul Raof Ibrahimi declared the debate over, saying that 
a special commission should be formed in order to investigate whether the law was 
in accordance with Islam.
Fawzia Koofi, badly discredited by the failed initiative, made no further at-
tempts to introduce the law for ratification. Internationally, the truncated debate 
was reported as a sign that Afghan women’s rights were in the process of back-
sliding (Sethna 2013; Arghandiwal and Aziz 2013). This was because the EVAW 
law—despite never having been approved in Parliament, had gradually come to 
gain the status, both internationally and nationally, as the singular most important 
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achievement of the Afghan women’s rights community. Significant funds had been 
allocated toward the dissemination of, training for, and monitoring of the law. It 
had featured prominently in Afghanistan’s first CEDAW report, submitted in 2011, 
and its implementation was a high-up item in donor assessments of overall prog-
ress in the country. The fifteen-minute debate in Parliament was thus perceived by 
many as a massive setback. This was the case even if, technically, the debate had 
actually done nothing to change the status of the law one way or the other.
“WHAT IS  THE BASIS  FOR THIS L AW? ” DISCURSIVE 
STR ATEGIES AND HIER ARCHIES
Having sketched the trajectory of the EVAW law from its initial conception to its 
possible demise, I now turn to the debates over its content. Below I explore which 
articles proved most contentious, the discursive parameters of the various forums 
where the law was discussed, and what this says about the intersections of gender 
and broader fields of power.
The Text of the EVAW Law
The law that was enacted as a decree in July 2009 and served as the basis of the 
discussions in Parliament consisted of forty-four articles. It enumerated twenty-
two forms of violence against women and provided punishments for them, which 
ranged from fines and various lengths of imprisonment to the death penalty, the 
latter in cases where the victim was killed as a result of a sexual assault.
Forms of Violence Listed in the EVAW Law
 1. Rape
 2. Forced prostitution
 3. Publicizing the identity of a victim in a damaging way
 4. Burning or use of chemical substances
 5. Forcing a woman to commit suicide or to self-immolate
 6. Causing injury or disability
 7. Beating
 8. Selling and buying women for the purpose of or under pretext of marriage
 9. Baad (giving away a woman or girl to settle a dispute)
 10. Forced marriage
 11. Preventing the choice of husband
 12. Marriage before the legal age
 13. Cursing, humiliation, or intimidation
 14. Harassment or persecution
 15. Forced isolation
 16. Forced drug consumption
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 17. Denial of inheritance rights
 18. Denial of the right to property
 19.  Denial of the right to education, work, and access to health services and 
other rights provided by law
 20. Forced labor
 21. Marrying more than one wife without observing Article 86 of the Civil Code
 22. Denial of relationship
Of physical acts, the EVAW law named rape, statutory rape, immolation and acid 
attacks, beating, and violence leading to injury or disability as acts of violence against 
women. The punishments for these crimes were stipulated mostly by reiterating the 
punishments already provided in the Penal Code. However, whereas the Penal Code 
had been unclear about whether rape was a crime distinguishable from adultery (i.e., 
if one of the parties could be considered an innocent and violated victim of the act), 
the EVAW law differentiated between rape and adultery by using the term tajavoz-e 
jinsi (literally, “sexual violation”) to refer to rape. Unlike zina, tajavoz-e jinsi was not 
a term originating in Islamic fiqh (on fiqh, see chap. 1, n. 2); it was a newer term in 
Afghanistan, used mainly in colloquial and media discourse to refer to rape.19
The EVAW law stated that if a person commits rape (tajavoz-e jinsi) of an 
adult woman, the offender “shall be sentenced to continued imprisonment in 
 accordance with the provision of article 426 of the Penal Code,” and if it results in 
the death of the victim, the perpetrator “shall be sentenced to the death penalty” 
( article 17).20 It also stated that consensual sexual relations with an underage girl 
should be punished in the same way as rape. The law was therefore significant in 
making rape a crime distinguishable from adultery and in making statutory rape 
(sexual relations with a minor girl) a crime on par with rape.
As for punishments for causing injury and disability, the EVAW law merely 
reiterated specific articles in the Penal Code. In the view of some, simply referring 
to the Penal Code made parts of the EVAW law superfluous, since it was repeat-
ing punishments already provided in existing laws. However, many civil society 
supporters of the EVAW law argued that it was nevertheless important to have a 
law that specifically stated that punishments would apply equally if the victim of 
violence was female. In existing legal practice, this was often not the case, they 
argued, especially when a woman was abused by a family member.
In addition to the forms of physical violence already mentioned in the Penal 
Code, the EVAW law, more controversially, made a number of more minor of-
fenses punishable. A person who beats a woman but causes no damages or injury 
was to be imprisoned for no more than three months (article 23), harassment or 
persecution of a woman was to be punishment by a prison sentence of no less than 
three months (article 30), and the same punishment was provided for those guilty 
of verbal abuse, degradation, and even cursing a woman (article 29).
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As with the existing legal framework, forced marriage and baad (giving away 
a woman or girl in marriage as compensation or as a conciliatory gesture) were 
deemed punishable offenses. However, the punishments provided for these crimes 
in the EVAW law were considerably stricter, a minimum of two years imprison-
ment for forced marriage and up to ten year for the act of baad. Moreover, the 
EVAW law also criminalized underage marriage, selling a woman for the purpose 
of marriage, and preventing a woman from marrying according to her choice. The 
law also specified numerous other violations of the Civil Code and civil matters as 
punishable offenses. Polygamy in breach of the conditions set out in the 1977 Civil 
Code21 was to be punished by a short-term imprisonment of no less than three 
months. Depriving a woman of her inheritance or property, denial of an actual 
familial or marital relationship to a woman (for whatever purpose), prohibiting 
a woman from pursuing an education or work, forcing her into isolation (for in-
stance, by stopping her from seeing her parents), and forcing her to use narcotics 
were all to be punished with short prison sentences of one to six months. In addi-
tion, forced labor was to be punished with a six-month imprisonment, and forcing 
a woman into prostitution or to commit suicide was to be punished with prison 
for up to ten years.
Debates Prior to the Final Decree of the Law
Before the EVAW law was decreed in July 2009, it went through a number of 
changes.22 For instance, the draft that had been prepared by civil society activists 
and UNIFEM, which had been handed over to the Taqnin, contained elaborate 
and quite radical provisions, such as protective rulings and restraining orders and 
the suggestion that domestic violence could be prosecuted without a complaint 
from the victim.23 This draft also went much further in attempting to diminish the 
power of husbands over their wives. Article 53 made marital rape a crime, stating 
that “any intercourse with a wife without her consent is considered rape.” It said 
that polygamy was to be subject to the approval of the courts, who would seek the 
first wife’s approval, and in any case, a second marriage could be approved only if 
the first wife was barren, insane, or seriously ill. Violations would be punishable 
with up to five years in prison. The draft stated that rape victims could not be de-
tained or tried for zina, and that husbands accusing their wives of not having been 
virgins when they married could be punished for the hadd crime of qazf (slander, 
false accusation of zina).24 The draft also abrogated article 398 of the Penal Code, 
which made the killing of adulterous female relatives a minor crime.
MOWA was uncomfortable with many of these provisions. In interviews with 
me, MOWA staff recalled the civil society draft as being too far removed from 
Islamic law. The head of MOWA’s legal department—one of the main initiators of 
the law—told me that she thought that the civil society draft had been influenced 
by foreigners (i.e., Westerners) and, as a result, did not sufficiently incorporate 
“Good Women Have No Need for This Law”    63
sharia. This, she felt, would reflect badly upon MOWA, who had officially submit-
ted the law, and could put her ministry in conflict with the Supreme Court and the 
ulema council.
Civil society made their own draft. They had included some input from foreigners 
and, as a result, the draft was not based on sharia. . . . Seeing that there was no refer-
ence to sharia, I refused to present this draft as a MOWA draft. . . . If we had accepted 
that, it could have created some problems for MOWA. What I suggested was that—
okay, as we had already sent the MOWA draft [to Taqnin], I can help civil society to 
send a copy of their draft to Taqnin as well, [and] as [a] result, the final law will be 
even more enriched, as material from this draft could also be used.25
In the end, the law that was finalized by Taqnin in early 2009 was a much shorter 
and simplified version, and it did not include the more radical provisions from civil 
society. It also had some technical shortcomings, which was what most interna-
tional agencies focused on in their subsequent work with the law. Representatives 
of UNIFEM, UNAMA, and UNODC protested what they argued was excessive 
and unenforceable criminalization, such as the inclusion of verbal degradation and 
cursing as crimes and up to twenty years imprisonment for sexual harassment like 
groping.26 Some of the language in the law was impossible to work with, they said, 
such as the terms “forced prostitution” or “forced suicide.”27 They also wanted the 
EVAW law to explicitly amend existing provisions in the Penal Code when the 
two laws differed, arguing that not doing so would lead to a contradictory legal 
framework causing confusion for judges and prosecutors. Moreover, since the law 
focused only on crimes against women, U.N. legal advisors argued that it created a 
loophole in which sexual violence and assault against boys and men were effective-
ly decriminalized. They suggested that the law be renamed the Law on Elimination 
of Violence against Women and Sexual Violence.28 Additionally, they proposed that 
the law define rape in specific terms: “the penetration of the vagina, anus or mouth 
with an object or body part, accompanied by violence, threat or deceit.”29
These suggestions were mainly rejected by the Taqnin and the Afghan women’s 
rights activists who had been promoting the law. The head of the Taqnin,30 an 
experienced and generally respected official who had worked in the Ministry of 
Justice for decades, explained to me that he had thought the suggestions to amend 
the Penal Code was unrealistic and would complicate matters, when there was an 
imminent need for the EVAW law due to the suffering of Afghan women. He also 
thought that the suggestion to include a physical definition of rape would have 
pushed the sensitivities of Afghan society too far. It would have been very embar-
rassing for the Taqnin, he argued, to present such phrases to, for instance, the 
Supreme Court.31 Moreover, according to the view of the Taqnin, the EVAW law 
did not decriminalize sexual violence against boys and men, as this was already 
included in the Penal Code and still valid.
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The Afghan women’s rights activists who discussed the international inputs 
also objected to many of the suggestions. They argued that to specifically repeal or 
amend other laws would not be accepted by the Taqnin or the legislators and, as 
a result, the law would be rejected in its totality. For instance, one senior  Afghan 
staff member at an international women’s rights organization stated that the judges 
who had implemented the Penal and Civil Codes for years (and sometimes de-
cades) believed that these laws “were written in stone” and would revolt against 
open attempts to amend them. He reasoned it would be unwise for the activist or-
ganizations to “make [their] intentions clear” by explicitly announcing that some 
of the articles in the EVAW law were, in fact, different from those of the existing 
laws. It was better to simply refer to the Penal Code—or, in the cases where the 
EVAW law differed from the Penal Code, to make separate provisions without spe-
cifically amending the latter. And since the EVAW law contained an article stating 
that it overrode all other laws, this would not be a problem.32
The disagreements between the international legal experts and the Afghan of-
ficials and activists reflected a different understanding of the purpose of the law. 
Whereas the former emphasized the need for a technically sound law and one that 
was in line with other laws in terms of punishments, the latter were focused on the 
symbolic and political impact of the law. They argued that given the widespread 
discrimination against women in Afghanistan, a law that was solely for them and 
that provided harsh punishments would go some way in rebalancing their posi-
tion in society and the legal system, even if it could not be implemented in full.33 
This line of argument also testified to a top-down way of thinking about political 
change, a point to which I will return below.
“Good Women Do Not Need This Law”: Discussions in Parliament
Many of the people who had supported the EVAW law were worried that it would 
meet with considerable resistance in Parliament, and as it turned out, their fears 
proved justified. During the autumn of 2009, seven meetings were held in the Joint 
Commission debating the law.34 The Women’s Commission, tasked with chairing 
the meetings and functioning as a secretariat for the revisions in Parliament, had 
added their own revisions to the law. These were minor and without consequences 
for the overall protection and rights afforded to women in the version that had 
been decreed that summer. Indeed, one of the members of the commission con-
fided that some of revisions were silly and had been put there simply so that they 
could be easily removed in order to show flexibility to their adversaries.35 In addi-
tion, the other commissions had reviewed the law, and some—three in total—had 
submitted proposed amendments in writing. Of these, the amendments submit-
ted by the Legislation Commission of Parliament were the most comprehensive. 
Its representative in the joint discussions, Qazi Nazir Ahmed Hanafi—a former 
mujahed from Herat—emerged as the leader of the conservative MPs who sought 
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to block the law or amend it significantly.36 The proposed amendments by the Leg-
islation Commission, which would be the focal points of discussions in the Joint 
Commission, centered around reinstating in the EVAW law the prerogatives of 
husbands and fathers over their wives and daughters, justified by references to the 
Quran and Islamic jurisprudence. They included objections to a set minimum age 
for marriage, as it was argued that sharia law permits marriage of a girl when she 
has reached maturity (i.e., puberty); the right of a father to marry off his underage 
daughter without her consent; the right of a husband to demand that his wife not 
leave the house without his permission; the right of a husband to beat his wife un-
der certain conditions, as stipulated by sharia; and the right of a husband to marry 
several wives, provided he observes justice between them.37 The amendments also 
took issue with the tendency in the law to impose prison sentences for actions 
such as cursing or preventing a marriage, arguing that these matters should not be 
criminalized and that, in general, the law risked “breaking up the family” through 
excessive use of imprisonment.
The first item of controversy that arose in the discussions was the question of 
beating or battery (lat-e kop). Arguing that the Holy Quran prescribes beating as 
a last resort in cases where the wife disobeys her husband, several MPs claimed 
that article 5(7), which listed beating as a form of violence, was therefore contrary 
to the Quran.38 Although everyone present agreed that beating resulting in visible 
injury was not permissible, the head of the Legislation Commission and others 
contended that it was unclear whether or not the article also prohibited what they 
saw as quranically prescribed beating, and, therefore, the article was problematic. 
Going against the Holy Quran simply based on the wishes of a few random women 
was unacceptable, the Legislation Commission stated in their submitted amend-
ments.39 While some protested this literal reading of the Quran and argued that it 
was outdated, it was agreed that beating should be defined in such a way that it was 
clear that it did not refer to the quranically prescribed disciplinary action. How-
ever, at a later meeting, when the head of the Legislation Commission was absent, 
the article was quickly approved in its original form.
Another controversy in the discussions was over the marriage of underage girls 
and the prerogative of fathers to arrange marriages for their daughters against 
their will, an issue that resurfaced several times. With reference to the rights of 
guardianship in Hanafi fiqh, it was suggested, first, that setting a minimum age for 
marriage was against sharia and, second, that in cases in which girls were young 
and wanted to marry “inappropriately,” fathers were better positioned to make 
decisions about their marriage and hence should be permitted to override their 
daughters’ choices and force them to marry someone more appropriate—(one MP 
offered the example of a daughter wanting to marry a man of a lower class: “Do you 
want to marry your daughter to someone smelly and dirty, someone who cleans 
toilets?”).40 The amendment submitted by the Legislation Commission read: “If 
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the father is fully authorized [competent] and considers all aspects of the marriage 
and gives the dowry to his daughter, the girl’s refusal shall not be accepted, as her 
foresight about the future is much less than her father’s.”41 This text was not incor-
porated, but the Joint Commission agreed that “kind fathers and grandfathers” 
should be exempted for punishments for arranging an underage marriage.42
The question of the extent to which polygamy should be regulated—and to 
what extent breaches of such regulations punished—was another matter where 
the women MPs met with vehement opposition from the conservatives. In its writ-
ten amendments, the Legislation Commission had stated, “Marrying more than 
more wife is not violence, it is a [natural] sexual drive (khast-e jinsi). Considering 
marrying more than one wife violence is contrary to the provisions of the Holy 
Quran.”43 Female MPs argued that the conditions under which polygamy could be 
permitted were not stricter than what was already stated in the Civil Code, though 
they conceded that two years’ imprisonment for breaches—a suggestion they had 
themselves made—was perhaps somewhat excessive. At the time that discussions 
in Parliament broke down later that autumn, there was still no agreement on the 
article on polygamy.
Article 17, on rape, was contested by some of the conservative MPs, who ar-
gued that the punishment was too strict. In particular, they protested that the law 
undermined a husband’s right to intercourse with his wife, even if there was no 
explicit mention of rape within marriage in the law. In general, the conservative 
male MPs questioned the need for stricter and better-specified punishments for 
rape (including a ban on presidential pardons on rapes and some other crimes). 
The background to the proposed ban on presidential pardons was a series of high-
profile rape cases in which the convicted perpetrators had been set free by par-
dons issued by President Karzai or the opaque workings of the Supreme Court, 
after serving only a brief period of their sentence. Many of the women in the Joint 
Commission wanted to keep this ban in the EVAW law (and, in private, some even 
proposed the death penalty for rape). But the male conservative MPs argued that 
such a ban was unconstitutional. They also worried that because the law dealt only 
with rape and did not mention consensual zina, it suggested that the latter was not 
an offense at all.
As the discussions proceeded, different female MPs suggested some additional 
acts that should be added to the twenty-two forms of violence against women that 
the decree had listed. Two of these were readily accepted in the Joint Commission: 
the nonpayment of maintenance (nafaqa, a wife’s allowance, normally to cover 
necessities such as food, clothes, and medicine) and preventing a woman from 
exercising her political rights.44 A third suggestion, however, proved more con-
troversial: honor killing (qatl-e namus). In fact, it was to be the issue over which 
discussions broke down. The Taqnin department in the Ministry of Justice had 
removed honor killing from an earlier draft, arguing that the crime of murder was 
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already covered in the Penal Code. In Parliament, there were no suggestions to 
amend article 398 of the Penal Code, which reduced punishment for the killing of 
female family members and their lovers caught in flagrante delicto to a maximum 
of two years imprisonment. Everyone was apparently in agreement that there was 
such a thing as “real” or legitimate honor killing when a man discovered his wife 
or female relative in the act of adultery. Rather, the problem was over a man who 
killed his wife or female family member and then falsely or casually claimed that 
she had been engaged in an adulterous act. The representative of the Taqnin and 
the conservative male MPs contended that this act simply amounted to murder 
and was already covered in the Penal Code. To single it out as a special category of 
crime in the EVAW law was unprecedented in Afghan legislation and, moreover, 
actually amounted to eroding women’s legal protection. Female parliamentarians 
and representatives of MOWA argued that because this kind of murder was so 
common, it should be included in the EVAW law so that the difference between 
legitimate and illegitimate honor killings could be explained, and the latter pun-
ished appropriately. As one female MP stated, “In so many cases, there was no 
[sexual] relation—there was no bed—but the woman was killed. This is a prob-
lem, and we should not ignore it. What is the punishment for those who kill their 
 innocent daughter?”45
Eventually, in the last meeting, most participants agreed that in cases of honor 
killing, the EVAW law would state that if article 398 of the Penal Code was not 
applicable (i.e., if the woman was not directly caught in the act of adultery), the 
perpetrator should be punished for the crime of murder. This was a remarkable 
concession from the women’s side—an agreement that men could take the law 
into their own hands when “real” honor was at stake. But before they could pro-
ceed further, one of the conservative male MPs declared that he did not agree with 
the proposed solution. Why this was the case never became clear, because the 
discussion suddenly escalated. A representative of MOWA quickly retorted that 
his agreement or disagreement did not matter, as the majority was in concord. The 
MP, infuriated, started insulting the MOWA representative: “You are a prostitute! 
You have given money to get this position. Unlike you, I am a representative of the 
people!” To which she responded, “You are the one who gave money to get your 
position! You gave banquets to get votes. I am a professor, a teacher. I do not care 
for illiterate men like you.”46 In a show of loyalty to a fellow mujahed, 47 the conser-
vative male MPs all got up and left the room, stating, as they departed, “We shall 
see how you will be able to pass this law in the plenary.” Bewildered, the female 
MPs apologized to the MOWA representative, but they asked her not to attend any 
further meetings. “These men are used to us,” they said. “We know how to deal 
with them, but they do not accept outsiders.”
In 2011, a year and a half later, when the discussions were reopened, many of 
the MPs were new, and the original decree from 2009 was used as the starting 
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point.48 It was the same issues that caused debate: underage and forced marriage, 
polygamy, and the question of “permissible” beating. In addition, following the 
2011 controversy over the women’s shelters (see chapter 4), the shelters had now 
become one of the issues where Hanafi’s commission refused to compromise. 
Rather than by shelters, the commission proposed that victims of violence should 
be protected by parents or other mahram individuals,49 under the supervision of a 
judge.50 Although Fawzia Koofi later claimed that the Joint Commission, through 
personal meetings between herself and Hanafi, had reached agreement on every-
thing but a minimum age of marriage, most of these issues resurfaced during the 
plenary debate in May 2013, where several conservative MPs protested the law’s 
restrictions on polygamy, permissible beating, and forced marriage, as well as its 
references to women’s shelters.
The discussions over the EVAW law had revealed particular discursive hierar-
chies and strategies. Occupying absolute authority in the discussion were referenc-
es to the Quran and sharia. The female MPs made systematic attempts to ground 
their arguments in sharia, often emphasizing that they had sharia-based reasons 
for their claims. This was only partially successful, as none of them could speak 
Arabic or was thoroughly conversant in Islamic law, and the conservative MPs 
often outmaneuvered them. In the Joint Commission, the head of the Legislation 
Commission was often the only person present who was able to quote at length 
in Arabic and who claimed detailed knowledge of Hanafi fiqh. This put him in a 
unique position, and others frequently deferred to him because of it.
The frequent references to sharia effectively also undermined the authority of 
Shias. Many of the more liberal Islamic scholars in Kabul were Shia, often having 
studied in a more pluralistic scholarly environment in Iran, but their readings of 
fiqh were rejected by the Sunni MPs. When a Shia scholar was trying to make an 
argument about what Islamic law said about underage marriage, a Sunni MP re-
sponded condescendingly, effectively rendering him irrelevant to the debate: “My 
dear, you are Jafari. I care only for Hanafi and Maliki fiqh.”51 This was a barely con-
cealed reminder to the scholar that, as a Shia, his historical place in the religious 
hierarchy of Afghanistan was one of insignificance.
During the plenary debate in May 2013, religious arguments were particularly 
pronounced. Many of the conservative MPs angrily spoke against the EVAW on 
religious grounds. One asked, “God [Khudawand] says that you can marry up to 
four wives. . . . What should we do—change God’s law?”52 Another, Mullah Tora-
kheil, argued, “Mr. Speaker, This law is in contradiction with several aspects of 
the verses of the Quran. Article 3 of the Constitution explicitly states that those 
laws that are contrary to sharia and the sacred religion of Islam have no validity 
whatsoever!” Abdul Satar Khawasi even questioned President Karzai’s judgment, 
given that he had signed a law so obviously in contradiction with Islam: “I am sur-
prised. . . . Yet again, I am asking the presidential palace—how was possible that 
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the president approved such a decree that contravenes sharia and religion? He has 
himself promulgated the Constitution, signed it into law, article 3 of the Constitu-
tion says that nothing can be contrary to the beliefs of the sacred religion of Islam. 
But even so, five or six of the provisions of the decree that the president signed are 
explicitly in contradiction and opposed to the word of God [Kalamullah]!”
The 2004 Constitution was another joint reference point for the discussions, 
and throughout the debates on the EVAW law none of the participants openly 
challenged the Constitution or any of its provisions. Indeed, as shown above, in the 
plenary debate, in particular, several of the opponents of the law invoked  article 3 
of the Constitution, which states that “no law shall be contrary to the beliefs of the 
sacred religion of Islam.” Afghan laws written after 2004 normally started with a 
reference to specific articles in the Constitution as reasons for their enactment, 
and the EVAW law presented to Parliament did so as well. It referred to article 24, 
which stipulated the state’s duty to upheld the liberty and dignity of human beings, 
and article 54, which obligated the state to protect the well-being of the family, the 
fundamental unit of society, and to eliminate traditions contrary to the provisions 
of Islam. Earlier, there had been suggestions to also refer to article 22, on gender 
equality, and article 7, on the state’s obligation to abide by international treaties 
and conventions it had signed, as well as the U.N. Declaration on Human Rights. 
This had been rejected by the head of the Taqnin, probably to avoid making the 
law more controversial than it already was to the conservatives in the Parliament. 
 Article 22 was, however, invoked by one of the conservative MPs when he pro-
tested the EVAW law’s blanket ban on pardons for crimes covered by the EVAW 
law—he argued that this ban infringed on the rights of men.53
The 1976 Penal Code was also often defended by the conservative men. Some 
of them stated that the Penal Code provided a sufficient framework for violence 
against women, making most of the provisions of the EVAW law, if not the law 
itself, unnecessary. The 1977 Civil Code, on the other hand, proved less unassail-
able. When it seemed to contradict their interpretations of sharia, the conservative 
MPs declared that the Civil Code was of little importance to them. For instance, 
when many other participants in the discussions protested that the Civil Code 
prohibited underage marriage, one of the conservative male MPs retorted, “The 
Civil Code is not the book of Allah. The father has the right to marry off a girl 
whether she is young or old.”54 Some of the supporters of the EVAW law started 
to worry that, as a consequence of the parliamentary process, they might end up 
not only with a significantly weakened version of the EVAW law but also with an 
invalidated Civil Code, which, in many respects, provided women with rights in 
relation to marriage (see chapter 1). This, they argued, was a sign that the very idea 
of putting the EVAW law through Parliament had been a mistake from the outset.55
The women MPs were careful not to make references to human rights as a jus-
tification for the EVAW law. Likewise, the accusation that the law was in essence 
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a foreign invention—“a gift from the foreigners” as one legal scholar had con-
temptuously called it56—was never openly stated in the debates. Yet the possibility 
of such charges being raised—and the risk of their ramifications—existed as an 
underlying threat, of which all parties were well aware. There was a sense among 
some of the civil society activists who attended the discussions that the conserva-
tive men were trying to tease out an explicit admission that the EVAW law was 
indeed “foreign” in origin when they repeatedly asked, “What is the basis of this 
law?” (Mabna-ye in qanon chi ast?). If such a trap was laid, the women MPs suc-
cessfully avoided it. Instead of referring to human rights or international con-
ventions, they appealed to the importance of nurturing the health of the family, 
eradicating traditions contrary to Islam, and giving women the rights they were 
afforded according to sharia, in particular in relation to inheritance, the choice 
of a marriage partner, and education. The conservative men, in turn, built many 
of their arguments on claims that the law would “destroy the basis of the fam-
ily,” in particular, by putting fathers and husbands in prison. Some of them also 
expressed the sentiment, although less openly, that only immoral women were in 
need of the law: the kind of protection it provided was illegitimate and suspect. In 
one of the discussions, one of the conservative male MPs rather loudly muttered, 
“This law is, anyway, for the women of the street [i.e., prostitutes]. Good women 
living under the protection of Islam have no need for this law.”57 The statement 
reflected a commonly made assertion that women who left the house on their own 
were transgressors undeserving of protection or recognition. To feminist Afghans, 
both male and female, such sentiments were deeply offensive. As a female shelter 
manager stated to me in an interview: “In Afghanistan, what kind of woman is re-
garded as deserving of their male relatives’ protection and support? A woman who 
is obedient, loyal, always thinks about the name of her male relatives, one who is 
silent and tolerates everything. Not one who goes to court to complain, who goes 
public, who goes outside.”58
Some hoped that the EVAW law could go some way in challenging the notion 
that women who ventured into public places without male escorts were forfeiting 
their rights to safety: “It’s important that the EVAW law states explicitly that the 
government has an obligation to protect women in public places. Because there 
are these ideas in Afghan culture that good Afghan women are those who tolerate, 
who suffer, who stay at home and do not open their mouth. And that those who 
leave the house are not good women.”59
The strategies at work in the negotiations over the EVAW law in Parliament had 
revealed a discursive field structured by Islamic terms. Justifying arguments by 
reference to the provisions of Islam was paramount. But the two sides approached 
their references to Islam in different ways. The supporters of the law argued that 
threats to the realization of “true Islam” were Afghanistan’s internal conditions 
and harmful and ignorant traditions (or, occasionally, male power and patriarchy). 
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For the conservatives, on the other hand, the threat was cast in the form of foreign 
influence, which could undermine the otherwise strong Islamic foundations of 
Afghan society. Traditionally, it was alleged, Afghan women sensibly preferred to 
stay at home under the protection of fathers and husbands. The specter of women’s 
increased visibility, promiscuity, mobility, and subversion of male authority was 
presented as a novel and dangerous break with these foundations, an unnatural de-
velopment that could be explained only by atheism and by foreign contamination.
In any case, it was not as if the conservative MPs “won” the debate solely based 
on the merits of their argumentation. Underpinning the rhetoric of the conserva-
tive MPs were more subtle dynamics that made most of the female MPs unwilling 
to risk a full-on public confrontation and, in the end, led the supporters of the 
EVAW law to choose a more discreet way of promoting the law and supporting 
its implementation. In order to fully appreciate the power relations at work—and 
to assess the strategies that the supporters of the law employed—I turn from sub-
stantive debates to the processes through which the EVAW law was conceived, 
promoted, contested, and (in parts) implemented.
POLITICAL AMBIGUIT Y AND DISCREET LOBBYING
The process of drafting and advocating for the EVAW law revealed the constraints 
under which Afghan women’s rights activists worked and the strategies they ad-
opted as a result. MOWA existed in an increasingly tense relationship with the 
assertive and often more radical “civil society activists”—mainly staff in interna-
tionally funded aid organizations, along with a small group of government legal 
officials. Staff at MOWA had been unwilling to share the draft of the EVAW law 
with them until the day it was handed over to the Ministry of Justice. This upset 
many of the civil society activists and confirmed their opinion of MOWA as a non-
transparent institution that would rather produce substandard work than consult 
others for help. More dramatic, however, was the sudden presentation of the third 
draft of the EVAW law, the one written by the then head of the Women’s Commis-
sion in Parliament, Qadria Yazanpardast. As stated above, Yazanpardast claimed 
to me and to others that she had been unaware of the existence of the two drafts 
already produced and merely wanted to present Afghan women with a “gift” on 
International Women’s Day, an occasion widely celebrated among urban groups in 
the country.60 Others contested this, however, saying that her draft carried exactly 
the same title as the other drafts and was clearly an attempt to improve her meager 
record of achievements by appropriating the whole idea.
Divisions also appeared once the EVAW law reached Parliament. At that point, 
Qadria Yazanpardast, a Tajik MP and self-declared supporter of the jihad, had 
been displaced as the leader of the Women’s Commission in an acrimonious lead-
ership contest. In her place were two younger, more savvy female MPs, Fawzia 
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Koofi and Sabrina Saqeb, who played the lead role in attempting to steer the law 
through Parliament and defend it against conservative assaults. Like Yazanpar-
dast before them, they had links to the opposition group in Parliament, but they 
were also perceived as being personally beholden to the powerful parliamentary 
speaker, Yunus Qanooni. They did not succeed in gaining the trust of other female 
or progressive MPs, who questioned Koofi’s and Saqeb’s personal commitment to 
women’s rights and accused them of pushing through with a counterproductive 
process in order to be able to claim the EVAW law as their own legacy.
The competition, at times bitter, that existed between the various actors pro-
moting the EVAW law reflected a broader set of dynamics in Afghan politics: per-
sonalization and individual competition.61 Of this, more will be said shortly, but 
here I would like to suggest that the international aid given to women’s activism 
was operating in such a way as to reinforce such dynamics. Jad points to the con-
tradictions between NGOs and social movements and the way in which “the NGO 
structure creates actors with parallel power based on their recognition at the in-
ternational level, and easy access to important national and international figures” 
(Jad 2004: 39; also see Jad 2007). Her analysis can be extended to any entity whose 
existence is largely dependent on international funding. International aid, as a bu-
reaucratic practice, rewards time-limited achievements that can be formulated as 
the realization of objectives, targets, and benchmarks. Continued existence is de-
pendent on the ability to “deliver” concrete “outputs” presentable in technocratic 
templates rather than the mobilization of large constituencies and coalitions. To 
some extent, this could explain the appearance of the three competing drafts and 
the seeming prioritization of personal aggrandizement and people trying to take 
credit for the law over the actual quality of the law being passed. For instance, 
MOWA—which, since its establishment, had been dependent on international 
funding and which recently had been under fire from both donors and civil soci-
ety for a lack of tangible accomplishments—was understandably keen to protect 
the EVAW law as its own achievement and to see it realized sooner rather than 
later. This was presumably an important reason why, rather than going through a 
long process of carefully revising the law and anchoring it more broadly within the 
women’s movement, MOWA was anxious to see the law ratified and implemented 
without delay. The third draft, the one submitted by the head of the Women’s Com-
mission in Parliament, was interpreted, similarly, as a strategy to demonstrate her 
individual achievement—even if it was at the cost of quality and collective gains.
The subsequent promotion of the EVAW law, once a single draft had been 
consolidated, took place through a small constellation of women’s rights activists 
and diplomats. Rather than seeking broader alliances, in civil society or in Parlia-
ment, the law was fast-tracked through a presidential decree in a manner that 
reflected a small, externally dependent, and top-down women’s rights movement 
more generally. When made aware of the technical weaknesses in the law—how 
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it contradicted existing laws—the civil society activists and MOWA protested that 
such issues were of secondary importance. The most important objective was to 
get the law approved and to start implementing it, thus sending a signal that im-
punity for violence against women could not be tolerated.
This approach must be situated within the larger practices of lawmaking by decree 
referred to in chapter 1—devising and promoting a law in relative isolation and as a 
stand-alone piece of legislation was by no means particular to Afghan  actors. As Hart-
mann and Klonowiecka-Milart (2011) point out, lawmaking by decree had become a 
standard practice among international consultants and aid workers in  Afghanistan, 
who were often even more oriented toward the technocratic (and  political) demands 
of demonstrable outputs than Afghan women’s rights activists were. As reforms in 
the area of “rule of law” had gathered pace and large donor-funded programs were 
established in the country, international consultants and aid workers often became 
involved in what Hartmann and Klonowiecka-Milart fittingly term “résumé law re-
form” (2011: 282). In the field of justice sector reform in  Afghanistan, as with the aid 
industry more generally, tangible results was what mattered—both in reports sent to 
headquarters and funders and on the résumés of staff and consultants, who typically 
were on short contracts. Drafting laws was an appealing activity in such a context. 
Laws were relatively straightforward to produce for expat staff, and they represented 
a concrete achievement. It was such rationales, rather than coherent efforts to im-
prove the Afghan legal framework overall, that often drove the production of new 
laws. At other times, they originated in the specific preoccupations of small groups 
of Westerners or Afghans, resulting in stand-alone laws on issues such as money 
laundering, terrorism, anticorruption, and antinarcotics.
Many of these stand-alone laws had been conceived and drafted in their en-
tirety by actors outside of the Afghan government. And then, through political 
pressure and informal lobbying, laws were typically enacted by presidential decree 
(Chaudhary, Nemat, and Suhrke 2011). In fact, I was told that the U.S. embassy 
had, one summer, sent an email out to various international aid organizations and 
actors in the field of the rule of law, wondering if anyone had suggestions for laws 
that they wished to see enacted as presidential decrees before the Parliament was 
due to return from their recess. (Once Parliament was in session, laws could not 
be enacted by decree but had to be presented to Parliament before coming into 
force.)62 The drafters of such laws often did not amend or even consult the exist-
ing legal framework, instead merely “using as an transitional provision an omni-
bus clause that declared as abrogated any laws that were contrary without listing 
the laws and provisions that it abrogated” (Hartmann and Klonowiecka-Milart 
2011)—a habit that produced incoherence and inconsistency in the legal corpus 
as a whole. Such practices also reinforced the opaque dynamics of legislative pro-
cesses, where informal connections to the president and access to his gatekeepers 
were key determinants (Chaudhary, Nemat, and Suhrke 2011).
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In the case of the EVAW law, these kinds of dynamics were particularly evident 
in the period leading up to its presidential ratification in July 2009. After the fiasco 
of the Shia Personal Status Law, which had embarrassed all NATO governments 
vis-à-vis their home constituencies by making it obvious that claims to liberate 
Afghan women could not be sustained, diplomats—particularly U.S. diplomats—
took a strong interest in the EVAW law.63 They thought that the EVAW law, which 
at that point was being reviewed in the Ministry of Justice, could to some extent 
neutralize the Shia law. This was also what many Afghan MPs, human rights of-
ficials, and, indeed, the minister of justice himself argued. As is evident from em-
bassy cables, the U.S. embassy had repeatedly discussed the law with Minster of 
Justice Sarwar Danesh. A cable from May 2009 read: “[The political consular] told 
Danesh the Embassy had studied the EVAW bill and found it to be a strong piece 
of legislation. We were disappointed it was not moving through the Administra-
tion as quickly as we expected. We informed Danesh that [U.S. Ambassador-at-
Large for Global Women’s Issues] Verveer planned to visit Kabul in late June. We 
would welcome cabinet approval prior to her arrival. . . . Danesh pledged to work 
on getting the bill through Cabinet approval prior to the end of June” (Embassy of 
the United States Kabul 2009b).
Therefore, although the U.S. government did not want to take public credit for 
the EVAW law, as this would certainly have harmed its status by giving ammuni-
tion to those who sought to frame the law as a “foreign gift”—it also participated in 
(and reinforced) the kind of law reform where isolated, symbolic, and sometimes 
hollow achievements obtained through informal pressure and negotiations was 
pursued over more anchored, long-term gains requiring broader coalitions.
There were, however, other important reasons why such strategies prevailed. 
Chief among these was the dynamics in Parliament, described by Larson (2009) as 
a “culture of political ambiguity.” This political ambiguity—or “a reluctance to dis-
close political allegiances” (12)—in turn hindered the formation of blocs and the 
articulation of platforms and made the development of a pro-women alliance that 
could secure legislation such as the EVAW law in Parliament difficult. It had sev-
eral causes. Political parties and issue-based politics never had a strong position 
in Afghanistan. The electoral system after 2001 also discouraged the formation of 
political parties through the obscure system called the Single Non-Transferable 
Vote (SNTV), which recognized only individuals and not political parties (Reyn-
olds 2006). President Karzai and many in his circle who had put forward this sys-
tem argued that political parties and their divisive ways were to blame for the 
violence that had plagued Afghanistan since the 1978 coup (Humayoon 2010), a 
particular historical narrative that—incidentally—also favored executive power. 
Larson also argues that the importance of patronage politics served to discourage 
open and committed political allegiances, since this kind of politics depends on 
the  possibility of shifting loyalties.
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However, the most important reason for this political ambiguity, Larson sug-
gests, was the lack of security. As she points out, Afghanistan had little history 
of political pluralism and tolerance of opposition (2009: 13), and the widespread 
caution about expressing political positions and allegiances should therefore be 
unsurprising. The members of the former jihadi parties64—who also dominated 
Parliament (Ruttig 2006)—had a comparative advantage in such a climate. Their 
leaders were widely believed to be able to exert intimidation and coercion. Even 
if such assumptions were often based on rumors, they nonetheless served to keep 
opponents in check.
For women, there were additional elements to these dynamics. Women were 
invested with particular importance when it came to assessing Afghanistan’s 
observance of Islam. To the mujahedin, having been rehabilitated to power as 
partners to the U.S. invasion that overthrew the Taliban government, presenting 
themselves as the guardians of Islam was often a powerful way of demonstrat-
ing nationalist credentials and distancing themselves from the infidel military and 
diplomatic presence. Paradoxically, despite having returned to power through 
Western military force, they managed to boost their influence by tapping into 
popular resentment against the Western military operations. Positioning them-
selves as the authorities on Islam was useful to ward off other forms of opposi-
tion. When defending a controversial law that provided a blanket amnesty for the 
considerable abuses committed during the civil war (see chapter 1), the former 
mujahedin commander Abdul Rasool Sayyaf had notoriously stated, “Whoever 
is against mujahideen is against Islam and they are the enemies of this country” 
(BBC 2007). This ability to effectively to invoke Islam in confrontations with ad-
versaries, combined with actual or rumored powers of coercion and violence, gave 
many conservative and mujahedin parliamentarians significant advantage. And, 
as elsewhere, women’s appearance and conduct was an appealing measurement of 
religious adherence. Women who were seen to challenge the authority of conser-
vative actors, whether directly or by defying gender norms, could find themselves 
the target of a particularly potent denunciation, one in which female and religious 
transgression was conflated.
I experienced these dynamics for myself when going to the house of the head 
of the Legislation Commission to interview him about the law and his views of 
it. At the end of the interview, the conversation turned to my own marital status, 
and there were some probing questions about my religious identity. As I was cast 
as a lapsed Muslim and unfit wife who had left behind my husband (of Pakistani 
origin) to pursue research in a foreign country, I suddenly found myself uncom-
fortably trying to pull down my long coat to conceal my legs completely. I recalled 
rumors that this man, during his time as a judge for the mujahedin, had ordered 
a number of executions based on religious non-adherence, and I started to feel 
uneasy—it was getting dark, and we were in the outskirts of Kabul. Although my 
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sense of unease was passing and completely unfounded, it provided me with some 
insight into the powers of intimidation facing local women’s rights activists.65
This sense of insecurity and intimidation was an often unstated yet obvious 
factor in the calculations and conduct of the Afghan promoters of the EVAW law. 
Many women MPs and women’s rights activists were conscious of the risk of be-
ing labeled “anti-mujahedin” or being seen to openly challenge their authority. 
Some of the activists had suggested that in order to get the EVAW law through 
Parliament, it would be best to introduce it furtively and quickly on a day when 
the main jihadi and mullah MPs were not present, possibly through some kind 
of prior deal with the speaker, which pressure from the foreign embassies could 
bring about.66 They were reluctant to meet the conservative MPs in open debate 
and felt that it was better to quickly and discreetly get a parliamentary ratification 
without drawing too much attention to the law or to themselves. The fear of arous-
ing jihadi wrath also manifested itself in the actual debates in Parliament. Some of 
the women advocates of the law were careful not to appear too provocative or as-
sertive, and it seems safe to assume that it was sometimes such concerns that pro-
vided their adversaries with much of their power, rather than the strength of their 
arguments. Compare the ways in which the two key MPs formulated themselves 
in the plenary debate over the EVAW law in May 2013. Fawzia Koofi, her voice 
somewhat hesitant, pleaded with her male colleagues to approve the law as a favor 
to their female counterparts: “Today I request the people’s honorable representa-
tives to view this law as a national need and vote for it . . . as a token of cooperation 
and friendship with their sisters who, shoulder by shoulder [for many years], have 
cooperated with them on so many issues.” Qazi Hanafi, on the other hand, thun-
dered that the approval of the EVAW law would be comparable to the aftermath 
of the communist coup of 1978, normally referred to by its Afghan date, the 8th 
of Saur: “If you ratify this law, which will make the shelters legal and permissible, 
you should expect similar outcomes to that of Hasht-e Saur,”—here he paused for 
dramatic effect—“and the [consequent Islamic] Revolution. . . . And millions more 
shall be martyred.”
It was the anticipation of statements such as these that had made women MPs 
approach the speaker of the Parliament, Abdul Raof Ibrahimi, prior to the debate, 
in order to extract a promise that he would stop the debate if the tone became to 
inflammatory or if it looked like the law was in danger of being repealed. Ibrahimi 
kept his promise. He halted the debate, thereby returning the EVAW law to the 
same ambiguous status that it had held prior to the plenary debate.67
A L AW OF ONE’S  OWN?
But in mid-2015 came what might prove to be the final blow to a separate EVAW 
law. It arrived not from Parliament, but from the new president, Ashraf Ghani. 
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A few years earlier, President Karzai had agreed that work would start on a com-
prehensive penal code that would incorporate the criminal provisions from ap-
proximately fifty different freestanding laws. As the drafting of the new code 
gathered pace, supporters of the EVAW law, such as prominent members of the 
Afghan Women’s Network, started to advocate for the EVAW law to be kept as a 
separate piece of legislation. They argued that the EVAW law was a unique achieve-
ment and that to integrate its provisions into a general code would dilute protec-
tion for women. Like before, they contended that having a special law for women 
would send important political signals and be a tool of advocacy. Others, such as 
Ministry of Justice officials and U.N. staff, were somewhat baffled by this line of 
reasoning.68 They countered that the EVAW contained significant technical weak-
nesses that made it problematic to implement, that it was unrealistic to expect 
prosecutors and judges to be able to refer to some fifty different criminal laws, and 
that there was no reason why the EVAW law’s provisions could not be incorpo-
rated into a comprehensive penal code. Besides, the EVAW law remained a mere 
decree, and integrating its provisions into a penal code that would be presented for 
approval in Parliament would strengthen women’s protection. The women’s rights 
activists were not convinced. They lobbied the Ministry of Justice, the new vice 
president, the First Lady, and finally President Ashraf Ghani himself, who refused 
to commit himself to maintaining the EVAW law as a separate code.69 To some of 
the advocates of a comprehensive penal code, the arguments in favor of separate 
EVAW law were so weak that they could not fully explain the women’s rights activ-
ists’ stance. They speculated that the considerable funds that had been distributed 
to aid projects devoted to the implementation of the law was an additional, if un-
spoken, consideration.70
Even if this was a rather sinister reading, it was true that the EVAW law had 
become central to the large aid programs dedicated to women’s rights in post-2001 
Afghanistan.71 After the EVAW law was signed as a presidential decree in July 2009, 
it had quickly became the focus of the parts of the international aid apparatus that 
was orientated toward women’s rights and legal reform. Donors funded the estab-
lishment of a special unit at the attorney general’s office in Kabul, to be emulated in 
other provinces. These units, called the Special Units on Violence against Women, 
were specifically to investigate and prosecute cases of violence against women, and 
the unit in Kabul came to have more than half a dozen of dedicated prosecutors, 
who received top-up salaries through donor funds.72 In addition, donor funds paid 
for training sessions on the EVAW law for judges, prosecutors, and other govern-
ment officials; booklets that were produced and disseminated; and various confer-
ences and meetings that were organized to discuss and promote the law.
Despite this, the impact of the law was uneven and difficult to ascertain. Some 
judges in Kabul stated that they were not applying the law, as they had heard it was 
under review in Parliament, and they were therefore unsure of its status.73 During 
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2011, as various aid agencies conducted more training sessions, the law seemed 
to gain some level of traction. International donors were keenly tracing prosecu-
tions and conviction numbers. A U.N. 2012 survey of twenty-two of Afghanistan’s 
thirty-four provinces found that 1,538 cases of violence against women were reg-
istered with prosecution offices over a twelve-month period and that 225 of them 
resulted in convictions (UNAMA 2012). For sixteen provinces where more de-
tailed information was available, it was found that 44 percent of the cases in which 
indictments filed were based on the EVAW law, meaning that the other 56 percent 
were indicted under the Penal Code.
The implementation of the EVAW law gradually became the focus of donor 
and international engagement with women’s rights in Afghanistan. The law con-
stituted a central issue during Afghanistan first CEDAW hearing in July 2013, 
with most member countries present urging the Afghan government to acceler-
ate its implementation. In another indication of the central position the law had 
obtained, donors made a government report about progress in its implementa-
tion one of a key set of aid conditionalities (“hard deliverables”).74 When, in 2013, 
the Afghan government failed to produce the report, the government of Norway 
cited this failure as one of two reasons for why it would cut development aid to 
Afghanistan by almost 10 percent. Finally, in March 2014, the long-awaited report 
was published, covering the status of 4,505 cases that had been registered with 
either the police, the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, or the prosecution over a one-
year period.75 The data suggested that at least 40 percent of the registered cases 
had been “solved” either through mediation or by the withdrawal of the case by 
the victim.76 Only 361 cases (8 percent) resulted in some kind of criminal convic-
tion, and a further 40 cases resulted in acquittals. (However, almost two-thirds 
of these 361 convictions came from a single province, Herat. Out of Afghanistan’s 
34 provinces, Herat was known for having a competent court system and a com-
mitted female chief prosecutor.) The rest of the total caseload, 2,129 cases, was still 
under processing.
C ONCLUSIONS
In the next chapter, I delve into the background to this data, disaggregating both 
the statistics and the stories behind them. Here, I want to offer some initial reflec-
tions on the following questions: To what extent did the EVAW law challenge es-
tablished gender orders and domains of governance? Did it entail a transformation 
whereby women were constituted as citizens under state protection and where 
family authority over women was supplanted by, or at least modified by, that of 
the state? As this chapter has sought to demonstrate, there can be no straightfor-
ward answers to these questions. The EVAW law as it was decreed did represent 
a potential reorganization of both women’s subject position and the reach of state 
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realms versus that of kinship. Had the decree been enforced in full by the courts, 
the result would have been a significant increase in the power of the government 
in overseeing and regulating sexual and gender relations, in underwriting women’s 
protection and equal rights in marriage, and in punishing transgressions. As we 
have seen, however, as the law was reviewed in Parliament, attempts were made to 
amend it in a direction that would safeguard fathers’ and husbands’ prerogatives 
over women—by allowing fathers to marry off minor daughters and by establish-
ing husbands’ rights to beating and polygamy. Women were also afforded their 
part of the “patriarchal bargain” (Kandiyoti 1988); it was to be a crime for hus-
bands not to provide maintenance for their wives.
But regardless of the final the text of the law, an equally important point is 
this—unlike the not too dissimilar legislation introduced by kings like Abdul 
 Rahman Khan or Amanullah (see chapter 1), the EVAW law did not in any way 
represent the attempts of a ruler to curtail the power of kinship groups. This was 
not an attempt by the country’s ruler to “modernize” society by emancipating its 
women from family control. Evident in the attempts to promote and implement 
the law were instead a constellation of foreign diplomats, activists, and pro-women 
justice officials, their efforts underwritten by the funds and infrastructure of aid 
agencies. While this constellation worked, in parts, through Afghan state institu-
tions, this did not mean that there was a single, unambiguous, sovereign national 
power ruling over a single “public domain.” Both the status of the law and its im-
plementation was partial and tenuous. The legal status of the law was uncertain. 
It had neither been approved nor rejected by the Parliament, and it appeared to 
be in contradiction to other laws. Its presidential endorsement was offered up as a 
bargain. The minister of justice and the president had effectively offered to let two 
constituencies each have its own law—the progressive EVAW law for Afghan femi-
nists and their allies and the Shia personal status law (which was, in many cases, in 
direct contradiction to the EVAW law) to the Shia clergy. Some of the supporters 
of the EVAW law appeared to endorse this—rather than engaging with the entire 
legal framework (and their political adversaries), they were content to be granted 
a law of their own.
In many respects, the EVAW law appears as a textbook case of Saskia Sassen’s 
“neither global nor national” assemblage. As she states, “these assemblages cut 
across the binary of the national versus global. They continue to inhabit national 
institutional and territorial settings but are no longer part of the national as his-
torically constructed” (2008: 61). In many ways, the promotion and implementa-
tion of the EVAW law was a case of the global working through the national. The 
law was drafted and promulgated through national institutions, submitted by the 
Ministry of Women’s Affairs to the Ministry of Justice, and revised there before 
eventually being decreed by the president. Similarly, the implementation of the law 
happened through Afghan justice institutions—the prosecutors and the courts. 
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At the same time, as this chapter has demonstrated, these processes were to a large 
externally driven. The EVAW law, adopted partly due to Western pressure and 
enforced partly due to strong international involvement in monitoring and fund-
ing, in many ways brought Afghan women into a global protection order, where 
the guarantors were international organizations such as the United Nations. But if 
there was a global EVAW law assemblage working through national institutions, it 
should also be said that this assemblage was in no sense a totalizing, unidirectional 
force. Global templates intersected with local dynamics, dynamics that amounted 
to more than simply the formal procedures of national institutions seamlessly fa-
cilitating a global order. The processes traced in this chapter show that rather than 
being two contradictory forces, personalized politics and external reform attempts 
often worked together. Executive power was strengthened, because Western dip-
lomats preferred to work with the cabinet and the president rather than the cum-
bersome and unpredictable Parliament when they wanted something done. This 
also gave President Karzai an opportunity to strengthen his power base through 
the granting of favors in an exchange of offerings and loyalty. The EVAW law was a 
gift to two of his constituencies—women’s rights activists and Western supporters. 
At the same time, he also bestowed other gifts, such as the Shia law. Similarly, the 
emphasis placed on output and fundraising by the “NGO-ization” of women’s ac-
tivism also fed into personalized and patron-client politics. As I detail in the next 
chapter, the way in which the EVAW law was implemented also constituted justice 
officials as the patrons and benefactors of the victims of violence.
What clearly lost out in the EVAW law assemblage were the possibilities for 
more robust practices of democratic participation and collective mobilization. 
Supporters of the EVAW law decided that the price for parliamentary ratification 
of the law was too high. As we have seen, there were several aspects to this price. 
The conservatives in Parliament demanded significant concessions, which would 
have reinstated some of the authority of fathers and husbands over daughters and 
wives. But there was also a more general sense of uncertainty among women’s 
rights activists about the prospect of confronting a political field that was stacked 
against them. They were well aware of sentiments—among certain male MPs and 
beyond—that the EVAW law represented an illegitimate protection claim: good 
and respectable women could rely on male relatives to shelter them from outside 
predations and for the same relatives not to subject them to violence. By implica-
tion, it was immoral women who were in need of the EVAW law. The category 
of “immoral women” was frequently also subtly stretched to include all Afghan 
women who questioned male authority in one way or another. This kind of gen-
dered denunciation, infused with implications of religious and national betrayal, 
constituted a key political weapon in the hands of the jihadis and added to wom-
en’s sense of vulnerability when operating in public debate and national politics. 
Instead of risking this hazardous terrain, the supporters of the law decided to fall 
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back on more discreet strategies and on the support they had among sympathetic 
government officials and Western donors.
By virtue of it operating through transnational funding and pressure, the EVAW 
law assemblage was, in many ways, part of a technocratic global discourse about 
violence against women, one in which violence against Afghan women was ren-
dered a global concern subject to the expert interventions of transnational actors 
and institutions (see introduction). At the same time, however, there was more 
to the composition and workings of the EVAW law assemblage than just another 
manifestation of a transnational governmental practice, underlining the point 
made in the introduction of this book that global power does not work in a singu-
lar direction. As we have seen, local politics shaped the framing and promotion of 
the EVAW law in particular ways, enabling and reinforcing personalized politics.
The international aid interventions in Afghanistan were also imbricated with 
broader geopolitical relations. The aid agencies involved in drafting, funding, and 
monitoring the EVAW law had proliferated on the back of a military invasion that 
had produced much starker international hierarchies than what could have been 
immediately visible through looking at the practices of organizations such as the 
United Nations and IDLO in isolation. In the processes examined in chapter 4, the 
controversies around women’s shelters and the geopolitical dimension of external 








The Special Prosecution Unit for Crimes of Violence 
against Women in Kabul
A woman approaching the special unit for the prosecution of violence against women 
(the “VAW unit”) in the outskirts of Kabul city will pass several checkpoints, road-
blocks, and blast walls. Security has become tighter and tighter around the city, and 
with hardly any foreign troops moving around anymore, Afghan government build-
ings are becoming a frequent target. In the spring of 2015, two woman prosecutors 
working at the unit were killed when one of the cars transporting female staff to 
their workplace was blown up by a suicide bomber. Nonetheless, work continues 
 unabated—after the attack in 2015, the prosecution unit reopened the very next day.
If the woman is here to report a case of violence against her, she is likely to be ac-
companied by a family member, perhaps her father or mother. Statistically, her case 
is most probably a claim of domestic abuse. The building she sees in front of her as she 
enters the compound has five floors, but only six rooms belong to the VAW unit. After 
asking around, she will find her way to one of the rooms. Her father, if he is with her, 
will want to speak on her behalf. First, she will be directed to the administrative office 
and will be told to submit a petition. A few days later, she will be back, and if she is 
lucky, her case will have been processed and will now be with one of the investigative 
prosecutors, who will be ready to take her statement. She will sit in one of the two 
rooms assigned to investigations. On a normal day, there will other complainants, 
witnesses, or suspects in the room, who, like her, are answering questions from the 
prosecutor assigned to their case. In each of the two rooms, there are supposed to be 
five prosecutors. Most of them will be sitting at their desks, but normally at least two 
will be absent, with their colleagues covering for them if the manager comes by to 
ask. Most of the prosecutors are male, and all of them are working with papers and 
pens only, despite the computers donated by the unit’s chief aid donor only last year.
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The chance that the woman’s case will go to court is very small. It is quite pos-
sible that she has marks on her body from the violence, perhaps a broken bone or 
a strangulation mark on her neck. If she does, the prosecutor will refer her to the 
forensic medicine department, where she will get a certificate to be attached to her 
case file. The prosecutor will summon her husband in for questioning, and when he 
is there, the prosecutor will ask him why he is beating his wife. The husband might 
deny having beaten her altogether, though if he does, the prosecutor will tell him to 
stop lying—the marks are there. He might respond that he has only beaten her a few 
times, and it’s because she has a phone relationship with another man or because she 
leaves the house without his permission. The prosecutor will brusquely tell him that 
“even a single slap”—no matter the circumstances—will earn him several months in 
prison under the EVAW law.
But then the prosecutor might suggest to the husband that if he is willing to sign a 
written guarantee, his wife might be persuaded to withdraw the claim. Or he might 
say to the woman that he has convinced her husband not to beat her again and that 
the husband will put this in writing. Her husband is young; he has made a mistake. 
Or his drug addiction has driven him to beat her. He clearly loves her. And where will 
it leave her to have her husband in prison?
If the woman refuses to withdraw her complaint and says she cannot live with 
her husband again, the prosecutor might suggest that she go to the family court for a 
divorce. He is likely to advice her not to withdraw her complaint until her divorce is 
secured. Perhaps this is what she wanted all along. Divorce is not easy to obtain for a 
woman in Afghanistan—she needs valid grounds, such as violence, to present to the 
courts. The woman may not be too concerned about whether or not her husband goes 
to prison, but she does want to obtain a divorce. Moreover, if she is to get her mahr 
(dowry) from her husband, her only financial asset, she has to have a valid reason for 
the divorce. If she withdraws her claim from the prosecution, her husband will have 
no reason to grant her a divorce, and the court might refuse to issue one too.
But perhaps the woman’s family finally persuades her to withdraw her claim. Her 
husband has sent some elders to mediate. Her mother is worried about the stain on 
the family’s reputation, and her father is concerned about his ability to feed her if 
she moves back to his house permanently. So the woman goes back the prosecution 
unit and says that her husband regrets everything and that she has forgiven him. The 
prosecutor, pleased that the case has been solved, asks her routinely if she is with-
drawing the claim out of her own volition, and when she says yes, he tells her to come 
back if her husband starts beating her again. She never returns.
INTRODUCTION
The vignette above illustrates some typical features of how the special unit for the 
prosecution of violence against women (the “VAW unit”) in Kabul operated and 
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what the unit’s cases most commonly looked like. The unit in Kabul was the first in 
the country, established in 2010. I attended the opening ceremony in March that 
year, in a small, packed conference room at the attorney general’s compound. At 
that point, the unit had not yet been formally established, since the International 
Development Law Organization (IDLO)—an independent organization dedicated 
to the rule of law that works around the globe, which was the main initiator and 
donor of the special prosecution unit—had not yet been able to secure the unit’s 
inclusion into the tashkheel—the official structure of the attorney general’s office as 
an institution. The opening ceremony went ahead, however, and some six months 
later, that final issue had also been resolved. It was hoped that the unit, to be 
emulated in other provinces, would increase the prosecution of cases of violence 
against women. Female prosecutors, dedicated resources, and increased visibility 
would make this new branch of the legal system more accessible to women and 
more accountable to activists and donors.
Drawing upon a wealth of observational data, this chapter documents the every-
day working of the VAW unit in Kabul. It argues that, by and large, the unit did not 
function quite as donors intended. More than 85 percent of cases registered there 
were closed prior to trial, often because the prosecutors were reluctant to pursue 
them. The prosecutors suggested to the women, that rather being left without a 
home and an income, they would be better off reaching some kind of agreement 
with their abusers, backed up by the prosecution itself. In some cases, however, it 
was victims or their families who did not want their petitions to proceed to court. 
A closer look at many of the cases reveals that women sometimes came to the pros-
ecution office with intentions very different than seeing their husbands or other 
family members convicted and imprisoned. Some wanted a divorce, others wanted 
straying husbands to return to the marital home, and still others were seeking a 
government-sanctioned guarantee that the violence would cease. In some cases, 
the prosecution units simply became a tool used by families in conflict with other 
families or for the rehabilitation of reputation and honor. Complaints of rape or 
abuse, for instance, might be filed with the purpose of pressuring the defendant’s 
family in matters of bride-price or compensation for elopement.
Overall, prosecutors, women, and their families bargained within a paradigm 
of gender norms in which rehabilitating the family unit and absorbing sexual 
transgressions into the framework of conventional marriage transactions were 
paramount. The VAW unit thus served to reaffirm the notion that acts of violence 
were family problems rather than criminal cases that belonged in the mainstream 
justice system. I suggest that this was a predictable outcome of the way in which 
the special prosecution unit operated—located, as it was, at the intersection of 
donor pressure, government indifference, and a lack of attention to (or disinterest 
in destabilizing) the broader relations that cast women’s independent existence 
outside the family setting as deeply subversive.
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This is not to say, however, that the VAW unit was of no consequence. To a 
significant number of women and their families, the VAW unit provided a novel 
recourse (and a resource) in the face of abuse, desertion, or unheeded responsibili-
ties. Even if the VAW unit tended to adopt an approach of negotiation rather than 
the dispensation of justice, it was able to invoke at least the specter of criminal 
prosecution and, through this, sometimes secured women a better deal than what 
was available elsewhere.
THE SPECIAL UNIT S AT A GL ANCE
The rationale for establishing the special units had been fairly straightforward. 
With the EVAW law enacted in the summer of 2009, the special units were intend-
ed to serve as a focal point for the law’s implementation. The initiative came from 
IDLO but soon received backing from other aid agencies and from Afghan sup-
porters of the law. Having dedicated units within the justice system would provide 
women with a space where they would feel more welcome and where staff would 
both be committed to and skilled in dealing with cases of gender violence. It would 
also give donors a point where efforts of funding, training, and advocacy could be 
directed. All of this would bolster the enforcement of the EVAW law.
By the end of 2015 there were special units for crimes of violence against women 
at the prosecutor’s offices in twenty of the thirty-four of the country’s provincial 
capitals. In theory, each office was to process all cases of gender violence in that 
office’s province.1 Most of the units were supported by international aid. IDLO 
was the most prominent donor, providing top-up salaries and technical support, 
such as staff training in information technology and record keeping. It was, how-
ever, difficult to ascertain whether the rates of prosecution and conviction had 
increased, because neither the prosecution office nor the courts produced any data 
on this question. IDLO had attempted to establish an electronic database of cases, 
but it went unused. The U.N. mission’s human rights section had, as described in 
chapter 2, published yearly reports between 2011 and 2013, but these reports could 
not give a full picture of how many—and which type of—offenses led to pros-
ecutions or convictions (Shahabi and Wimpelmann 2015). The long-awaited 2014 
report by the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, produced after considerable Western 
pressure, provided more details. Based on data from twenty-six provinces, it sug-
gested that 18 percent of all cases registered with the prosecution were referred to 
courts and that 13 percent led to a criminal conviction.2 It also disaggregated these 
numbers according to type of offense. Unsurprisingly, cases of murder and rape 
had relatively high prosecution and conviction rates. Beating (lat-e kop; physical 
battery not leading to permanent or long-term injury) was, by far, the most com-
monly registered claim. It also was the offense with the lowest conviction rate, at 
only 11 percent.
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In 2014, I embarked upon a more detailed study of the VAW units in eight 
provinces together with two Afghan colleagues.3 Our quantitative data confirmed 
the patterns in the MOWA report (Shahabi and Wimpelmann 2015). It also found 
some stark geographical differences in the percentage of cases referred to court. 
Particularly striking was the difference between Kabul and the other seven prov-
inces. The prosecution unit in Kabul had registered the largest number of cases by 
far—two thousand over a two-year period, which amounted to almost two-thirds 
of the total caseload in the eight provinces and was the highest rate per capita. But 
it also had the lowest rate of indictment—13 percent. Even when disaggregated by 
type of offense, Kabul referred fewer cases to court than any other province.
In the remainder of the chapter, I provide an analysis of the intricacies of how 
the VAW unit in Kabul operated.4 I suggest that the unit practiced a fairly open-
door policy but, at the same time, was unable (or, in some cases, uninterested) in 
overcoming the structural relations that cemented women’s dependence within 
the family unit. As such, it largely became a recourse for women whose martial or 
family situations had become intolerable, rather than a mechanism for dispensing 
justice as defined in the laws.
“D ON’ T YOU FEEL SHAME WHEN YOU BEAT YOUR 
WIFE? ” :  PROSECUTORS REPRIMANDING HUSBANDS
In many of Afghanistan’s more rural provinces, merely registering a case of gen-
der violence at the VAW unit was a difficult exercise. According to Afghan law, 
only acts defined as felonies (jenayat) could be prosecuted by a representative of 
the state regardless of the will of the victim. This included murder, rape, injury 
table 1 Calculations based on the 2014 report by the Ministry of Women’s Affairs  
(Afghan year 1391, March 2012–13)
Total cases registered 
with the prosecution 
in 26 provinces
Percentage 
 referred to court 
Percentage 





All cases 1,638* 18 72 13
Rape 96 50 75 38
Murder 84 48 70 33
Injury 41 39 56 22
Beating 971 14 76 11
* The number 1,638 refers to the total number of registered cases, and in addition to rape, murder, injury, and beat-
ing, it also includes a range of other crimes, such as forced marriage and harassment. The 1,638 number also includes 
a larger number of incidents not defined as crimes under Afghan law where women might nonetheless be filing a 
complaint (e.g., 145 cases of divorce and 242 complaints of non-maintenance) or be accused of an offense not codified 
in law (running away from the family home, 163 cases).
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by chemical substances, and “forced suicide.”5 For other acts, such as beating or 
forced marriage, a claim had to be submitted by the victim in the form of a written 
petition (ariza). But in many provinces, women and family members attempting 
to file cases of violence often encountered prosecutors who either dragged their 
feet in registering their claim or sought to devise a “solution” through negotia-
tions with family members without officially opening a file for the case. The reason 
to this reluctance was twofold. First, in rural provinces, the prosecutors were all 
male, and many had the attitude that VAW cases did not belong in the legal sys-
tem at all, that the stains left on the family and the women’s honor dictated that 
such cases should be solved within the family, with the women remaining within 
their marriages or families. Second, some perpetrators were able to influence the 
prosecution through bribes or political connections. As a result, prosecutors could 
sometimes be extremely abrupt with women who came to the VAW unit to regis-
ter a case (Shahabi, Wimpelmann, and Elyassi 2016).
By contrast, at the VAW prosecution unit in Kabul, registering a case was rela-
tively easy, even if it wasn’t exactly straightforward. Complainants had to negotiate 
some administrative hurdles, such as writing a petition. For this purpose, com-
mercial petition writers set themselves up outside the prosecution office, out in the 
open—simply with a chair and perhaps a desk. Upon the submission of the formal 
written petition, however, prosecutors would generally open a file—and without 
any particular requirements regarding evidence or the seriousness of the claim.6 
Neither would they, as was common in more rural areas, admonish women for 
daring to bring their “private problems” to outsiders in general and the prosecu-
tion in particular. The prosecutors in the VAW unit in Kabul would also make sys-
tematic efforts to bring in suspects. Complainants were given a summoning letter 
to hand over to the local police, who would deliver the letter to the suspect. If the 
suspect subsequently failed to show up at the prosecution, the police would be sent 
to identify his (or, less often, her) whereabouts and to bring him in.
There was a marked difference in the tone prosecutors used when interviewing 
the people involved in a case. When questioning a female complainant, prosecu-
tors were normally oriented toward establishing facts and a sequence of events, 
often in some detail. By asking such questions, the prosecutors wanted to establish 
the truthfulness of the woman’s account. In cases of beating, prosecutors would 
typically ask the woman when she had been beaten, where, how, and if there were 
any witnesses. As a rule, they would ask if the complainant had any physical marks 
and, if so, refer them to the department of forensic medicine. A review of the case 
files of some 160 claims of beatings showed that least 50 percent of the women did 
have physical marks documented by forensic examination, and these were often 
the victims of severe, repeated violence, which could involve broken bones, burns, 
and fingernails that had been pulled out. The majority of beating cases implicated 
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husbands, and the prosecutors normally asked if the marriage had been consen-
sual, and what had been the occasion or reason for the violence inflicted.
When subsequently interrogating male suspects, the nature of prosecutors’ 
questioning often took on a mixture of fact-finding and reprimanding (as it turned 
out, this often to set the stage for subsequent mediation). “Why do you beat your 
wife?” one prosecutor demanded to know.
 Husband: “I only slapped her once.”
Prosecutor (raising his voice):  “You have done a bad thing. Don’t you know that one 
slap means three months in prison?”
 Husband:  “My little daughter is one year old, she dropped my 
wife’s cell phone in the water. My wife started beating 
her; she beat her twice—once when she dropped the cell 
phone, and later on she beat her again. I got angry, and I 
slapped her once, that was all.”
 Prosecutor:  “Why? Your wife is not your daughter; she is your wife. 
You have no right to beat your wife because she beat 
your daughter.”
Most husbands would typically either flatly deny that they had beaten their 
wives, or they would admit to some beating but would suggest that they had good 
reasons. A common theme was that their wife had left the home without their 
authorization. One man said, “I have not beaten my wife; I have just hit her three 
times when she escaped the house. Most days when I got back from work, my wife 
would not be there. After two [or] three days, I would find her in some relative’s 
house. I just have one thing to say: if my wife does not leave the home without my 
permission, I will not beat her.”
Another man stated that he had only recently started to beat his wife, after she 
had begun to do things without his approval: “But she is my wife; she must be 
obedient to me. I am saying, ‘Don’t go alone to the male doctor for television [ul-
trasound] examinations; I don’t like it.’ But she does it over and over again. I keep 
telling her to inform me, so that I can go with her, but she doesn’t.”
Other men argued that they had reasons to doubt their wives’ chastity and, 
therefore, to beat them:
I got to know this girl over the phone, and I fell in love with her. She told me her 
father would never agree to our marriage and our only option was to elope. One day 
we escaped as she was walking to school, and we had a nikah [wedding ceremony]. 
But after the nikah, I found out that this girl is not a virgin. That is why I started to 
hate her. I couldn’t send her back to her father’s house, because we were elopers. So 
I became compelled to violence, to beating her, but it was never very serious, only 
sometimes a few slaps, if I was very upset.”
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Prosecutors would generally not accept this kind of reasoning. They would as-
sert that any beating, no matter the circumstances, was wrong and unlawful. Such 
reproaches did not necessarily mean that the prosecutors were ready to bring a 
case to court. But they would systematically set out to gather evidence. In addition 
to sending women for forensic medical checkups if they had physical marks of 
abuse, prosecutors would normally summon witnesses, especially in cases where 
the complainant and the suspect were not related to each other. In cases in which 
the two parties were married or otherwise related, it was often unnecessary for 
the prosecution to summon close relatives, since the relatives would accompany 
the complainant and the suspect to the office. In any case, the prosecutors often 
distrusted witnesses’ credibility. They paid little heed to character statements and 
sought to scrutinize witnesses’ accounts by probing into details, since they fre-
quently suspected a witness had either been bought off or was conspiring with one 
of the parties to the case.
The prosecutors would not always trust complainants’ statements either, in par-
ticular in cases of sexual violence. One prosecutor, when discussing a kidnapping 
claim, stated that the allegation could not be true, because the woman in ques-
tion had not been attractive enough: “Look, she is not that beautiful, if someone 
is going to kidnap a girl, he’ll definitively go for a good-looking one.” Another 
prosecutor disbelieved a claim of forced sodomy (lawat),7 saying that because it 
had happen so many times, it had to be consensual. Some prosecutors applied a 
rather absurd belief that a gynecological examination could distinguish between 
rape and consensual intercourse by establishing how the hymen had been broken. 
A hymen torn at the “top” (what the prosecutors referred to as “the upper side 
of the clock: 11, 12, or 1”) suggested rape, whereas a hymen torn at the lower side 
(“the lower side of the clock: 5, 6, or 7”) indicated the crime of zina (consensual 
intercourse). During the course of the fieldwork on which this chapter is based, 
there were a few cases in which women had been subjected to such “clock” exami-
nations, although in none of those cases was the evidence from those exams used 
in court. DNA testing was not available in Afghanistan, and in any case, claims 
of sexual violence would typically be reported many days or months after it had 
taken place, so that medical evidence could not be obtained.
Overall, whereas prosecutors in Kabul sometimes distrusted women’s account 
of sexual violence because of what they held to be “bad moral character,” they 
would not generally say this to women to their face. Nor would they scorn women 
for other “bad” behavior or in any way suggest that they had deserved any violence 
inflicted upon them. Occasionally, however, they would ridicule men for acting in 
“unmanly” ways. In one case, a male prosecutor made fun of a man whose wife 
wanted to divorce him due to impotence. In another case, in which a wife was 
about to leave her husband, a female prosecutor told the husband to toughen up.
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This man, whose case actually belonged to another prosecutor, had come to this 
female prosecutor for advice and help. Sobbing, the man said, “I love my wife, and 
I don’t want to divorce her. Please Saranwol sahib [honorable prosecutor], show 
me a solution.”
The prosecutor laughed, asking why his wife wanted a divorce.
“She says, ‘I don’t like you. I don’t love you,’ ” the man responded, immaculately 
dressed in a striking turban, but still in tears.
“What kind of a husband cries over his wife?” the prosecutor wanted to know. 
“Just tell her, ‘If you want a divorce, fine with me, [but] I won’t give you a single 
afghani of your mahr [dowry].’ ”8
By and large, the question that determined if a case would go to trial was not 
the status of the evidence or even the seriousness of the charge. Instead, the pros-
ecution of a case typically hinged on whether the complainant and the accused (as 
well as family members) could reach an agreement, either on their own or with the 
facilitation of the prosecutor. The efforts made to prepare evidence must be under-
stood from this perspective. The main function of evidence was often to serve as 
leverage in the hands of the prosecutor to get the accused to agree to some of the 
terms of the complainant.
As mentioned earlier, the fact that so few VAW cases led to convictions was a 
concern for women’s rights advocates, as well as Western diplomats. There was 
hardly an international donor conference or event related to women’s situation 
in Afghanistan at which a discussion of the need for the Afghan government to 
step up its efforts to implement the EVAW law did not feature prominently. This 
insistence suggested—implicitly or explicitly—that higher conviction rates were 
mainly a question of the Afghan government’s political will to apply pressure on 
the justice institutions to do their job properly:
The problem is that neither Hamid Karzai nor current President Ashraf Ghani 
has taken meaningful steps to enforce the EVAW Law. An estimated 87 percent of 
 Afghan women experience abuse in their lifetimes, and this continues today, while 
the law sits, largely unused, on a shelf. (Barr 2016)
Today, on International Women’s Day, the United Nations family in Afghanistan calls 
upon the Government of Afghanistan to take a stand and fully implement the Elimina-
tion of Violence against Women (EVAW) Law. . . . Providing appropriate support ser-
vices for survivors of violence is important but it is not enough. . . . The most important 
thing is to put an end to the culture of impunity that prevails in Afghanistan and make 
the perpetrators of violence against women responsible for their crimes. The Govern-
ment has to take the lead and ensure that the EVAW law is implemented. (UNDP 2013)
It is true that there was a lack of interest in large parts of the government to 
apply pressure to enforce the law, but that was not the only factor explaining the 
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low conviction rates. A more complete explanatory framework must take into ac-
count the determinate contexts of women’s lives (Agnes and Ghosh 2012: xiii) and 
those of legal officials. As Basu reminds us, “engaging with the legal realm always 
also entails specific entanglements with family and state, and [law] is metaphori-
cally and metonymically working out those dramas” (2006: 45). In other words, a 
singular focus on a lack of political will could not accommodate the position of 
actual women arriving at the prosecution—not simply as autonomous individu-
als seeking the application of the law, but as social beings embedded in and con-
strained by intimate social and material relationships. Hence the objectives of the 
women (or their families) might not be the exact implementation of the law but, 
instead, the negotiation of a better deal within those relationships. Legal officials 
were similarly maneuvering within parameters of cultural expectations and mate-
rial realities and, like the women, they did not always define the ideal outcome as 
the mere enforcement of the law.
In the sections below, I look into some of the most common types of cases 
registered with the VAW prosecution in Kabul. Reviewing the available informa-
tion about cases registered over a two-month period, I attempt to detect patterns 
with respect to how cases were dismissed or withdrawn. I show that the reasons 
behind the large number of closed cases are rather complex and do not fit into a 
single category. What is abundantly clear, however, is that the high number of non-
prosecuted cases makes more sense through a lens that understands people “to be 
moving themselves in and out of law in ways by which they can best optimize their 
social cultural and economic options” (Basu 2006: 71).
“MAKE HIM RIGHT AGAIN”:  CASES OF BEATING
In order to try to detect patterns with some level of accuracy, my colleagues and I 
decided to review available information about all cases registered with the VAW 
unit in Kabul over a two-month period in 2015—162 cases altogether. Of these, 105 
cases were claims of beating (lat-e kop).9 Our research was able to retrieve some 
information about the status of 68 of these 105 cases. During our period of exami-
nation, 14 of the 68 cases were still ongoing, and 3 had been referred to trial. Of the 
3 cases sent to court, 2 had led to a prison sentence of three months, whereas the 
last had been withdrawn by the complainant during the trial. The remaining cases 
of beating—51 altogether—had been closed. For 21 of the 51 closed cases, there 
was no additional information available, other than that the majority of the cases 
involved claims made by wives against their husbands. However, for the remaining 
30 closed cases, more details were available.
More than half—16 of the 30 cases—were withdrawn after the complainant had 
obtained some kind of guarantee, issued by the prosecution, that the violence would 
not be repeated. It was not uncommon that getting such a commitment had been the 
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explicit wish of the complainant from the outset. In one case, a middle-aged woman, 
wrapped in a large white veil and a rural dress, appeared in front of the prosecutor in 
tears, explaining that after more than twenty-five years of marriage, her husband had 
suddenly started to beat and abuse her, accusing her of extramarital affairs:
I have six children; one of my daughters is married, and I even have grand chil-
dren. . . . At this age, he drove me out of my home. It’s been twenty days that I am 
living with my father. I don’t understand what this man wants from me. It’s my idea 
that he has been using drugs this last year, and that’s why he has gone like this. Even 
in front of my five-year-old he humiliates me, calling me bad things. Please, Mr. 
Prosecutor, do this; make him right again (o ra jor konid, literally, “please fix/repair 
him”), and ask him—why has he been like this for the last one year?
The prosecutor told the husband to come inside and sent the wife out of the 
room so that he could take his statement, asking him, “What is the issue here?”
The husband, his hands shivering and his eyes brimming with tears, said with 
a trembling voice, “The Lord shames one person in young age and another in old 
age; it is certainly my destiny to be ashamed now. Twenty-five years of marriage, 
[but] before this last year, I did not even tease her. At home, she was always the 
husband, and I was the wife.”
After advising him at some length, telling him not to ruin his life by taking drugs, 
the prosecutor asked him, “Well, do you regret what you have done?” The man re-
pented deeply, and when the prosecutor asked him whether he would pledge to stop 
the abusive treatment—“You will not doubt your wife’s character; you will not beat 
her; you will not humiliate her”—he agreed. His wife and her father were called back 
into the room, and she was asked if she would be willing to resume living with her 
husband if the latter would formally guarantee these things to the prosecutor. Yes, 
she enthusiastically replied, but then added that she wanted some of her relatives 
to come to the prosecution office and act as guarantors. This last-minute request 
brought some complications to what the prosecutor had thought was completed 
business. The husband, upon hearing his wife’s demand for relatives to guarantee the 
reconciliation, turned to her and said in a new, abrupt tone: “Listen, don’t try to be 
clever in front of Mr. Prosecutor; just agree with whatever he says.”
 Woman:  “See, Mr. Prosecutor! He is behaving like this with me in front of 
you; he is even worse at home. If we go back to the house, he will 
become the same person again.”
 Prosecutor:  “Do not fight! The issue is over. Your husband is giving you a 
written guarantee, he says, ‘I am not going to beat her or doubt 
her.’ . . . That’s it; the problem is solved.”
The woman’s father interrupted him angrily: “No! Without relatives, it’s not 
possible. The relatives should assure us and give us a guarantee.”
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 Prosecutor:  “What do you want the relatives for? I am taking his shop’s 
 license;10 what else do you want? A written guarantee is better 
than some relative’s assurance.”
 Woman’s father:  “If they go back to home; the same things will happen. Nothing 
will change.”
 Prosecutor:  “Well, what do you want, uncle? Do you want [people] who have 
grandchildren to divorce?”
 Women’s father:  “No! I don’t want them to divorce. But still, relatives should come 
and assure us.”
The husband, yelling to the woman’s father: “You—do not interfere; you have 
ruined our life.”
This led the prosecutor to shout at the husband: “This is not a place where you 
can fight! Stay silent, and talk when you are asked to.” He then said to the women’s 
father: “What are you going to do with the relatives? I am taking a written guaran-
tee from him. The case file will be here with me. If he does the same things again, 
then you can come back. In that case, his punishment will be double; they call this 
repeat offender (mojrem-e mutakarer).”
After getting the husband’s signature and fingerprint for the guarantee letter, 
as well as a copy of his shop’s license, the prosecutor asked the party to leave. Six 
months later, when our fieldwork had finished, they had yet not returned.
In this case, the wife and her father had clearly approached the prosecution 
with the purpose of obtaining some leverage to change the husband’s behavior. 
There was no indication that the woman had wanted to press charges and had then 
been prevented from doing so by the prosecutor. Even so, the somewhat rushed 
way in which the prosecutor dealt with the husband’s guarantee suggested that 
he did not harbor any deep commitment to ensure the welfare of women vic-
tims. As  human rights advocates repeatedly pointed out, there was no systematic 
mechanism in place to follow up with women who had withdrawn their claims, to 
prevent them from being subjected to further violence (UNAMA/OHCHR 2015; 
UNAMA 2012). Unless they returned to file another claim, they were assumed 
to be fine. Nevertheless, it was the case that what some women wanted (within 
the broader constraints shaping their choices) was some kind of intervention that 
would force the husband to stop the violence, rather than to see them prosecuted 
and imprisoned. This partly accounts for the high withdrawal rates.
In some of the other sixteen cases in which women had withdrawn their com-
plaints, the women did indeed appear more motivated to see the law implemented 
and their abusers put on trial. Yet even in some of these, the women still settled for 
a guarantee and withdrew their cases. There were various reasons for this. Some 
had lost access to their children during the course of filing a case, perhaps having 
left them behind in their marital home. According to Afghanistan’s family law, 
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women are entitled to custody over sons until the age of seven and daughters until 
the age of nine (article 429). In practice, it was sometimes difficult for women 
to get the family courts to enforce this—and even more difficult to get judges to 
apply the provisions in the family law that allowed woman to be granted custody 
beyond those ages, if special circumstances applied.11 To some women, the idea 
of going to court was so daunting that they chose to withdraw their case and be 
reunited with their children, even if that meant returning to an abusive spouse. 
Others stated that although they had originally wanted to pursue the case, they 
thought that their husbands showed sufficient regret and willingness to change 
their behavior. In these cases, it was difficult to ascertain exactly what had made 
the women change their mind. It was quite possible that they had been pressured 
by their husbands or in-laws.
In around half of the sixteen cases that were closed by way of a guarantee, 
it appeared that the prosecutors themselves had suggested to the woman that 
she withdraw the claim and reconcile with the perpetrator. In many of these 
cases, there was limited forensic evidence, or the woman was recently mar-
ried, and the prosecutor judged it was better that her husband be given an-
other chance. Whether prosecutors tended to suggest such a course also differed 
according to personal preferences. One of the female prosecutors displayed a 
particular inclination toward reconciling couples, often advising them to patch 
things up. In one case, a young woman around twenty years old came with her 
father to file a complaint against her husband. She complained that she con-
stantly witnessed her husband flirting with other women in the most outrageous 
ways, and when she confronted him, he would beat her. The case was being 
processed by the female prosecutor’s male colleague, but the female prosecu-
tor nonetheless asked the complainant to sit with her so that she could give her 
some advice: “What are you going to do now? If you get a tafreeq [a divorce 
granted by the court]12—you have a child—what will be his fate? And your hus-
band regrets what he has done; just give him a chance.” The young woman was 
crying, saying that she had given her husband so many chances, tolerating his 
behavior because of her baby, but he was not going to change. The prosecutor, 
however, persisted: “Well, I can see that there is regret. He is not a bad person; 
he is a very calm man. He is saying that he loves you. You give him one more 
chance, for the sake of your child. If he doesn’t improve, we are here; you can 
get your tafreeq.” In this particular case, however, the woman was not to be per-
suaded. Nor was she placated by the prospect of obtaining a divorce; she insisted 
on pressing criminal charges against her husband. But other women were more 
easily convinced. Moreover, some of the “guarantee agreements” (which were 
kept on file with the prosecution) also contained points that the woman should 
adhere to. For instance, in one such agreement, it was written that while the 
husband would never beat his wife again and would set up a separate household 
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for her, the wife would wear proper hijab, refrain from going out without her 
husband’s permission, and not misuse her cell phone.13
Yet not all the withdrawn cases were closed by way of guarantee that the abuse 
would end. Ten of the thirty beating cases in the sample were withdrawn after 
the victim had obtained some kind of civil claim or settlement through the fam-
ily court or through a private agreement. Many of these women had arrived at 
the prosecution with specific demands in mind. One young woman wanted her 
husband to commit to paying her a certain amount of monthly allowance (8,000 
afghanis, around US$130) and to set up a separate household for her, so she would 
not have to live with her in-laws. Once her husband had pledged to these two 
things, she withdrew her beating claim. Similarly, a woman withdrew her claim 
once she was assured of getting a divorce and the custody of her small children. 
Another withdrew hers after her brother-in-law had paid her 25,000 afghanis as a 
compensation for having beaten her.
Regardless of the strength of the criminal case before them, the prosecutors 
would summon the accused and try to broker a deal between him and the com-
plainant. In a sense, the prosecutors defined their professional duty more in terms 
of “solving” disputes, rather than in implementing the law. In one case, a young 
woman had entered into an engagement with a man she had later found to have a 
controlling, difficult character. An engagement had no binding status in Afghani-
stan, and the woman had no marks from the beating she claimed that her fiancé 
had subjected her to, but the prosecutor still summoned the fiancé. Once there, the 
prosecutor got the fiancé to state that the engagement was broken, and the claim 
of beating was withdrawn.
At times, it was clear that the threat of prosecution functioned as a kind of 
bargaining tool for the woman. In these situations, their withdrawal of their cases 
cannot readily be interpreted merely as an expression of weakness or as an imposi-
tion on them by the prosecutors or their husbands or families. Instead, it is pos-
sible to argue that the prosecution provided women with a new form of leverage, 
which, comparatively speaking, strengthened their bargaining position. Moreover, 
this function extended to other types of scenarios too, where physical violence was 
of less importance to the complainant—or did not feature at all. However, it was 
also clear that in at least two of the ten cases, the complainant had filed an earlier 
complaint and had followed the prosecutors’ advice to withdraw their criminal 
claims and simply pursue a divorce in the family courts. When the women got no-
where in the family courts, they came back to the prosecutors to file new criminal 
claims, saying that they regretted having withdrawn their earlier ones.
In the final four of the thirty cases, the victim returned and said she had for-
given the perpetrator and wanted to withdraw the claim. In some of these, it was 
difficult to tell what had made the complainant change her mind. Some women 
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stated that elders had mediated; others provided no explanation. Most likely, they 
had been subjected to pressure from their families.
At best, then, the prosecution unit provided women subjected to beating with 
a new form of strategic leverage when it came to negotiating highly unequal rights 
in marriage and economic entitlements (Basu 2006: 71). In some cases, it might 
also have curtailed the violence inflicted on them. At worst, the prosecution unit 
reinforced gender norms in which women’s responsibility to stay in their  marriages 
overrode their physical safety, and similarly, in which the government’s responsi-
bility to uphold marriage took priority over its obligation to protect women from 
harm. Even in the best-case scenarios, however, the function of the special unit 
was far from empowering women as equal partners in marriage (Basu 2006: 71). 
Rather, women were negotiating a slightly better deal within highly unequal gen-
der relations. That the prosecution units (at best) served to modify rather than sus-
pend the “patriarchal bargain” (Kandiyoti 1988) was underlined by another type of 
claim that women brought: complaints that their husbands had abandoned them. 
In these cases, women came to the prosecution unit not with claims of violence 
but in an attempt to force their spouses to uphold their obligations as husbands by 
resuming marital cohabitation or by ending affairs.
“I  AM LEFT WITH NO FATE” :  CHARGING HUSBANDS 
WITH ABAND ONMENT
The largest single category of cases after beating was abandonment. Fourteen 
claims of abandonment (filed as be sarneveshti, literally “without fate”) were reg-
istered with the VAW prosecution in Kabul over a two-month period. The legal 
grounds for these claims were unclear. Under the 1977 Civil Code, a husband is 
obliged to provide maintenance to his wife, but the failure to do so, or “abandon-
ment,” is not a crime under Afghan criminal law. Nonetheless, the prosecutors 
opened files on these claims and spent time investigating them, even if none of the 
fourteen claims led to indictments.
The details of the cases show that the VAW prosecution units had, to some 
extent, become an accessible resort for women whose spouses appeared to have 
disregarded their most basic responsibilities as husbands. Most married Afghan 
women were dependent on their husbands for financial survival, and social norms 
(and the Civil Code) dictated that husbands should provide for their wives. In-
terestingly, it appeared that women approached the prosecution to reinforce 
norms that more subtle forms of social control (family interventions or society’s 
disapproval) evidently could not compel their husbands to adhere to. Many of 
these women found themselves in quite desperate circumstances. Yet from their 
accounts one could glean more than material difficulties—expressions of deep 
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disappointment and anger about the way that they had been treated. One young 
woman came to the prosecution office with her mother and holding a newborn 
infant in her arms:
Three months ago, while I was pregnant, my husband hit me and kicked me out 
of the house. Even before this, I was suffering from cruelty in my husband’s house. 
His family used to say to me “You are a zan-e mordarkhor” (dirty woman, literally, 
someone who eats corpses or carrion). They humiliated me in any way possible. And 
then they brought me [to my father’s house] three months ago, and they never came 
back for me. When I gave birth to my baby, my mother called them and asked them 
to come, but they didn’t. Now my baby is eight days old, but my husband hasn’t come 
a single time to see the baby. I have been abandoned.”
Her mother continued, “When we were in the hospital, I called her husband 
and told him, ‘Come, you are going to be a father.’ But he did not come. This caused 
my heart so much pain. I do not want my daughter to get a divorce from her hus-
band. I just want him not to leave her abandoned like this. Look at my daughter—
she is like a flower; she is young; she is beautiful. Why should her life be ruined?”
In most of these cases, the prosecutors first tried to convince the husband to 
stay with his wife and fulfill his marital obligations. This was generally also what 
the women themselves wanted. Sometimes they also hoped to pressure a husband 
to cease an affair he was having with another woman or to stop him contracting a 
second marriage. However, even in these cases, the “abandoned” wives were insis-
tent that divorce was not their preference. This was not surprising, given the enor-
mous stigma and economic hardships faced by women divorcees. One woman, 
whose husband had sent her back to her parents’ house when she protested his 
second marriage, said, “I don’t want divorce; I will never ask for divorce, even if he 
marries a hundred women. I just want him to take me back home.” Another wom-
an came with a complaint that her husband was having an affair with a woman on 
whom he spent all his money. A few days before, she said, her husband had even 
taken this khanom-e bad akhlaq (woman of bad morals) for a trip to Dubai. Again, 
she emphasized that she did not want a divorce; she just wanted her husband to 
break off his affair. But attempts by the prosecutors to convince husbands to as-
sume their marital responsibilities normally did not lead to anything. Typically, 
when confronted with the prosecution, they would opt for divorce, and there was 
little the prosecutors could do legally. “Divorce is a man’s prerogative, and nobody 
can prevent him,” as one prosecutor said to a despairing woman when she had to 
tell her that, rather than give up his affair, her adulterous husband had stated that 
he would end his marriage. However, in these cases, prosecutors would try ensure 
that the woman was paid her mahr, which is a wife’s right when a divorce is initi-
ated by the husband (talaaq) or granted by the courts due to certain faults by the 
husband (tafreeq).
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“MY FIANCÉ MARRIED SOMEONE ELSE WITHOUT 
TELLING ME”:  THE VAW PROSECUTION AS AN 
AC CESSIBLE RESOURCE
One of the more surprising aspects of VAW prosecution unit in Kabul was how 
it had become an accessible resource to women seeking to solve a range of prob-
lems in which violence featured only marginally, if at all. Given the importance of 
notions of privacy and shame in Afghan culture—and the indifference and mis-
conduct of legal officials—many scholars have concluded that Afghans approach 
government justice offices only when absolutely necessary (De Lauri 2015; USIP 
2010). However, many of the cases in the VAW prosecution in Kabul challenged 
this conclusion. This is not to belittle the difficulties faced by other people who 
approached the prosecution unit, many of whom clearly were quite desperate to 
find a solution to their troubles. Yet it was also evident that to some, the open-door 
policy of the VAW prosecution unit encouraged them to also seek help with prob-
lems that did not really center on incidents of violence, as defined in the law. One 
example, which certainly was at the extreme end of the spectrum, was of a young 
woman who arrived with a complaint that her fiancé had married someone else.
My fiancé married someone else without telling me. . . . He used to live abroad. As 
long as he was there, he used to talk properly with me, and we had a good relation-
ship. But after coming here,  .  .  . I don’t know what happened to him. One day he 
simply said, “I am in a relationship with my neighbor,” and after that, he never called 
me again. Then I heard that his wedding ceremony is in so-and-so hotel. I went to 
his wedding ceremony. I talked to him and asked him why he was marrying someone 
else, and he just said “Can’t you see it’s my wedding? We will talk later.” His brother 
hit me and asked me to leave the hotel.
“What did his brother hit you with?” the prosecutor asked her. “With his hand,” 
the woman responded. One of his colleagues, listening in on the conversation, 
jokingly said, “Only his hand—a hand doesn’t really count.” The woman was  quiet, 
and another prosecutor suggested, “You also go and marry someone else. You were 
just engaged—you were not married to him.” The woman again did not say any-
thing, smiling unsurely. The prosecutor continued, “Why have you been so lazy? 
He has married someone else—you also go and marry someone else. He is enjoy-
ing his life, and you are wandering around in the prosecution. . . . I feel pity for 
you.” Hearing this, the woman started to cry. “You people can’t understand my 
feelings,” she said and left the room.
Other prosecutors criticized their colleague for the way he had talked to the 
woman, saying to him, “You cannot make fun of those coming here.” The prosecu-
tor whose case it had been then went and asked the woman to come back inside the 
room. “Well, what do you want us to do?” he enquired. “Do you want us to make 
him give talaaq to his wife?” The woman responded, “I want you to summon him 
102    New Protection Mechanisms
here and ask him why he has done this to me.” The prosecutor asked her to give 
her or a family member’s phone number so that he could contact her if necessary.
Because the woman stated that she had been hit by her ex-fiancé’s brother, the 
case was registered as a beating case in the records. She did not return, and the 
prosecutors did not follow up further. Her case thus appeared in the records as a 
withdrawn case. Without further examination, it would have appeared as part of 
the problematic trend of women being pressured by family members or prosecu-
tors to withdraw their complaint. In this and quite a few other cases, however, the 
actual dynamics were quite different.
More generally, many of the complainants or their families did not necessarily 
think of the prosecution office as a place where one went to secure an actual pun-
ishment for a crime in accordance with the law. Some came with vague notions 
of just wanting some kind of solution, and many came with a specific objective 
in mind other than prosecuting the case, such as obtaining a divorce, a financial 
payment, or custody of children. The larger picture is, of course, that Afghan laws 
and social practices granted women very few possibilities to obtain such rights. 
The VAW unit, therefore, provided some correction to a very uneven playing 
field, where women’s access to fundamental rights was severely restricted. In some 
roundabout, unexpected, and limited way, the VAW prosecution unit could be 
said to serve as a tool of legal empowerment.
“HERE IS  YOUR HUSBAND,  AND HERE IS  YOUR 
FATHER .  CHO OSE ONE OF THEM.” :  
R APE AND KIDNAPPING
Over the two-month period, 7 claims of rape and sexual assault, and 4 claims of 
kidnapping (which involved sexual crimes) were registered with the VAW pros-
ecution unit in Kabul. By the time our fieldwork in the VAW unit was completed, 
some seven months later, there had been no recorded convictions among these 11 
cases. For 3 of the rape cases, there was no information available. One case had 
ended with withdrawal, as the complainant stated that she was going abroad for 
medical treatment and could no longer pursue the case. In 2 cases (one of which 
involved a father, and the other a brother-in-law), the suspects were indicted, but 
the cases had not yet proceeded to trial. The final case had gone to trial, but the 
rape charge was dismissed, and both the complainant and the defendant received 
suspended prison sentences for zina instead. This case involved two young rela-
tives, and the woman eventually confided that the relationship with her cousin had 
been consensual. Although she had wanted marriage, her parents had forced her 
to approach the prosecution unit with rape charges instead, after they had failed 
to convince the man’s family to provide a baad to compensate for the humiliation 
the premarital affair had caused the family. The prosecutor also thought that the 
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relationship had been consensual and thought the best solution was a nikah. He 
argued, however, that as long as the family of the young woman did not agree, he 
had no option but to send the case to court and the suspect to jail. Before the trial 
could conclude, the woman arranged to see the judge privately, and she confided 
that she had been in a relationship with her cousin and that it was her family who 
had forced her to go ahead with the trial. The judge applauded the woman for her 
bravery and sentenced the couple to a three-year suspended imprisonment for 
adultery. For as, as the judge said to his colleague, “The girl and the boy seem to be 
in love, and being in love is not a bad thing.”
A similar dynamic was evident in one of the kidnapping cases, but this case 
was closed before being sent to trial. A young couple had eloped, whereupon the 
sister of the woman filed a kidnapping claim against the man. The prosecution 
summoned all parties for questioning. The woman who was alleged to have been 
kidnapped stated that she had married the man of her choice and that her family 
was upset because they had already promised her to an older man who would pay 
a handsome bride-price. Although there appeared to be no grounds for a criminal 
charge, the prosecutor was not content to simply dismiss the case; he wished to 
see the parties reconciled, too. Protracted and detailed negotiations took place 
in the prosecution office, down to the exact kilos of meat and rice that were to be 
provided by the groom’s family for the wedding feast. However, in the lead-up to 
the wedding party, relations between the two families again broke down. The pros-
ecutor summoned the parties one more time and simply told the woman to chose 
between her own family and her husband there and then: “Here is your husband, 
and here is your father. Choose one of them. Do not fear; no one can say anything 
to you. You are in a government office—no one can beat you. Say whatever you 
want.” After some hesitation, she walked over to her husband, and her family left 
in anger. The case was dismissed.
The three other kidnapping cases did not lead to convictions either. Two were 
dismissed and referred to the family court for divorce, and the final case was sent 
to court, where the defendant was acquitted. In all three cases, during the course 
of the alleged kidnappings, the complainant had been married to the accused, al-
though whether the marriage had been consensual or not was disputed.
That many of these claims of kidnapping and rape turned out the be about 
something very different—families seeking compensation for their loss of control 
over their daughters’ sexuality—should not, in any way, be taken to suggest that 
there were few actual cases of rape and sexual assault in Afghanistan. The loss 
of “virginity” under any circumstances, forced or not, was associated with such 
stigma (and outright danger) in Afghanistan that a large number of rape cases 
went unreported. Moreover, the sample of cases presented here is too small to 
determine whether they might be representative even of the rape cases that were 
registered with the prosecution units. What the cases discussed above illustrate, 
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however, is that the prosecution units could become vehicles for family agendas 
that had little to with women’s rights. In these cases, dismissal or acquittal cannot 
be understood to mean a setback for women’s position per se—in fact, quite the 
opposite, since when the prosecutors dismissed these cases, they were siding with 
women against family claims over their bodies. In other words, dismissal rates 
must be treated with some caution.
Interestingly, the prosecutors in the VAW unit in Kabul showed little inter-
est in charging anyone for consensual sexual activities. Sexual intercourse before 
and outside marriage (zina) is punishable in Afghanistan by up to fifteen years in 
prison. Elsewhere in the country, women were sometimes also prosecuted for “at-
tempted zina” or even for “running away from home” (see chapters 4 and 5). In the 
cases covered by this research, there were several instances where it appeared that 
women (and men) had committed acts of zina, but if this was the case, the concern 
of the prosecutors was to see the individuals involved married or otherwise to cau-
tion against immorality. One woman even got the prosecutor to call her lover—the 
father of her unborn baby—and tell him to face up to his responsibility. There were 
no examples of the prosecutors in the VAW unit in Kabul initiating investigations 
of zina. This was in contrast to the prosecutors in some of the rural provinces, 
who would sometimes boast about how their investigations of rape had uncovered 
acts of zina—cases in which women who had filed claims of rape suddenly found 
themselves accused of crimes instead.
BARGAINING UNDER THE SHAD OW OF THE L AW?
The VAW unit in Kabul displayed many similarities with the various alternative 
dispute-resolution mechanisms and specialized civil courts for women set up in 
other countries in the region, such as India and Bangladesh. In these countries, 
delays and corruption in the formal legal systems, as well as class and gender bar-
riers, have led feminist groups to push for the establishment of “women’s courts” 
or other arbitration mechanisms (Basu 2011). These bodies, which deal with a great 
number of domestic violence cases, are intended to provide women, especially 
poor women, with a safe space where they can speak freely about their marital and 
other difficulties, using their own language, in a nonjudgmental environment.14 
Research has shown, however, that in practice, these institutions, despite their 
feminist foundations, have displayed an overwhelming tendency to reinscribe 
gendered norms (Vatuk 2013; Basu 2011). Women’s existence outside of marriage 
is considered problematic, if not impossible, and the focus is on the restoration of 
family life—and thus on getting both parties to amend their behavior. In some in-
stances, officials in these institutions will threaten men with criminal prosecution 
if they don’t take part in the reconciliation negotiations, but these threats are often 
defused by the fact that the main objective is to reconcile the parties. At the same 
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time, as indicated by much of the literature on these bodies, the underlying cause 
for the inability to transcend such gender expectations is not always ideological 
prejudice but is often the realization that for many women in abusive marriages, 
there are few options available. Vatuk cautions that before judging these bodies 
too harshly, one should keep in mind that the problems of domestic violence that 
they are trying to address on a case-by-case basis are intrinsically linked to the 
structural issues of male bias and gender discrimination that characterizes society 
as a whole (2013: 97).
Although the Afghan VAW unit in Kabul, as part of the criminal justice pros-
ecution, was intended to be a different kind of institution, it displayed many 
parallels to the specialized civil courts and dispute-resolution mechanisms in 
neighboring countries. Like these bodies, the VAW unit was unable to overcome 
the structural relations that situated women as dependents within the family unit. 
And like these bodies, the VAW unit thus largely became a recourse for women 
whose marital or family situations had become intolerable, rather than a mecha-
nism for dispensing justice as defined by the laws. Yet within those larger con-
straints, it is still possible to argue that the Kabul VAW unit served to strengthen 
many women’s bargaining position. Generally speaking, the VAW unit was not 
unique among legal institutions in Afghanistan in prioritizing settlements be-
tween parties over the application of the law. It is well known in legal research on 
Afghanistan that legal officials—presiding over both civil and criminal cases— 
often seek to reach agreements rather than to make decisions strictly based on law 
(De Lauri 2015). To a significant extent, a key function of the VAW prosecution 
unit in Kabul appeared to have been to include cases of violence against women 
into this preexisting practice. In other words, the dedicated prosecution units 
have made it possible for more claims of violence against women to enter into the 
criminal justice system, but without necessarily subjecting these cases to pros-
ecution. As one of the cleaners in the Kabul prosecution unit muttered to herself 
with disapproval (after having scorned a complainant for making too much fuss 
about a missing file): “Don’t know where this Violence [the VAW prosecution 
unit] came from. . . . In our time, any kind of dispute would be solved at home. . . . 
These days, even if husbands push their wives with a finger, they come running 
to the Violence unit.”
The dismissive attitude of the cleaner notwithstanding, she was correct in her 
perception that the prosecution unit in Kabul provided (some) women with a nov-
el resort—one with a very low threshold—in case of abuse or difficulties. This was 
a far cry from how the supporters of the EVAW law, both local and international, 
had wanted to see the new prosecution units operate. They argued—correctly—
that a low conviction rate sent signals of impunity and that many women could be 
at increased risk after their claims had been dismissed or withdrawn. Indeed, there 
was no evidence of a systematic follow-up of women who had withdrawn claims 
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or obtained a “guarantee” from the prosecution. The general message given to such 
women was simply “come back if it happens again.”
Moreover, in Kabul, women were at least generally welcome to register their 
claims, with prosecutors starting initial proceedings. In rural provinces, women 
were met with a much more aggressive attitude, with officials denouncing them 
for being “bad women” and refusing to open files without significant pressure. 
There, the attitude that cases of violence against women did not belong in the jus-
tice system and that no decent woman would bring her “problems” to an outsider 
was very much in evidence still. Moreover, the open-door policy in Kabul, in turn, 
also meant that some cases were registered for reasons that had little to do with 
women’s protection. Particularly in cases filed as rape and kidnapping, families 
would sometimes bring false charges in order to restore their reputation or to ob-
tain a bride-price. Nonetheless, I would like to suggest that in some instances, the 
inclusive policy in Kabul provided some women complainants with new forms of 
leverage. Because claims of gender violence and abuse had not featured much in 
the criminal justice system at all, the ability to apply the threat of criminal sanc-
tions increased the bargaining power of women vis-à-vis their abusers. This en-
abled some women a greater chance of obtaining some limited rights—such as 
divorce, child custody, or some kind of formal recognition that the violence that 
they were subjected to was unlawful and illegitimate.
C ONCLUSIONS
The low prosecution and conviction rates of cases of gender violence were disap-
pointing to many of the supporters of the EVAW law. They saw it as a sign that 
the government was lacking in commitment or even pandering to conservative 
constituencies. This was certainly part of the picture, and, as shown in chapter 2, 
the political buy-in of the EVAW law was incomplete at best. To some extent, the 
dedicated VAW units represented an attempt to solve the problem of missing na-
tional will by placing part of the legal implementation under direct global man-
agement. The VAW units—particularly the unit in Kabul—became a focal point 
where donors could channel money and training efforts and, up to a point, moni-
tor performance.
Yet, as this chapter has emphasized, to view a law’s implementation simply as a 
question of top-down enforcement offers a limited perspective. Laws and justice 
are ultimately filtered through a host of social relations before becoming concrete 
possibilities in individual lives (Agnes and Ghosh 2012: xiii). Especially when there 
is a considerable gap between legal frameworks and the lived structures of kin-
ship and gender, it makes sense to view legal institutions as a space where rights 
and obligations between people—women, family members, and perpetrators—
are negotiated, and where the law constitutes one reference point rather than the 
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overarching framework (Agnes and Ghosh 2012: xiii). Applying this perspective 
makes it easier to grasp both the limitations of the Kabul VAW unit and the small 
difference it sometimes made. As the examples in this chapter illustrate, the with-
drawal of claims did not simply occur as a result of the ideological prejudice of 
officials who believed that cases of gender violence were not criminal offenses. 
Rather, withdrawals took place against a composite backdrop of concerns and ob-
jectives by women, perpetrators, families, and officials. Although larger structural 
relations narrowed women’s options, it was not always the case that withdrawing 
their complaint was simply the result of an imposition. In many instances, the 
prosecution unit in Kabul served to empower women in a limited sense—by offer-
ing them leverage in pursuing objectives other than punishing the perpetrators in 
accordance to the law. Arguably, there was a common thread running through the 
way in which the EVAW law was promoted and enacted—and the way in which it 
was expected to be enforced. Both entailed a mode of intervention that attempted 
to circumvent, rather than transform, complex political and gendered landscapes. 
Both, nonetheless, were filtered or somewhat appropriated by localized practices 
of mediation and patronage, so that the ultimate impact was curtailed.
108
As long as there is violence against women, . . . when a girl has no place at 
her father’s house, which should have been the place of love and mercy; when 
she has no place at her husband’s house, which should have been a place of 
dignity; when she is not treated according to the rights and dignity that Islam 
has given to a woman, then she must have a place where she can take refuge 
and her life can be saved, and shelters are these places.1
The girls running away from their houses and seeking refuge in shelters are of 
the kind who seeks to realize immoral and unhealthy desires, desires contrary 
to our society and against our culture. These are girls wishing to be free to do 
whatever they want.2
This chapter focuses on the controversies in Afghanistan over the space, both 
literally and metaphorically, for women to leave their homes and families in cases 
of abuse. Between 2001 and 2014, more than two dozen women’s shelters were 
established in the country, providing a living space for women and girls who could 
not—or for security reasons, did not want to—live with their families. As it was 
highly uncommon, if not altogether unheard of, for women to set up accommoda-
tion on their own outside of family or marital dwellings, the shelters were, by their 
very existence, radical establishments. They unsettled government practices and 
popular discourses that cast women running away from their homes as transgres-
sors and even criminals. They also problematized the domestic domain as a poten-
tial site of abuse, from which women had a legitimate right to seek protection. As 
the shelters gradually established themselves in the post-2001 landscape, a series of 
negotiations unfolded over the conditions under which women could legitimately 
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“escape” from home and take up residence in a shelter. At stake were the interests 
that kinship groups and society at large could claim in the movement, chastity, and 
propriety of women—and how such interests could be secured in practice through 
surveillance mechanisms over women’s mobility and conduct.
At the same time, I argue that the controversies over the shelters revealed  deeper 
social and political fault lines. The women’s shelters operated through donor fund-
ing and donations from abroad. As they drew upon international networks and 
resources, they were, at least in part, constituted as transnational institutions. 
This enabled the shelters to act fairly autonomously of the Afghan government on 
many counts and to challenge or circumvent attempts by Afghan government of-
ficials to regulate, supervise, or co-opt them. However, the international leverage 
and resources that the shelters were able to mobilize could be sources of frustra-
tion, suspicion, and resentment. To many Afghan officials, and to the conservative 
media and politicians rallying against the shelters, the fact that the shelters were 
funded and supported by foreigners meant that the women residing in them were 
out of control in three ways: beyond family control and outside both government 
and national supervision. In other words, the shelters were regarded as a challenge 
to the institution of the family, to the government’s authority over the foreign-
funded civil society, and finally to Afghanistan as a sovereign Islamic nation. Such 
anxieties formed the backdrop to the government’s 2011 attempt to nationalize the 
shelters by placing them under government administration. As I will explain, the 
contestations over the shelters became enmeshed in broader issues of compet-
ing models of service provision, popular discontent with NGOs, and finally the 
U.S.-led war against the Taliban.
THE “RUNAWAY WOMAN” AS A TR ANSGRESSOR
When human rights workers visited Afghan prisons in the months after the 2001 
invasion, they found that the majority of female detainees were held for reasons re-
lated to “moral crimes”: “There were about 300 women confined in Kabul jail. . . . 
The majority were . . . detained for a variety of offences related to family law such 
as refusing to live with their husbands, refusing to marry a husband chosen by 
their parents, or for having run away from either the parental or the matrimonial 
home. It appears that these women have no access to lawyers, have no information 
on their rights, if any, and are generally left in jail until their respective relatives 
intervene” (Lau 2003).
Being incarnated for having run away was a gender-specific predicament. Only 
women could “escape from the house” (farar az manzel); men simply went out, 
left, or, in some cases, abandoned their families. Broadly speaking, constructions 
of “running away” as a female-specific crime or subversive act hinge upon a gen-
der order in which women are considered legal minors. Women are the wards of 
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household heads, husbands, and families who have claims over them and to whose 
supervision and protection they should be returned. Women’s outings to public 
places (anywhere outside the house: the street, the bazaar, or the houses of rela-
tives) are thus subject to permission (ijaze) by elders, husbands, or male relatives.
The kind of gender order that renders unaccompanied women in public places 
potential runaways whom the authorities are duty-bound to arrest is not only hier-
archical (in the sense that women are subordinated to men and family elders) but 
also segregated. Outside space is constructed as male space, where men socialize 
and engage in business, trade, and politics, whereas women remain trespassers. 
As interlopers in public spaces, women must limit their forays to what is strictly 
necessary and with a clear purpose. Unaccompanied women who move around at 
leisure or without legitimate reasons are suspect and seen as potentially threaten-
ing to the social order. The head of a juvenile detention center in Herat patiently 
explained this to me as a response to my somewhat disingenuous question as to 
whether there were any boys in the center who had been arrested for running 
away. Boys, he said, could not be said to “run away”: “When a boy leaves and come 
back after two or three days, no one in the family considers that to be a problem. 
A boy can walk alone on the street in the night; nobody’s going to stop him to 
ask him what his business is or where he is going. The police take notice of a girl 
or woman walking alone on the street in the night with no obvious aim, but they 
won’t notice boys in the same way. According to our traditional beliefs, if a girl is 
gone for three [or] four days, it will be a big shame for her family.”3
The underlying principle in this is the stake others, namely a woman’s family 
and male guardians, hold in her sexuality and her reproductive capacities. In post-
2001 Afghanistan, doubts over a woman’s virginity or fidelity could potentially be 
raised whenever her chaste behavior and nature could not be positively verified 
by reputable witnesses. Women who had spent unaccompanied time outside of 
family domains might fall into a category of questionable virtue. From a systemic 
perspective of public morality and social order, that is, the overall upholding of a 
gender order that recognizes kinship claims on women, single women at large in 
public spaces or living beyond family surveillance are deeply unsettling. If toler-
ated, the entire system of social regulation of female sexuality might collapse. As 
it turned out, this was exactly what many feared the shelters might bring about.
In the years following the overthrow of the Taliban, government practices gen-
erally accommodated family sovereign claims over women, although in fluid and 
unpredictable ways. During the Karzai presidency (2001–14), the number of wom-
en imprisoned for moral crimes was several hundred at any one time, according to 
government figures.4 But moral crimes was a broad category; it encompassed both 
zina (premarital or extramarital intercourse) and the more vague crime of running 
away. While the Penal Code made zina a punishable crime for both sexes, there 
was no reference in the legal framework to any crime of running away. Families, 
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judges, and the police often asserted that, regardless of the written legal frame-
work, the practice of detaining runaway women was in accordance with Islam. 
In fact, however, governments in Muslim countries have dealt with women run-
aways in quite different ways, as recent literature has shown. Mir-Hosseini (2010) 
points out that while all the classical fiqh schools construct a marital relation in 
which women are placed under the protection and domination of the husband in 
an exchange relationship—in return for nafaqa (maintenance: food, shelter, and 
clothing), a wife is obliged to observe tamkin (obedience), but the exact meaning 
of obedience differs. For some legal scholars, obedience is primarily understood as 
sexual obedience, a husband’s right to his wife’s body. If the wife requires her hus-
band’s permission to leave the house, it is because of his rights of sexual access to 
her. To go out without his permission would be to infringe upon his rights to this 
access and she would be declared nushuz (disobedient). Others have interpreted 
the duty to obedience more broadly, as opposed to only in sexual matters.
Furthermore, the exact conditions under which women have been housebound 
in Muslim societies have been shown to vary. And even more variance has been 
found in the degree to which this has been enforced by institutions of law. Sonbol 
(2003) examines the Egyptian concept of the “house of obedience” (bayt al-ta’a), 
which she points out is a modern practice. The house of obedience is a precept 
under which a judge could order a woman to be forcefully sent back to her hus-
band if her petition for divorce was rejected in court. Sonbol argues that prior to 
the codification of personal law in the late nineteenth century, legal practice was 
more flexible. Egyptian women were able to negotiate their own marriage con-
tracts and could include clauses giving them significant mobility, the ability to get 
divorce, and so on (Sonbol 2003). As a general rule, a judge would not order—and 
even less, force—a woman to live with a husband if she refused to do so. Sonbol 
claims that the nineteenth-century promulgation of personal laws in Egypt, while 
ostensibly a mere codification of sharia, actually incorporated patriarchal gender 
relations from Europe to greatly enhance the husband’s power over his wife com-
pared to existing legal practice. The new laws, in effect, gave the husband absolute 
right over his wife and the bayt al-ta’a was an official enforcement mechanism to 
that end (Sonbol 1998; see also Cuno 2009; Tucker 2008). This Egyptian law also 
became a model for other codified personal laws across the Middle East, such as in 
Yemen, where, until recently, the bayt al-ta’a was enforced by the courts and police 
(Shehada 2009).
The Egyptian example serves to illustrate that there is no single Islamic or fiqh 
position on women’s right to leave the home and certainly no uniformity in types 
of government enforcement. If Islam cannot serve as a deterministic analytical 
device, it follows that historical variation has existed also in Afghanistan, although 
the limited research on gender boundaries in earlier periods makes it difficult to 
assess how much. However, as detailed in chapter 1, judges and legal officials who 
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had been working since the 1970s and 1980s recalled that the government rarely 
prosecuted people for zina in those years, and it certainly did not detain wom-
en for escaping the house. The mujahedin government started to arrest runaway 
women, and incarcerations for zina also increased. Yet even compared to those 
stricter conditions, the Taliban government’s infamous orders that women could 
leave their house only in the company of a mahram and only if completely veiled 
were a radical new imposition. In their rigidity, Taliban gender policies effectively 
usurped kinship power. The question of permission for women to leave the house 
was no longer left to the discretion of families or husbands; it was subject to the 
uniform dictates of the government, which also took it upon itself the right to 
punish women directly (Cole 2008). As Malikyar reports from the Taliban’s 1996 
takeover of Kabul: “The new rulers of Kabul assigned a number of militia men to 
the streets, markets and mosques, bestowing them with a mandate to carry out 
on-the-spot punishments on violators. On 2 October, two women, spotted in full 
veil on a Kabul sidewalk, were beaten with a car radio antenna. When asked for 
the charges, the militia men stated that the women did not have a good reason for 
leaving their homes” (1997: 396–97).
The Taliban’s attempts to impose their singular gender regime was part of their 
larger project of imagining and enforcing a political vision counterposed to the 
West and to the urban depravity (as they saw it) and violent chaos presided over 
by the PDPA and the Rabbani-led mujahedin government, respectively. It was also 
an assertion of rural, Pashtun power over urban, non-Pashtun groups, forcing the 
latter to adapt practices more associated with the former (Cole 2008).
After 2001, government policies on women’s mobility and public presence be-
came much less restrictive, and more fluid and open-ended. Nevertheless, women 
and girls were detained, charged with, and convicted for farar az manzel, signify-
ing that the Karzai government was accommodating family sovereign claims over 
women and had not embarked upon a total break with the mujahedin and Taliban 
governments of the 1990s. Except for in the large, more liberal cities (Kabul, Herat, 
and Mazar-e Sharif), women—particularly women in their teens or twenties—
who appeared to be travelling on their own were usually considered suspicious 
and apprehended by the police. In some cases, women were tracked down and 
arrested after the police had received reports from their families that they had run 
away. Yet the outcome of an individual case of running away was never certain. If 
the police did not suspect adultery and thought that the woman had acceptable 
reasons to flee, they might refer her to a shelter. In other cases, women would be 
detained and investigated. Once detained, women were typically subjected to hy-
men examinations (“virginity tests”). Unmarried women who failed this test could 
be found guilty of adultery by default.5 Others could be found guilty of the act of 
running away or the intention to commit zina based simply on the fact that they 
had left their home on their own and without family permission. Typically, the 
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prison sentence for running away would be one to five years, whereas zina could 
be punished with between five and fifteen years in prison.
The significant number of incarcerations of women based on charges of running 
away in the post-2001 period gradually became the focus of both Afghan women’s 
rights workers and the gender and legal reform aid agencies. They protested that 
running away was not an offense according to Afghan criminal law; only zina was 
criminalized.6 Elaborate training programs were developed to inform legal officials 
of the actual limits of the law. In response, many judges—if they engaged with such 
appeals to legality at all—referred to article 130 of the Constitution, which stated 
that Hanafi jurisprudence could be applied when no other laws did.7 Alternatively, 
many changed the charge of running away to “running away with the intention 
to commit zina.” Eventually, the Afghan office of the International Development 
Law Organization (IDLO), the intergovernmental organization active in the field 
of women’s rights and the legal system that had initiated the special prosecution 
units, solicited the opinion of the Afghan Supreme Court on the matter, which 
responded by issuing a directive in August 2010.8 The directive stated that in order 
to determine a runaway case, the first step was to consider the following questions:
 1. Is the runaway a female? Is the runaway single or married?
 2. What was the cause and motive for running away?
 3. Has the runaway escaped to the house of relatives or strangers?
Stating that it concerned itself with female runaways only, the Supreme Court 
further listed three scenarios, differentiated on the basis of whether there had been 
violence or not, and whether the woman had run away to a relative or “legal inti-
mate” (mahram). It concluded that if a woman had experienced violence and was 
running away to a relative or legal intimate, this would not be considered a crime, 
“because it is the right of every individual to stay safe from cruelty or torture.” 
Moreover, if a married woman ran away to a relative or legal intimate, but for no 
“religious or legal reason,” this was deemed not to be a criminal issue but a civil 
one, and only the husband could launch a complaint against the wife. However, if 
a woman, married or single, ran away to the house of a “stranger” (a category that 
included any nonrelative, not necessarily people the woman didn’t know) rather 
than to relatives or to state authorities, even if she ran away due to family violence, 
this act was prohibited and punishable, because, the court reasoned, it could result 
in crimes such as adultery or prostitution. The Supreme Court’s directive referred 
to a principle of Islamic jurisprudence called the Prohibition of Means: “Any ac-
tion that leads to what is prohibited is prohibited. That is why running away [to a 
stranger] is prohibited and is punishable.”
The Supreme Court’s directive illustrated that what was under discussion was 
not only the validity of the grounds for running away, but also the mode of doing 
so. Effectively, it identified a danger in the prospect of women being outside family 
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or government surveillance. This hinged on a strong connection being made be-
tween women’s mobility and freedom and their sexual availability. The directive 
said women were incapable of being entrusted with their own virtue—therefore, 
women who had been outside the supervision of authorized guardians could no 
longer be considered positively chaste. Although men could also be arrested for 
zina, it was not considered problematic per se for them to travel or live on their 
own or to go to the houses of “strangers.” For women, these acts were deemed 
crimes in themselves.
The fact that escaping from the house was considered such a subversive act is 
critically important for understanding the controversy over the shelters. Shelters 
enabled women to leave their families and reside in a space where, in the imagina-
tion of many Afghans, they were completely at liberty to indulge in immorality. As 
Qazi Hanafi, MP, said on a television program in 2011: “[A shelter] is a place where 
youngsters want to go to fulfill their immoral desires, those that they cannot fulfill 
at home, where they are monitored and controlled by their parents.”9
Given such sentiments, it is not surprising that the shelters increasingly found 
themselves on a collision course with conservatives. The first shelter had been reg-
istered in Kabul in early 2003, initially in response to the deportation of single 
Afghan women from Iran. They were a novelty in Afghanistan. During earlier 
times, women subjected to abuse would seek refuge with other family members, 
neighbors, or in some cases, local leaders. During the communist era, a number 
of women, if they could afford it, also lived independently.10 Mary Akrami, whose 
organization set up the first shelter, argued that the shelters responded to a new 
need in Afghanistan, brought about by the upheavals of war and the accompany-
ing impoverishment and dislocation.
“When I returned to Afghanistan [after the fall of the Taliban], there were women on 
the street, at night, who had nowhere to go. I don’t remember it was like this before. 
Other family members or neighbors would take in women with problems at home. 
Now, family members were too poor, and neighbors were strangers to each other. . . . 
When I set up the shelter, even my friends and family were against what I was doing. 
They said that shelters are against our culture. But I told them: it’s not in our culture 
to have women on the street either.”11
By the end of the decade, there were nine registered shelters in the country. 
The majority of these were run by Afghan women’s NGOs, receiving funds from 
a variety of sources, including U.N. agencies, private donations, and international 
NGOs.12 Two were run by directly by UNIFEM, although these were technically 
short-term referral centers, from which women would move to long-term shelters 
in the capital. Four of the shelters were in Kabul and would each typically house 
between forty and fifty women. Provincial shelters, located in the northern, east-
ern, and central parts of Afghanistan, could accommodate around twenty women 
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each. Shelter residents had quite different backgrounds. Some were single women 
deported from Iran or Pakistan; others had fled forced marriages, threats, or vio-
lent abuse. Yet others had been placed in the shelters after the police had acted 
upon reports from neighbors about family violence—in some cases, violence so 
severe that it could only be described as torture. Foreign women had also stayed at 
the shelters, including citizens of Pakistan, Iran, and European countries.
At the same time, the shelter managers were well aware of the fact that some of 
their residents were potential criminals in the eyes of the authorities and sections 
of the public. By the time the Supreme Court directive was issued in 2010, such 
considerations had already informed the admittance procedures of several shel-
ters, as became clear in my conversations with shelter staff in Kabul and provincial 
capitals. However, the exact practices that the shelters developed in response to 
this dilemma differed. In theory, women were not supposed to go directly to the 
shelters (whose location was not to be disclosed), but to MOWA, the Afghan In-
dependent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), or the police, who would then 
refer them to the shelters. But one shelter manager in Herat explained that a lot 
of women in her province were unable to come to the shelter because the po-
lice would accuse them of adultery and begin a criminal prosecution instead. If a 
woman failed to go directly to the authorities or to a close relative’s house after she 
fled her home, she was liable to be prosecuted for zina or running away. The re-
sponse of this particular shelter manager in Herat was to attempt to systematically 
inform local women of what she perceived to be the parameters set by the law. Us-
ing the example of a driver breaking the speed limit and then claiming ignorance, 
she contended that it was the duty of women themselves to know how the law 
worked. Women seeking to leave their families because of abuse had to make sure 
they would come directly to the authorities. A woman should not spend even a 
single night at a more distant relative’s house or anywhere else, which would create 
a gap of time in which she was unaccounted for.
According to the manager of a referral center in Jalalabad—a kind of short-
term shelter that would send women on to shelters in the capital—the police and 
this center had an understanding that the former would subject all women to hy-
men examinations before they were allowed to go to the center. Unmarried wom-
en were allowed to go to the shelter only if they were found to have intact hymens; 
those who did not were arrested and could be prosecuted for adultery. This was a 
way of giving the shelter legitimacy within the local community, and, the shelter 
manager said, it was also in accordance with the protocol they had signed with 
MOWA.13 Staff members at the local MOWA office, however, confided that when 
they suspected sexual relations between a young man and woman who were elop-
ing, they would try to contact the family directly and arrange for a nikah (wedding 
ceremony) so as to keep the couple out of reach of the police and their medical 
examinations.14
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Other shelters, notably those run by the organization Women for Afghan 
Women (WAW), were more defiant. They stated that they would admit women 
even if they had come directly to them without referral—regardless of their prior 
history.15 This stance fed into anxieties among conservatives and others that the 
shelters were some kind of moral void into which women could escape and where 
they could behave without regard for social norms and propriety. The statement 
by Qazi Hanafi, MP, quoted at the beginning of the chapter succinctly articulated 
such concerns. Allegations such as Hanafi’s, which circulated widely in Afghan 
media, formed part of the backdrop for the sudden announcement by the minister 
of women’s affairs in 2011 that the government would take over the administration 
of the shelters.
“WHAT HAVE BEEN RUN BY NGOS NOW BELONG  
TO THE GOVERNMENT ”:  AT TEMPT S  
TO NATIONALIZE THE SHELTERS
On February 15, 2011, the minister of women’s affairs, Dr. Husn Banu Ghazanfar, 
held a press conference in Kabul at which she stated that the women’s shelters 
would henceforth be run by MOWA. In a series of rather nebulous formulations, 
the minister made several accusations against the shelters and laid out the reasons 
why MOWA was better positioned to run them. The background to the new regu-
lation, she stated, was a ministerial commission that had reviewed the shelters and 
had uncovered “serious problems and many violations.” When asked for further 
clarifications, the minister mentioned a lack of order and discipline, chaos, no 
follow-up of the women’s legal cases, and disregard for the protocols that MOWA 
had drawn up for the individual shelters.
The question of who would run the shelters was also presented as a matter 
of national sovereignty and self-reliance. Minister Ghazanfar referred to a donor 
conference held in 2010 at which the Afghan government had asked the interna-
tional community to channel money through the government. “What have been 
run by NGOs now belong to the government. We are ready to be responsible and 
should stand on our own feet.” The minister further stated that the budgets of indi-
vidual shelters were completely out of proportion to their activities, implying that 
some were involved in corrupt practices. Questioning why the shelters needed to 
spend a total of US$11 million on 210 residents, she declared that MOWA would 
be able to run these shelters much more cost-effectively. The minister also said 
that there were rumors that were discrediting the shelters, but that they would find 
less fertile ground if the shelters came under government control. The minister 
did not specify what these rumors were, but they generally consisted of allega-
tions that shelters were immoral places harboring prostitution, extramarital sex, 
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and drug abuse and that they were encouraging women to leave their families and 
husbands. When probed, the minister stated that she had no evidence that such 
things had taken place in the shelters, but she added that neither did she have any 
evidence to the contrary. In any case, she said, the takeover by MOWA would stop 
such rumors, as the ministry’s staff would be present in the shelters and constantly 
report back to the ministry.
The press conference was the culmination of long-running tensions over the 
shelters involving the government, conservative politicians, the international 
donor community, and the NGOs running the shelters. The statements made 
by the minister illustrated the many dimensions to this conflict. Indeed, the 
press conference was a microcosm of them. One axis of tension concerned the 
conditions under which women could leave their families. Although the formal 
requirement was that admittance to the shelter was only through referral from 
the government or AIHRC, some shelters admitted women directly. Such open-
door policies undermined the possibility of screening out those women who 
were not deemed worthy or in need of protection. To the conservatives, they 
opened up the possibility for any woman to leave her family, engage in adultery 
on the way, and take up residence in a place where no questions were asked. But 
some women’s rights activists and shelter managers were also uneasy with the 
open-door policy adopted by a few shelters, which they regarded as an obstacle 
to a broader acceptance of the shelters in Afghan society. To these activists, ad-
hering to the stricter admittance procedures would provide some reassurance 
that those residing in shelters had legitimate protection needs, demonstrating 
that the shelters were providing a necessary and legitimate service.16 When faced 
with the unilateral declaration by MOWA that the shelters would be national-
ized, however, all the shelters joined together to form a united front in the ensu-
ing confrontations.
As the press conference indicated, MOWA’s decision to take over the shelters 
was the result of other considerations as well. Minister Ghazanfar spoke about 
how Afghanistan, as a sovereign country, should no longer tolerate the fact that 
large portions of its development aid were channeled directly to NGOs. Whether 
the government or the NGOs should run the shelters was made a litmus test of 
whether the country was recognized as an equal and sovereign nation state in the 
international community and, particularly, by its Western allies. But the skepti-
cism toward NGOs was also rooted in preferences for welfare and social services 
to be more tightly regulated and implemented by the state, as well as a growing 
antagonism toward the aid industry in general and “Westernized” female NGO 
personnel in particular. In order to show how the shelters had become entangled 
in all these additional dynamics, the next section details a few events leading up to 
MOWA’s nationalization attempt.
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“WHAT HAPPENS IF  WE LEAVE  
AFGHANISTAN”:  BIBI  AISHA
In the spring of 2010, when I visited a shelter in Kabul run by WAW, the staff told 
me that one of their residents was a girl from the province of Uruzgan whose 
nose and ears had been cut off by her husband. The main reason I had visited the 
shelter that day was to try to retrace the complicated story of a woman named 
Fereshta, who had run away from her family and whose tragic fate is detailed in 
chapter 5. The girl who had been disfigured by her husband did not feature much 
in our conversation, but a few months later the world would come to know her 
as Bibi Aisha. On the cover of Time Magazine, her mutilated face was accompa-
nied by the headline “What Happens If We Leave Afghanistan.”17 The Time cover 
revived debates both about the war in Afghanistan and about the appropriation 
of Afghan women’s suffering as an argument for supporting the U.S.-led mili-
tary operation. The magazine cover was rightly criticized for constructing an ir-
refutable and uncomplicated relationship between saviors and victims, between 
Western withdrawal and the mutilation of Afghan women. In fact, the linkages of 
Aisha’s husband with the Taliban—which the logic of the article associated with 
the  mutilation—proved vague at best and, as was widely pointed out, the presence 
of NATO countries had not prevented the violence against the girl. More generally, 
by making the fate of women like Aisha directly dependent on the West’s willing-
ness to commit to continued armed operations—and by depriving the maiming 
of Aisha of all context save this direct relationship—the magazine was a model 
example of how “discourses of salvation—of saving Muslim women from Muslim 
patriarchal law—are sutured on to a specific civilising mission, one that involves 
giving women their democratic/secular rights” (Siddiqi 2011: 77).
But the publicity surrounding the Time cover also fed into the growing con-
troversy in Afghanistan over the shelters. In some circles, the cover was viewed as 
a national humiliation. The case came to represent the impotence of the Afghan 
people vis-à-vis the international community. For instance, Amina Afzali, the 
minister of labor, social affairs, martyrs, and the disabled, expressed her displea-
sure with the shelters’ high profile in discussing abuse. She referred in particular 
to the case of Bibi Aisha, who had been taken to the United States for facial re-
construction, which had humiliated Afghanistan in the eyes of the world. Other 
countries, if subject to similar scrutiny, would also have been shown to have such 
extreme cases, she contended (A. J. Rubin 2011).
The photograph and the publicity surrounding it also reinforced the skepticism 
in some of the other shelters toward WAW—the organization running the shelter 
where Bibi Aisha had lived. WAW was founded by expatriate Afghans in New York 
in 2001. It proved very apt at fund-raising, lobbying, and arranging high-profile 
gala events in the United States. WAW also espoused an uncompromising stance 
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on women’s rights. However, among other shelters and their supporters, there 
was a measure of frustration over WAW. Questions had long been raised about its 
policy with the media. The fact that WAW permitted journalists to publish pho-
tographs of the shelter residents was criticized in particular, given that Afghan 
women who allow photos of their faces to be circulated are often stigmatized in 
conservative communities. Other shelters limited media access on the grounds 
that their residents were both deeply traumatized and in need of anonymity for 
protection. The location of some of the WAW shelters was an open secret in Kabul, 
and women were allowed to go out and visit their families. WAW also appeared 
to be paying little heed to its protocol with MOWA, which called for regular re-
porting and admission only through referral. Other shelters claimed that WAW’s 
lenient ways were undermining the standing of the shelters as a whole, making 
them vulnerable to populist backlash as well as government antagonism. The Bibi 
Aisha cover made these sentiments resurface. It might be easy for WAW to spirit 
one or two women away to the United States, but all Afghan women could not be 
sent into exile, one women activist complained.18 She worried about the ramifica-
tions that the publicity of the Bibi Aisha case had for the legitimacy and acceptance 
of the shelters in the communities where they were located.
Like the controversy over the government regulations for the shelters a few 
months later, the Bibi Aisha cover highlighted the transnational alliances that 
many Afghan women’s advocates had established. These sometimes entailed a 
framework of action in which the main target of advocacy was NATO countries 
and their populations, who had to ensure that their politicians would do the right 
thing and not “abandon” Afghanistan. NATO governments had to stand up to 
Karzai and his warlords, to mercilessly defeat the Taliban, and to keep supporting 
and funding Afghan women. Such a reductive framework made Afghanistan a ho-
mogenous field where the sources of women’s oppression were interchangeable—
local patriarchies, the Taliban, warlordism, and Afghan culture were collapsed 
into a singular threat that only the West could defeat. This framework could not 
accommodate the trade-offs, negotiations, and compromises that other Afghan 
feminists at times found necessary in order to mitigate continuing dependence on 
the West. Nor did it easily allow for a scrutiny of the new relations of domination 
created by the international military forces. In fact, the publication of Aisha’s pho-
to coincided with a surge of targeted operations involving frequent night raids and 
the detention and killing of suspects, creating widespread fear and anger among 
many Afghan groups.
The fallacies of “the rhetoric of rescue” and the discursive effects they produce 
have been amply analyzed elsewhere (Abu-Lughod 2002; Butler 2009). My point 
here is to show how such discourses appeared in contestations about concrete gen-
der issues within Afghanistan. For instance, WAW espoused a clear political posi-
tion that called for a continued NATO presence and was uncompromising toward 
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any strategy other than military defeat of the Taliban. After the announcement of 
the surge and the increase in U.S. troops in 2009, WAW had issued a press release 
declaring its support for this policy.19 The following year, referring to how the pic-
ture of Bibi Aisha had laid out the bleak future of Afghan women should Western 
troops leave Afghanistan, its country director, Manizha Naderi, told a New York 
Times journalist, “That is exactly what will happen. People need to see this and 
know what the cost will be to abandon this country” (Nordland 2010).
As the controversy over the shelter regulations moved into international are-
nas, a similar logic was articulated. Calls for the United States and other countries 
to honor their pledges to Afghan women were made synonymous with a resolute 
stand against the Taliban, and thus the defense of women’s rights was made depen-
dent upon continued international military presence.
NASTO NADERI’S  CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE SHELTERS
Fanning the backlash against the shelters around the turn of the decade was the 
relentless anti-shelter campaign of Nasto Naderi, a journalist at Noorin Televi-
sion, which was affiliated with the political party Jamiat-e Islami.20 Known as a 
formerly reputable journalist who had inexplicably turned into a populist reporter 
with questionable journalistic standards, Naderi had for a long time been running 
what he claimed to be an investigative exposé of the shelters. His television show 
My Homeland (Sarzamin-e Man) was widely watched. One of his early programs 
on the shelters had shown footage of an orphanage falsely presented by the show 
as a shelter. The program showed several young women gathered in a room in the 
purported shelter, and Naderi had implied that they had been forced into prostitu-
tion by international aid workers.
A later program, which aired just hours after the MOWA press conference, 
featured a story about a girl who had fled her family after her father had killed 
her lover. When we met a few months later, Naderi claimed to me that this “very 
beautiful” girl had caused the death of twelve people and was therefore a criminal 
who did not deserve to be in a shelter.21 In reality, she had run away after her af-
fair with the boy was discovered. Her father had killed her boyfriend when the 
latter refused marriage, which led to a cycle of revenge killings that claimed the 
lives of twelve people. In his feature about this story, Naderi stated his intention 
to go to the shelter where the girl lived the very next day, film crew in tow, to 
confront the shelter staff on live television about housing such a girl and to “show 
the faces of these activists.”22 Horrified, the manager of the shelter—run by an Af-
ghan NGO—mobilized her supporters and networks. They contacted the U.S. em-
bassy,23 and—as later narrated to me by Naderi—“then Karl Eikenberry [the U.S. 
ambassador] called the minister of interior, and the minister of interior told the 
chief of my television channel: ‘don’t make a program about this woman again.’ ”24 
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Unsurprisingly, Naderi argued that this constituted an undue interference into 
media freedom, and the event only served to reinforce his claims that the shel-
ters were ultimately a foreign product. Mixed into these spurious and speculative 
broadcasts was Naderi’s rhetoric, drawing upon the established vocabulary of the 
jihadis’ antifeminism (see chapter 2), which painted women’s increased mobility 
as a threat to national independence and Islam and, thus, to the historical achieve-
ments of the mujahedin. Naderi declared that the shelters were an abomination 
and an insult to the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,25 which 
the former mujahedin commanders had sacrificed so much for: “The shelters are 
not acceptable for our people who have fought 30 years to put the word Islam in 
front of Afghanistan. We live in an Islamic country. . . . But some NGOs come and 
want to make another way for our country” (Abi-Habib 2010).
Yet interspersed with all of this were elements of more substantial, if ultimately 
deeply flawed, criticism of the aid industry. In military combat trousers, a tight T-
shirt, and a bandana, Naderi and his similarly clad colleagues in the television sta-
tion had the air of urban vigilante militias, out to protect ordinary Afghans from 
the predations and injustices of NGO women and their international collabora-
tors. Echoing the charges made by the minster of women’s affairs, Naderi told me 
that the anti-shelter campaign had been motivated by what he called an “NGO 
mafia” that was exploiting women for its own gain. He claimed that while all wom-
en in Afghanistan needed help, those running the shelters were merely using the 
image of the downtrodden Afghan women to raise money for themselves and to 
further their careers. How was it possible, Naderi asked me, that so much money 
could be spent with so few results? And how could the shelters justify spending ten 
thousand dollars a month on a building that housed five or six women when other 
women were starving in the streets outside? These statements were not substanti-
ated by evidence, but they undoubtedly carried some local resonance. Naderi also 
played on popular perceptions, reinforced by the Bibi Aisha case, that the shelters 
pitted women against their families and encouraged them to leave their homes, 
and even their country, upon a whim. He complained to me, “They say you should 
leave your family, go to the shelter, and if you have a big problem, you can just go 
to the United States or Europe [for asylum]. No NGO is talking about how the 
women can live with their families.”26 This statement ignored the fact that some of 
the shelters were involved in or supported reconciliation between shelter residents 
and their families. Upon written promises that the families would not harm them, 
women would go back to their marital or natal homes, though sometimes with 
tragic consequences (see chapter 5).
Despite their inaccuracies, Sarzamin-e Man’s tirades against the shelters gave 
force to government and popular skepticism about them. Following Naderi’s cue, 
other television channels started to air programs about the shelters, often including 
personal attacks on the shelter managers and others, such as officials at AIHRC, 
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who had supported them. Eventually, as the public outcry escalated, the ulema 
council of religious leaders declared that the shelters had to be closed down, and 
upon the orders of the Vice President Marshal Fahim, MOWA was tasked with 
drafting new regulations that would bring the shelters under government control.
VICTORY FOR THE SHELTERS
At some point in early 2011, a draft of the new government regulations on the shel-
ters was presented to the Criminal Law Reform Working Group (CLRWG) in the 
Ministry of Justice, tasked with reviewing all laws and regulations related to crimi-
nal matters.27 Members of CLRWG alerted the shelters and activists, who found 
the draft deeply unsettling.28 In particular, they objected to article 4, which stated 
that all shelters would henceforth be run by MOWA: “The Ministry of Women’s 
Affairs shall be responsible for the administration of the protection centers. To 
administrate protection centers established by non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) the Ministry of Women’s Affairs shall appoint 2 of its female employees as 
the director and deputy director to the protection center.”29
The draft also provided for an admission committee that would consist of rep-
resentatives from relevant ministries, the Supreme Court, and AIHRC, who would 
supervise the running of the shelters and, when appropriate, refuse admission to 
some women. Furthermore, this committee would refer “women and girls who 
had been compelled to leave their house” for a forensic medical examination (i.e., 
a virginity test). Article 8 stated that women and girls suspected of or accused of 
crimes would not be allowed into the shelters and that residents were not allowed 
to leave the compound of the shelters. Shelter organizations and women activists 
feared that this would mean that the ability to accept women who were suspected 
of moral crimes would be even more constricted.
These provisions clearly reflected the ongoing tension between protection needs 
versus the dangers of adultery and anxieties over unsupervised women. MOWA 
representatives argued that the regulations were an attempt to secure legitimacy 
for the shelters and that a framework of government monitoring would provide 
reassurances (or recognized proof) that the women living in shelters were still 
chaste. The head of the legal department of MOWA explained to me: “Most men in 
this country are very conservative when it comes to the issue of women. To those 
men who regard themselves as Muslims, for their wives to go and live in a shelter, 
when nobody knows what’s going on in those places, . . . it is never acceptable.”30
In short, the draft regulations laid out an official monitoring regime to prevent 
women’s shelters becoming black holes where women’s conduct and chastity could 
not be controlled and verified. They were also designed to create some local an-
choring for incidents related to individual admission. Many shelters were under 
strong pressure to return women to their families who attempted to claim them 
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back. In one case unfolding during the development of the regulations, even a 
current minister was said to be applying pressure to retrieve a female relative from 
a shelter.31 MOWA, meanwhile, claimed that an admission committee at the lo-
cal level would strengthen the authority of shelter decisions to admit women and 
make it more difficult for families to challenge them.
The shelters protested these and other elements of the regulations. They argued 
that government-run shelters and an admission commission would actually be less 
able to withstand pressure from relatives and that MOWA was not institutionally 
equipped to run the shelters. On February 2, 2011, WAW issued a strongly worded 
press release, warning that the proposed government regulation endangered NGO 
funding of the shelters and conceded to the Taliban and their sympathizers in the 
government.
[The proposed regulation] would give the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA) 
control over the few existing shelters in Afghanistan, all of which are run by non-
government organizations (NGOs). These shelters are funded by international foun-
dations and governments, not one of which has authorized any branch of the Afghan 
government to assume control of them. . . .
WAW has taken a strong stance against negotiating with the Taliban. All past and 
recent history—the accumulation of vicious threats and violent acts against women, 
their stance against education for girls—is undeniable evidence that regardless of 
what they sign during negotiations, the Taliban will not honor women’s rights once 
they gain control of a territory. WAW sees MoWA’s audacious move as an attempt to 
appease the Taliban and ultra-conservative members of the government.
NGOs have made progress on women’s human rights in Afghanistan. In fact 
NGOs are the main defense against the obliteration of those rights in the country.32
Meanwhile, discussions in Afghanistan took place through CLRWG, where 
shelters and women activists were invited to provide their input. Although this 
process seemed to be making progress,33 alarming articles about the regulations, 
detailing their content and quoting the concerns of the NGOs running the shel-
ters, appeared in the international media.34 Critics also linked the proposed regu-
lations to ongoing efforts by the government to interest the Taliban in peace talks. 
Nader Nadery, a well-known human rights campaigner from AIHRC, stated that 
the government was restricting women’s rights for this purpose: “[The government 
officials] are sending these signals [to the Taliban] that: ‘look we have made these 
changes and look we are putting some restrictions, we are taking on board some 
of your concerns.’ It is a very, very wrong policy. If you give in more, in advance of 
any talks, you feed into the confidence of the Taliban, so that they will come and 
dictate their terms. They will not accept the constitution; they will not accept the 
gains of the past nine or 10 years” (Farmer 2011).
A few days later, the fronts hardened further with the press conference given 
by the minister of women’s affairs. She presented the regulations in their original 
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form, without the revisions arrived at in the CLRWG. Although more sympathetic 
observers argued that the minister’s aggressive tone was designed to placate con-
servatives,35 some of the shelters interpreted her intention as whipping up anti-
shelter sentiment in order to assert MOWA’s control. They found her accusations 
of corruption in the shelters to be irresponsible, especially since she had been un-
clear about what she meant—corruption in Dari can mean both moral corruption 
(fesad-e akhlaqi, which is a euphemism for illicit sexual behavior) and financial 
corruption (fesad-e idari, literally “office corruption”). Indeed, fesad-e akhlaqi was 
employed by Nasto Naderi later that day, when he declared his intention to visit 
one of the shelters and expose its activities on live television.36
The mistrust between MOWA and the shelters also reflected generational and 
ideological differences. In post-2001 Afghanistan, support for the state welfare 
model of the communist era remained influential, since many people from the 
urban middle class who were staffing government positions had also been bureau-
crats under the communist government. Furthermore, the notion that the state 
should be a provider and benefactor, running welfare programs and interven-
ing in markets had a certain resonance among the urban population as a whole. 
These ideas, however, ran counter to the dominant paradigm for the provision 
of social services in the international aid community that financed the shelters 
and for the ways in which the shelters were currently run, through NGOs. This 
paradigm entailed relying on non-state actors as subcontractors for provision of 
services. Doubtlessly, there was also a certain amount of resentment and even jeal-
ousy among MOWA staff toward the Afghan “NGO women” running the shelters, 
many of whom had made a name for themselves on the international conference 
circuit about Afghanistan and had received international awards and scholar-
ships.37 Their proficiency in English and in the vocabulary of the aid industry, as 
well as in delivering the project proposals and reports it required, stood in stark 
contrast to the somewhat hapless state of much of MOWA, where the skills valued 
by the international aid industry were much less in evidence.
In the weeks following the MOWA press conference, international mobiliza-
tion against the regulations gathered pace. At the forefront was WAW, which set 
up an online petition demanding that President Karzai withdraw any law “that 
wrests control of Afghanistan’s women’s shelters from the local Afghan NGOs that 
have founded and run them and transfers it to the Ministry of Women’s Affairs.” 
The Afghan Women’s Network, the umbrella network for women’s organizations, 
wrote a passionate open letter (in English) entitled To The Gatekeepers of Women’s 
Honor. The letter denounced the Afghan government for allowing a non-trans-
parent and incompetent process to take over the shelters and for hypocritically 
accusing shelters and their supporters of undermining national honor by expos-
ing human rights abuses against women. In reality, it was the government itself 
that was damaging Afghanistan’s international reputation by turning a blind eye 
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to the abuses committed against women, often by its own officials. Letters about 
the shelters were sent to Western embassies in Kabul from citizens in their own 
countries, and three U.S. senators wrote to the Afghan president, reminding him 
of the sacrifices the United States had made for Afghanistan and calling the pro-
posed regulations “a grave mistake.” The assistant secretary of state of the United 
States followed with a more cautiously worded statement, expressing concern over 
the regulation and encouraging the government to allow the NGOs to operate the 
shelters independently.38
As the international storm intensified, President Karzai eventually backed 
down. Claiming misunderstandings, he said the regulations were to be redrafted, 
along the lines of the suggestions already put forward by the CLRWG. This new 
draft would allow the NGOs to continue to run the shelters and incorporated 
their protests about admission committees and other issues. In contrast to earlier 
controversies, such as those over the Shia Personal Status Law (see chapter 2), 
the Afghan women activists were unanimous in their approval of the end result.39 
There was also a feeling of confidence: they had wielded influence and could shape 
government policy in a positive way. As one Afghan human rights official happily 
told me, “They [the government] are listening to us women activists, because they 
know that we are able to make trouble and noise if they don’t.”40
In the international diplomatic community in Kabul, not everyone considered 
the victory to be so clear-cut. A U.S. diplomat later told me that she thought the 
Afghan women activists had been too quick to mobilize international opinion. 
They should have tried to reach an agreement with the Afghan government first: 
“In this case, the women activists went straight to the New York Times. . . . They 
rely too much on international media. This kind of strategy is going to do some 
long-term damage. . . . Afghan women’s rights activists should focus more on ne-
gotiations, less on uncompromising public statements.”41
Judging from the timing of the press statements and international newspaper 
coverage, which appeared in parallel to the discussion over the shelter regulations 
in the CLRWG, the shelters and their allies had not exhausted the path of ne-
gotiation before mobilizing international outrage.42 It was the storm of interna-
tional reaction that made the Afghan government backtrack on its declaration 
to nationalize the shelters. As the controversy over the shelters was brought into 
the transnational sphere, however, the parameters of the debate changed. More 
than anything, the attempts to take over the shelters were presented as a deliber-
ate strategy to appease the Taliban, as a first step on a slippery slope of bring-
ing the militants into the government. The West was condemned for abandoning 
its commitment to Afghanistan and for not staying the course, which translated 
into fighting for Afghan women by defeating the insurgents and not making any 
concessions. In fact, there was nothing in the background or actions of the main 
advocates of the takeover—the minister of women’s affairs or Nasto Naderi—that 
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suggested they harbored a wish to bring the Taliban back into power. But in the 
polarized situation in which the shelters were now immersed, there was little room 
for the other kinds of criticism (however flawed) that earlier had emerged earlier, 
such as alternate visions of how to deliver these services or the limitations of the 
NGOs regarding accountability.
C ONCLUSIONS
As we have seen, attempts in 2011 to place the shelters under government admin-
istration spoke to the anxieties over the possible ramifications of unsupervised 
women. At stake were both individual families’ authority over women and so-
ciety’s ability to enforce female modesty and propriety. At one level, therefore, 
the controversies over the women’s shelters in Afghanistan centered on the sov-
ereign claims that families could make over women (and the entire gender or-
der that underwrote those claims). The shelters directly challenged the notions 
that women were the wards of their families and that the government and public 
institutions were duty bound to honor such claims by detaining women who ap-
peared to be defying family authority by traveling alone. By opening up a space 
into which conventional forms of social regulation of women’s conduct could not 
reach, shelters were seen as undermining family control over female sexuality. The 
initiative to nationalize the shelters was an attempt to accommodate such anxiet-
ies by establishing an official surveillance regime (or a guardianship system) that, 
through admission policies and the day-to-day monitoring of the shelters, would 
(re)constitute shelters as spaces where social regulation over female sexuality and 
mobility could be maintained. While some of the shelters were quietly addressing 
such demands on a case-by-case basis, having such concessions formalized and 
uniformly imposed by the government was unacceptable to the shelter managers 
and their international supporters.
The controversy over the shelters signified a logic of drawing up boundaries 
between good women, worthy of protection, and those beyond the pale of respect-
ability. A woman’s sexual purity was to serve as a measure of her eligibility for 
protection, based on the familiar notion “that the most important thing to know 
about a woman is her chastity” (Miller 2004). Moreover, in Afghanistan the pa-
rameters of respectability were extremely constricted, as shown by the Supreme 
Court directive that rendered all women outside family or government supervi-
sion criminals. The shelters did not challenge the validity of such a distinction 
between respectable and immoral women, at least not in Afghan public discourse. 
Instead, they adopted one out of two strategies. Some tried to expand narrow no-
tions of propriety, by renouncing, for instance, the claim that shelters were places 
of moral corruption and by underlining the existence of cases of abuse so severe 
that the women had valid reasons to live in shelters. In other words, rather than 
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questioning the distinction between good and bad women per se, they maintained 
that the women residing in nonfamily settings were not bad. Secondly, some of 
the shelters, notably those run by WAW, circumvented the moral/immoral catego-
rization by exiting the Afghan public domain altogether. Instead of directly con-
fronting constructions of sexuality that sorted women into those deserving and 
those undeserving of protection, they leaned on transnational support to operate 
independently of the scrutiny of Afghan government officials and conservatives.
As the struggle over the shelters intensified, it was reframed as a litmus test of 
the Western commitment to earlier pledges to help Afghan women versus Afghan 
sovereignty. Embedded within these competing prisms were opposing visions of 
state domain and statehood; an older welfare (and often paternalistic) model of 
the state was confronted with a neoliberal, privatized model. In this context, the 
shelters appeared as foreign space in a double sense, defying the regulation of both 
the state and of Afghan society more broadly.
The shelters’ success in thwarting government attempts to nationalize them in-
dicated the consolidation of an effective transnational alliance around women’s 
rights in Afghanistan. Yet the international financial and political support to the 
NGOs running the shelters served both to empower and to constrain them. It 
brought them victory, but it carried some costs, by entangling the shelters in the 
contested space of the ongoing war, the presence of the international military 
forces, and possibilities of negotiating with the Taliban. The transnational support 
structures used by some NGOs generated new hierarchies of power. In rallying 
Western support against the Afghan government’s nationalization bid, some of 
the shelter organizations argued that permitting the Afghan government to take 
over the shelters was tantamount to capitulating to the Taliban. As I have shown, 
the effect was to flatten the context in which the backlash against the shelters had 
emerged, reducing the criticism against them to a mere expression of Taliban ex-
tremism, to be defeated by Western military resolve.
To a greater extent than the EVAW law (and the specialized prosecution units), 
the shelters could be said to work outside, rather than through, Afghan govern-
ment institutions. Although the EVAW law had been promoted and implemented 
with external funds and support, it nonetheless came into existence with the ap-
pearance of being a bona fide national product. Its supporters, both Afghan and 
international, were at pains to erase any Western traces from the law, whereas 
the shelters were more starkly transnational. They defied closer government regu-
lation by mobilizing international support. In the shelters, Afghan women were 
explicitly protected by virtue of international funds and pressure, not by Afghan 
government institutions.
Almost four years after the attempted nationalization, this bargain was quite 
durable. The shelters remained autonomous. Furthermore, by the end of Karzai’s 
final presidential term, in 2014, the number of shelters in Afghanistan had tripled, 
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with close to thirty shelters in nineteen provinces. Run by NGOs, the shelters re-
mained completely funded by international aid, but in a less ad hoc way. Their ex-
penses were guaranteed up to at least 2017 through a shelter fund to which the U.S. 
government and UNWOMEN were the main contributors. Managers reported a 
more cordial relationship with MOWA and even with the police. The local police 
were now more likely to let women stay in shelters even if they were suspected of 
moral crimes, at least until their cases came up in court. At the same time, there 
were no shelters in the unstable, conservative parts of the country in the east and 
the south. In these areas, women who were abused typically faced the difficult 
choice of enduring the pain or fleeing by entering into an illicit relationship. The 
number of women imprisoned for moral crimes remained in the hundreds, and 
the Supreme Court still refused to change its stance that women who ran away 
from home might be punished for attempted adultery.





This chapter investigates the controversies surrounding three young women who 
embodied the role that had implicated the shelters in so much controversy—that 
of the “runaway” woman.1 I learned their stories only after hearing of the violence 
later inflicted on them—murder, rape, and stoning. Only when I started to retrace 
the series of events that had preceded these violations did it become clear that all 
three women had first run away from abuse at home. Moreover, it became appar-
ent how framing “escaping from the house” as a subversive act strongly bore on 
the women’s options and directly made them vulnerable to the violence that was 
later inflicted upon them.
In the following discussion, I explore the trajectories of the three women, as 
well as the competing interpretations and assessments of their actions and the 
actions of those around them. Rather than focusing only on the formal justice 
system, I expand my lens to map how multiple legal orders intervened in the three 
cases at different moments. I employ the idea introduced at the beginning of this 
book, namely, that what is considered violence or a violation can tell us a lot about 
prevailing gender orders and other forms of power in a given context. By probing 
the fault lines revealed in these three episodes as they were taken up by very dif-
ferent mechanisms of justice, I ask the following questions: How were these series 
of events defined and spoken about by various groups of people—relatives, reli-
gious authorities, government officials, and the women themselves? What kinds of 
claims about violations or transgressions were recognized by public institutions, 
whether these were jirgas of elders,2 government courts, or Taliban councils? Just 
as importantly, what was not recognized or named as offenses?
5
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Posing these questions makes it clear that in both government and nongov-
ernment forums, the loss or infringement of family or kinship sovereignty over 
female sexuality—as could occur when a woman runs away or engages in illicit 
relations—counted as a central violation. At the same time, this was not due to 
some predetermined cultural script, but a more tenuous construction, actively 
forged out of contingent struggles. A runaway woman was not automatically the 
main culprit in all cases; family honor was not always a key reference point. Al-
ternative forms of intervention existed and were sought out, with various degrees 
of success. In other words, whether a runaway woman was, in the end, treated as 
a criminal to be punished by public authorities, a fugitive to be returned to her 
family, or a victim of abuse entitled to protection was, in most incidents, an open 
question. Nonetheless, the stories of Nafisa, Fereshta, and Siddiqa show how dif-
ficult it was for individual women to escape family abuse when state and non-state 
mechanisms aligned to cast women who left their family settings as inherently sus-
pect. Even if some women might receive a sympathetic hearing when they finally 
reached a governments court, the paths they had to take to escape from abusive 
situations typically involved difficult choices that left them irrevocably tainted in 
the eyes of their communities and the law itself.
THE POLITICS OF SHAME
During the Afghan year of 1387, in the winter of 2008–09, a judge in a conservative 
Pashtun district in central Afghanistan was entrusted with a task he would later 
feel he failed at. The judge’s cousin was looking for a girl to be his second wife, 
and the family of the prospective groom approached him for help. The judge ac-
cepted the task, and when he heard that Mohammad Ajmal, a local farm laborer, 
had a good and decent daughter, he sent his female relatives to see the girl. They 
came back with reassuring reports—Ajmal’s daughter, Nafisa, was a good and 
hardworking girl—and the engagement was soon confirmed. The judge received 
from the groom-to-be a new suit as a token of appreciation for his efforts. But later 
on, after the ensuing scandal, he reflected on whether he should have been more 
thorough in his investigation. People had come to blame him for the scandal that 
followed, he later recounted. They said he should have asked more questions: Did 
the girl love someone else? At the very least, was she happy with the marriage? But, 
as he asked, how was he to have thought of such things? The custom in investigat-
ing a prospective bride was to send women to visit the girl, and the kind of things 
they would look for was whether she makes tea and looks after the guests properly, 
and of course, if she is beautiful. “It did not even occur to us that she could have a 
relationship with someone else. She was a Pashtun girl—how could she have a re-
lationship? That Ajmal’s daughter was completely without morals [bad akhlaq]—
how were we suppose to know?”3
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Nafisa, in fact, proved deeply unhappy with the engagement. She was only six-
teen, and her fiancé was forty, considerably older. She was also to be his second 
wife. Nafisa’s family was poor; her father had causal employment as a farm la-
borer. The bride-price, reported to be around 250,000 afghanis, the equivalent of 
US$5,000, played an important role in her betrothal. As was customary in many 
circles, once the engagement had been confirmed through a nikah ceremony, her 
fiancé was granted nocturnal visiting rights.4 This kind of arrangement, referred 
to as namzad-bazi (literally, “engagement play”), was often—or could be—a time 
of playfulness and excitement when couples got to know each other in an air of 
quasi-illicit mischief.
This was not Nafisa’s experience of namzad-bazi. She proceeded to make con-
tact with a young man working in the village as a servant. As Nafisa said when 
she was interrogated later on, “I was forced to marry someone. . . . He was an old 
man. I became friends with Amin, and I wanted to be with him. He became the 
one I loved. To run away was the only option I had.”5 Amin was the cousin of the 
host of a radio program, and Nafisa had called the program with her cell phone 
to place a song request. The radio host had passed on her phone number to his 
cousin, and Nafisa and Amin had struck up a kind of courtship over the phone. 
They then met in person and agreed to run away and get married. Theirs is not 
an unusual story—since the arrival of the cell phone network, many Afghan girls 
have attempted to escape unwanted marriages by seeking out men to elope with 
over the phone. But Nafisa and Amin’s intention to escape to relatives in Pakistan 
was thwarted en route, in the eastern city of Jalalabad, when they were reported to 
the police by the manager of a hotel where they were staying. They were detained 
and sent back to their home province, the scene of the crime. In court, Nafisa was 
sentenced to serve seven years in juvenile detention for running away and zina. 
Amin received a similarly lengthy prison sentence, although his sentence was re-
duced to two years after an appeal.
In the couple’s village, Nafisa’s fiancé and his family had been outraged when 
they heard of the elopement. They immediately went to Nafisa’s father, Ajmal, who 
agreed to hold a jirga to settle the matter. For two days, the proceedings went 
on, presided over by two elders from each of the families’ tribes. The discussion 
centered around one issue: under whose supervision had Nafisa been when she 
escaped, and therefore, whose shame (sharm) was it that this event had occurred. 
The fiancé and his family demanded two baad: one girl as a replacement for Nafisa 
and one girl as reparation for the dishonor that Nafisa’s family had caused the 
fiancé with her elopement. But Nafisa’s family rejected this demand. Ajmal ar-
gued that the fiancé had been visiting her, spending time with Nafisa in her room. 
Therefore, he should have known about her relationship. Eventually, the elders 
reached the decision that one baad would suffice. She was to be Nafisa’s younger 
half sister, Ajmal’s daughter by another wife. The mother of this girl found the 
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arrangement deeply unjust. It was Nafisa and therefore also her mother who had 
proven themselves to be the spoiled (kharab) ones; why should she and her daugh-
ter have to suffer the consequences? Her protests were to no avail, however, and 
after two days, she gave in. Nafisa’s half sister was to be handed over to the fiancé 
within ten days.
Meanwhile, Nafisa was in the juvenile detention center in the provincial capi-
tal. A senior official arranged to have a room for himself in the compound of the 
detention center, under the pretext that he could not travel back to his house in 
Kabul on a daily basis. This was a violation of the rules, but his subordinates dared 
not protest. Through deceit and threats, he sexually abused Nafisa, and she became 
pregnant. He had told her that he was in a position to influence her legal case, and 
at first, Nafisa told no one about what had happened. But when the prison attorney 
came on one of his regular inspections of the detention center, she spoke out, as 
he later recounted.
I went to Nafisa’s room and asked for permission to enter.  .  .  . When I asked her 
whether she had any difficulties with the juvenile rehabilitation center staff, she start-
ed crying and she was unable to talk for two minutes. I understood that she had a 
problem, so I insisted that she tell me. She said, “Something has happened to me that 
I cannot tell you.” Then she started crying again and said, “The [senior official] has 
raped me. . . . He called me to his room, and when I went there, he asked about my 
case. I told him that I had escaped to Jalalabad with Amin. Then he said, ‘I will ensure 
your freedom. I will marry you to Amin, and if he does not want to marry you, I will.’ 
After he had said this, I went back to my room. After one hour, Jalaluddin, who was 
his abettor, came to my room and said, ‘[the senior official] wants to see you in his 
room.’ When I went to his room, he locked the door and tried to hug me, but I didn’t 
let him. I told him, ‘But you are like my mama [maternal uncle].’ He said, ‘Who cares 
for the mama?’ ” and he threatened me with his pistol and tightly closed my mouth 
with his hand, and after that I couldn’t do anything, and he raped me.”6
After his initial shock and disbelief, the prison attorney arranged for Nafisa to 
make a statement in front of all the detention center staff, and then, in front of 
a judge. The senior official was subsequently taken into custody. At the primary 
court, he bribed the judge with a sum of around US$20,000 and was acquitted. 
It was at this point that I first heard about the case, through the lawyer who had 
just been assigned to defend Nafisa during the appeal for the charges of running 
away. At that point, the first trial of the senior official had concluded, but Nafisa 
was still being held in the juvenile center in the provincial capital, the location 
where she had been raped. Her lawyer and human rights officials were trying to 
get her transferred to Kabul, amid speculation that she would be released and 
killed through collaboration between the senior official and her family. The United 
 Nation’s human rights section and the Afghan International Human Rights Com-
mission (AIHRC) had also become involved. Since the case was sensitive and the 
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girl’s life appeared to be at risk, these organizations decided to involve themselves 
in a discreet manner and to not make public statements about the case. The United 
Nations would contact the Supreme Court about the release of the official, and the 
AIHRC would press the Ministry of Justice, which had jurisdiction over detention 
centers, to transfer Nafisa to Kabul. The lawyer, as he explained the case to me, 
spoke of his frustration with the lack of progress about these things, but a month 
later, Nafisa had been moved to the juvenile center in Kabul, and the official was 
under arrest again, awaiting trial in the provincial court of appeals. After a few 
months, he was sentenced to twenty years in jail, the absolute maximum sentence. 
The prosecution had based their case on article 17 of the EVAW law and articles 
from the Penal Code on the misuse of office.7
A few months after this, I had negotiated the permits required to visit the juve-
nile detention center in Kabul,8 where Nafisa was serving her seven-year sentence. 
I glimpsed her at the end of the long corridor, heavily pregnant. She looked at me 
from a distance, hesitated, and then turned back. The guards told me she did not 
want to speak to anyone. Four other girls volunteered to share their stories of how 
they ended up at the center. They were mostly around fourteen or fifteen years old, 
and their accounts were similar to Nafisa’s. All four girls I spoke to in depth had 
fled unwanted marriages or engagements, either to older men or to their cousins. 
I sat with them one by one in the corner of a brightly decorated and surprisingly 
pleasant common room. They talked hurriedly, as if worried that time would not 
permit them to tell their whole story. One, when engaged to a man in his forties, 
had left home and had been taken in by an elderly woman. “At first,” the girl said, 
“the woman treated me like a daughter, but soon she attempted to force me to sleep 
with a man for money.” The girl tried to escape back to her parent’s house, but the 
police picked her up and took her to prison. She had been detained for five months 
and thought she would go to court for the first time the next week. Meanwhile, her 
uncle had visited her and promised that if she returned to her family, she could 
marry a man of her choice. Another of the girls I spoke with had been engaged 
to her cousin in childhood but had run away with another young man right after 
her engagement party. They arrived late to the city of Mazar-e Sharif and decided 
to spend the night outside a shop. However, the shopkeeper discovered them and 
called the police. At first, she was put in a shelter, but when her father told the 
police she had a fiancé and had run away, she was sent to the detention center. The 
courts had decided that she should spend a year in the juvenile prison. After that, 
however, she would be free to marry whomever she wanted. Her eyes brightened 
as she spoke of her boyfriend, who was also in prison. She whispered about how 
much she loved him and hoped to marry him when they were both released.
The girls also said that Nafisa was always fighting with the staff, who thought 
her insubordinate and difficult. It could well be that this was the reason we were 
unable to meet. At this time—inexplicably, to the human rights officials who had 
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been following her case—Nafisa had been assigned a new lawyer from a different 
legal aid organization. The new lawyer appeared to take little interest in her case 
and was impossible to track down for an interview. He was thought to be less 
committed to Nafisa’s case than to the money that came with it.9 But even if Nafisa 
could have her sentence overturned or reduced, her life was in ruins, and her most 
likely prospect for the foreseeable future was to live in a shelter.
Still, what had happened affected everyone involved. None of the families 
recovered its standing. Amin’s family, afraid of revenge from both Nafisa’s fam-
ily and her fiancé’s family, moved back to their province of origin. For Nafisa’s 
family, the shame was the worst, and they eventually moved to another province 
in a different part of the country. This was not surprising to people who had fol-
lowed the case. “People will shame [phivar] this family; they will say ‘you are a 
family who cannot control or protect your women,’ ” said one.10 The fiancé and 
his family did not emerge unscathed either. Although friends and neighbors 
tried to console them, the family still felt that their standing had been severely 
damaged. “After a few days, people came to us and said that the shame [sharm] 
is related to her father. ‘You do not need to be upset. . . . She escaped from his 
house and not yours.’  .  .  . But we don’t have any kind of relationship with this 
family anymore. People and the tribe [quam] are blaming us, [saying] that we 
allowed this to happen. Because of this incident, we have lost our honor [izzat] 
in the community.”11
The fiancé was no doubt aware that he was an object of mockery in the area. 
People spoke of how Nafisa had used the cell phone he had bought her to make 
contact with Amin and how it was the day after one of his overnight visits that she 
had run away.
The jirga proceedings were criticized from several quarters. Local jirga “ex-
perts,” men who were reputed to be particularly knowledgeable about the tradi-
tions and rules of resolving conflicts, were dismissive of the way that the people 
involved had conducted themselves. They argued that the people in the jirga had 
been ignorant of real Pashtun traditions. They had completely failed to deal with 
the two people who had escaped. It would have been more appropriate for Amin’s 
family to give a girl in compensation for Nafisa. Moreover, the two elopers should 
have been found, and the fiancé’s family should have had the option of forgiving 
them or killing them.
“Oh, it was not a good and proper jirga, especially because Ajmal [Nafisa’s father] 
was not a powerful man. The subtribe that this man belongs to is one of the weakest 
subtribes. And his subtribe did not support him in this case. If he was capable, if he 
understood how jirgas worked, he would not have accepted [the demand] to give 
another daughter to this man. This is how he should have formulated himself: ‘My 
daughter was not only engaged, she has had a nikah. She was your wife, so the prob-
lem is not mine. If you want to kill them, it’s up to you.’ ”12
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This would have launched a challenge to the fiancé to admit “ownership” over 
Nafisa, an ownership that would have implied that he alone was responsible for 
rectifying the situation and thereby vindicating his own reputation. Another jirga 
expert concurred, saying that in this case, the best solution would have been to 
kill the eloping couple. But, he contended, the people on the jirga did not follow 
this principle, because they did not actually seek to restore the rights of the people 
who had been wronged. He concluded that, since the people on the jirga were 
weak, they instead sought to make peace between the two parties. He also blamed 
Amin for what happened with Nafisa after she was arrested: “What happened was 
very shameful, but [it is] connected to what had happened earlier. The boy has 
to be blamed for both. If he had known about Pashtun traditions, he would not 
have accepted [the demand] to give the girl to the government. He should have 
escaped to an area where there was no government presence, where he could have 
asked for protection. What he did [is that] he turned a Pashtun girl over to the 
government.”13
A government official also disputed the jirga, but as he was a trained religious 
scholar, his objections were based on religious grounds. He argued that the girl, 
a married woman, should have been stoned, and the boy should have been pun-
ished. The problem with the jirga was that neither of the guilty parties (the elopers) 
were punished and, moreover, that an innocent person (the sister given in baad) 
was penalized in their place. He said that Nafisa had made many mistakes. If she 
had disagreed with the engagement, she should have gone to the authorities to 
complain, not run away in secrecy with a man and without telling anyone.
In fact, however, elopement was often the only attractive option open to girls 
who found themselves in a situation like Nafisa’s—married or engaged against 
their will. If they chose to go to the authorities, there was a good chance that they 
would just be sent back home—and that was if they were not intercepted and de-
tained by the police even before reaching a government office. Leaving with a man 
offered them protection along the way. A couple was less likely to arouse suspicion 
than a young woman traveling on her own. It also promised a future, since single 
women without family support were often condemned to a life in a shelter or an 
unfavorable marriage arranged as a last resort. Ironically, then, constraints were 
stacked against them in such a way that young women saw embarking upon an 
affair as their only option—the most grievous transgression in the view of their 
communities and the government. The directive from the Supreme Court, prohib-
iting women from leaving their homes in the company of non-mahram men (see 
chapter 4), in effect often closed off the option of appealing to the authorities to 
escape abusive situations and coerced marital unions.
Unlike the others who commented on Nafisa’s case, the religious scholar faulted 
Nafisa for what had happened in the juvenile detention center, arguing that the 
senior official had offered her a bargain for her freedom in return for sex. He stated 
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that she had “agreed to this intercourse, without regard for laws or traditions,” 
and only when the official had failed to fulfill his promise did she make accusa-
tions of rape. On the other hand, many government employees pointed out that 
Nafisa should not have been the only female staying in the juvenile center. A few 
people argued that the chief of the Department of Women’s Affairs (DOWA) in the 
province was to blame for this. One female official from the province stated: “In 
our environment, a mother is responsible for her daughter, to keep her safe and to 
control her. When a woman has a legal case, DOWA is responsible for her. But the 
head of DOWA [in Nafisa’s province] has her own issues, and there is no activity 
of DOWA in this case. Look, both the boy and the girl are in prison, and nobody 
has helped the girl.”14
The former head of DOWA in Nafisa’s province said that when she held this 
office, she would bring women in difficult situations to her home:
There was a girl from an insecure district who came to the governor’s office, and she 
was referred to me so that I could find a solution. Her problem was that she had no 
brother, and she was in a land dispute with her cousin. I brought her to stay in my 
house. People from [her district] were coming to me and threatening me. I said, “I 
don’t have any special interest in this case. I have no young son, and my husband is 
very old. I am just solving her problem.” . . . She was in my house for several days, 
and then there was a meeting of elders, who decided that she could marry anyone 
she wanted and that nobody had the right to deny her this. Many proposers came 
forward, and she chose an MP. Now she is living with great honor in her husband’s 
house.15
But the present head of DOWA protested that she had security problems and 
had repeatedly asked for a women’s shelter to be built in the province. She could 
not take anyone in to live in her own house because of threats and insecurity. In 
other provinces, shelters sometimes served a dual function; the police would place 
women they had arrested in a shelter when there was no special women’s section in 
the prison or detention center or when there were no other women detainees. This 
comment by the head of DOWA shows that the distinction between protective 
spaces and places of detention was blurred and reinforced the notion that women 
fleeing violence or abuse were criminals. However, the suggestion that the head of 
DOWA should, by virtue of her personal and political abilities and connections, 
serve as a protector of women, was an accurate reflection of how the office was 
functioning in most provinces. When the head of DOWA was a forceful person-
ality with a political and family background enabling her to withstand pressure, 
the office could be an important ally to women who were in disputes with their 
families. In provinces where the DOWA chief lacked political clout or took less 
personal interest in these matters, the local DOWA office was of little help and 
sometimes even assisted families in pressing their claim over women. The latter 
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was the case in the province of Parwan, where, as related below, DOWA was one 
actor in a series of events eventually leading to the death of Fereshta, who had fled 
a forced marriage with her cousin.
THE KILLING OF FERESHTA
Fereshta, from a village in Parwan near the provincial capital Charikar, north of 
Kabul, had been engaged to her paternal uncle’s son in childhood, and Fereshta’s 
brother to her fiancé’s sister. When Fereshta’s father was martyred during the ji-
had, her mother married her late husband’s brother, and the family moved into 
his household. As she grew older, Fereshta began to dislike the idea of marrying 
her cousin, with whom she was now living in the same house. Many who spoke 
about her case later on suggested that it had been unseemly to expect her to marry 
a boy she had grown up with; she now looked at him like a brother. Perhaps there 
was also a looming conflict within the family; the engagement between Fereshta’s 
brother and the sister of Fereshta’s fiancé had already been broken, and the girl had 
married her maternal cousin instead. Whatever the case, when Fereshta turned 
twenty, she was told in no uncertain terms by her stepfather and uncle that her 
engagement would not be broken and that she would marry her cousin, whether 
she wanted to or not.
When she started to protest her impeding marriage, she was beaten, and her 
wedding eventually proceeded against her will. Fereshta’s mother, her striking fea-
tures painted with grief, later spoke bitterly to me of how her daughter’s wedding 
had been a cheap, rushed affair. The cousin, who was illiterate, was widely thought 
of as an unworthy match for the attractive and articulate Fereshta, who had com-
pleted nine years of school. On the evening of the nikah, Fereshta was given a seda-
tive, and the marriage was consummated while the bride was unconscious. Her 
grandmother, who played a pivotal role in the attempts to make Fereshta submit 
to the match, reportedly told Fereshta when she regained her senses that she was 
no longer a virgin and that she therefore had no choice but to stay in the marriage.
But Fereshta rebelled. Some forty days after her wedding, she left the house and 
headed south to Kabul. She traveled with her neighbor and boyfriend, but once in 
Kabul, she went to a shelter run by Women for Afghan Women. The shelter took 
her in and started to look at the possibility of invalidating her marriage or getting 
her a divorce. Meanwhile, Fereshta’s grandmother appeared in the Kabul offices of 
the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, presenting a formal letter 
issued by DOWA in Parwan. The official who received the grandmother later told 
me, “The letter introduced the grandmother of Fereshta saying, . . . ‘Fereshta has 
run away, but she is married. Please offer her your assistance so that she can find 
her granddaughter and take her back to Parwan.’ ”16
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Attempting to strengthen her story, the grandmother explained to the officer 
at AIHRC that Fereshta was not only married but also pregnant, and being young 
and innocent, she had been tricked by another man, with whom she had escaped. 
The officer decided to call the various shelters in Kabul, and once she found out 
which one Fereshta was at, she asked her to come to the AIHRC office, where her 
grandmother was waiting. When Fereshta arrived and saw her grandmother, she 
immediately started to shout at her, saying how she had been forced to marry her 
cousin despite declaring that she had not wanted to. The AIHRC staff decided that 
the case was more complicated than the grandmother had led them to believe, so 
they asked the grandmother to return to Parwan and let Fereshta go back to the 
shelter.
A few days later, however, when Fereshta had been hospitalized for an appen-
dix operation, the police arrived. How the police knew that Fereshta was at the 
hospital was never clearly established. It was speculated that someone in DOWA 
or at the hospital had tipped off the family, who had mobilized the police to arrest 
her. On the basis that Fereshta was married and had run away, the police arrested 
her and took her to the juvenile prison in Parwan, the scene of the alleged crime. 
The prosecution put together a case whereby Fereshta was charged for running 
away while being married, with reference to article 130 of the Constitution, which 
grants judges permission to apply sharia in cases in which no other laws applied 
(see chapter 4).
Fereshta’s grandmother, uncle, and self-declared husband appeared in court, 
now accusing her also of having aborted a child. Rather than having her impris-
oned, they wanted her returned to them. Fereshta’s defense lawyer, impressed by 
the way she was able to present her case, supported her by arguing that the mar-
riage had been invalid and that there was no evidence of Fereshta having com-
mitted zina. The judge proceeding over the case agreed and ruled that Fereshta 
should be released. She had been punished enough, and there had been no proof 
of adultery. She was alone when she came to the shelter, and she was alone when 
she came to court, the judge later stated to me. He had felt no need to probe the 
matter further. He also regarded the marriage as having been forced (though there 
were no attempts to incriminate anyone for this) and recalled how Fereshta, “wise 
and beautiful,” had been unjustly paired with an illiterate husband.
Having been acquitted both in the primary court and the appeal court,17 Feresh-
ta moved from the detention center into the shelter in Parwan. Shortly afterward, 
a “reconciliation agreement” was brokered with the help of DOWA and the local 
shelter. Such agreements were commonly used throughout the country in cases in 
which a woman had fled her family. Arranged by shelters, AIHRC, the police, or 
the courts, family members would normally sign a letter guaranteeing a woman’s 
safety, and she would move back into the house she had escaped from or would 
live with other relatives. In Fereshta’s case, she went to live with her maternal uncle 
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in a household different from that of her mother, uncle, and husband, and this 
maternal uncle acted as the guarantor of her life.
A few days later, however, this uncle invited Fereshta for what she thought was a 
reconciliation meeting with her husband’s family. Perhaps hoping that this was an 
occasion to settle matters with her extended family, she went. After the food had 
been served, when it was getting dark, Fereshta declared her intention to return 
home to her maternal uncle’s house. Defying her grandmother’s and other rela-
tives’ protestations, she made her way out of the compound, but as she reached 
the gate, she was killed by two shots from a single-barreled shotgun. The police, 
alerted by neighbors hearing the shots, arrived promptly at the scene. There they 
found Fereshta’s body and most of the family members, whom they arrested. Her 
husband and her father-in-law were not among them, having fled immediately 
after the murder. Nor was Fereshta’s mother, who had been sent away days before 
the dinner party.
In the trial that followed, an elderly and frail relative of Fereshta—her grand-
mother’s brother—figured as the perpetrator. He had voluntarily confessed to the 
murder, although Fereshta’s mother and others claimed that the main culprits had 
been the husband, his father, and the grandmother and said that the old man was 
put forward as the scapegoat. His age meant that he was expendable as a breadwin-
ner and that he was unlikely to be executed. To further mitigate the charges against 
her elderly brother, Fereshta’s grandmother showed a video in court. It was of a 
woman dancing lecherously and appearing drunk. In a bid to portray Fereshta as a 
woman of loose morals and therefore make her murder less of an offense, relatives 
claimed that this girl on the video was her, something that was refuted by wit-
nesses called in by the court. This and other attempts to justify the murder failed 
to convince the judge. The elderly granduncle was sentenced to sixteen years in 
prison for Fereshta’s murder, within the maximum range of sentencing, although 
it was not the sentence that Fereshta’s mother, now estranged from the rest of the 
family, told me she had wanted. As she publically declared following the verdict: 
“This horrible man had no right to kill my daughter. The government must avenge 
my daughter’s blood by sentencing this man to death.”18
A STONING IN KUNDUZ
On August 15 of the same year, a crowd of around two hundred men gathered near 
the bazaar of Mulla Quli, a small settlement in the Dasht-e Archi district of Kun-
duz. They were assembled for the stoning of Siddiqa and Abdul Qayam, who had 
confessed to the act of adultery. Sometime later, a cell phone video emerged, show-
ing in gruesome detail what had happened that day.19 Before the crowd, a Taliban 
mullah declares in Pashto: “When a married woman commits adultery, she will be 
struck by stones—this is called sangsar in Arabic. The women you see here today 
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committed adultery with this man. She has admitted this herself not once, but 
many times. . . . Islamic law will be enforced here in Kunduz, by the grace of God. 
They will both be punished, these two people.”
Siddiqa, who has been placed waist-deep in a hole in the ground, is then struck 
by stones thrown by the crowd. Her blue chadari gradually stains with blood until 
a large rock hits her head, and she slumps over. Subsequently, Qayam, a tall young 
man dressed in a fresh, white shalwar kameez, is brought before the crowd. He is 
blindfolded, and as he crouches on the ground, a rain of stones hits him. Eventu-
ally he collapses facedown on the ground, barely visible through the dust whipped 
into the air as the stones continue to strike him.
News about the stoning in Kunduz broke almost immediately and shocked 
much of the country. But Dasht-e Archi, along with other districts in Kunduz, 
had fallen to the Taliban, and beyond condemning the stoning, there was little the 
 government could do. Like Nafisa and Fereshta, nineteen-year-old Siddiqa had 
faced a marriage against her will, although in her case, it had not yet been consum-
mated. Siddiqa had appealed to Qayam, a married driver whom she knew through 
her brother, to escape with her. Together they eloped to relatives in Kunar Prov-
ince. But their bliss proved short-lived. Hearing the news of their escape, a large 
number of men from Siddiqa’s family, an influential and rich tribe, surrounded 
Qayam’s family home, threatening to attack the house and kidnap its women, un-
less Siddiqa was returned to them. Qayam’s family consequently convinced the 
couple to return, and over the phone, the former woleswal (district governor) 
guaranteed their safety. Qayam’s relatives immediately set out to broker a deal that 
would settle the matter with Siddiqa’s family, who had been greatly affronted by 
the elopement. A settlement involving a substantial amount of money and an-
other girl from Qayam’s family was agreed upon, and frantic efforts to collect the 
money ensued. Meanwhile, the couple found themselves turned over to the cus-
tody of the local Taliban. They confessed to adultery, perhaps thinking that their 
resolve would lead their community to accept the match, but instead they were 
sentenced to death by stoning by a committee of Taliban ulema. With Qayam’s 
family still scrambling for the last afghanis to settle the case, Siddiqa and Qayam 
were stoned and killed by a large group of villagers and the Taliban, with no pro-
tests from  Siddiqa’s family. When the horrific images filmed by someone in the 
crowd emerged a few months later, it led to renewed calls for government action. 
However, the government never managed to fully reestablish control over Dasht-e 
Archi, and years later, no arrest had been made.
THE VIOL ATIONS THAT MAT TERED
The three sets of events in this chapter all became issues of governance. They in-
volved attempts at dispute resolution, punishment, or redress through fora and 
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mechanisms outside of the immediate family, even if the institutions that dealt 
with the incidents were of a very different nature. Fereshta’s family mobilized 
DOWA, AIHRC, the police, and the courts in their attempts to retrieve Fereshta. 
They claimed that she was a married woman, implying that the government there-
fore had an obligation to return her to them. Fereshta, on the other hand, retorted 
to state officials that her family had been wrong in forcing her to wed her cousin 
and that her marriage was invalid. The elopement of Nafisa and Amin became 
a state matter at the point when they were arrested by the police in Jalalabad, a 
routine government action on suspicion of elopement. But to Nafisa’s family, the 
government did not appear as an ally, but rather as an irrelevant or alien institu-
tion, and perhaps out of reach. Once official bodies had detained their daughter, 
they made no attempt to contact her or follow her case in any way, and neither did 
Nafisa’s in-laws. Instead, the central violation that preoccupied those in Nafisa’s 
home area was the failure of her family to deliver their part of the engagement 
agreement between the two families when Nafisa ran away with Amin. However, 
the forum through which this conflict was settled was also public, even if informal 
and outside government scrutiny.
The stoning in Kunduz did not involve the Afghan state in any significant way. 
Instead, a group of Taliban insurgents who had recently taken over the district 
were the main governing force intervening in the case. From a distance, the ston-
ing looked like a brutal, top-down imposition of Taliban justice on a community 
that was already in the process of sorting out the dispute in a more conciliatory 
way. Qayam and Siddiqa had been stoned for zina following the intervention of 
the Taliban, who had insisted on applying sharia justice despite the fact that nego-
tiations over a settlement between Qayam’s and Siddiqa’s families were still ongo-
ing. As such, the episode could be understood as a classic example of contestations 
over legitimate authority, not unlike a case from the 1980s described by Edwards 
(2002), in which a Safi woman was stoned to death for adultery by mujahedin 
commanders contrary to the wishes and sentiments of her tribe.20 But, as I will 
show below, it quickly became evident that the conflict dynamic in Kunduz was 
more ambiguous than a matter of mullahs and their brutally rigid religious dogma 
imposing themselves over tribal authority, which is how Edwards reports that the 
local community perceived the Safi stoning. Notably, in Kunduz, the family of 
 Siddiqa voiced no protests over the execution of their daughter.
Despite the three cases being subject to interventions from different kinds of 
institutions, all of them featured the loss or infringement of family sovereignty 
over female sexuality as a central offense. In Fereshta’s case, her family, led by her 
grandmother, went to government agencies asking them to return her to them. 
Fereshta’s departure was framed as an illegitimate act of escape in which the gov-
ernment had an obligation to restore the runaway. The subsequent dynamics lead-
ing to Fereshta’s arrest and return to Parwan was difficult to pin down, given the 
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tragic outcome. Widely considered an unjust killing, it was not surprising that the 
various people involved tried to dissociate themselves from the events preceding 
it—and certainly from the act of sending Fereshta back to her family. In particu-
lar, the head of DOWA, a woman in her late twenties, who had later brokered the 
guarantee with the maternal uncle with whom Fereshta was to live, was extremely 
reluctant to talk about the case. She repeatedly cancelled our meetings, usually 
saying she had to go to a workshop at the last minute. This is also what she had said 
one day when I showed up at her office to speak to her assistant and found her at 
her desk. She then unenthusiastically agreed to an interview, in which she claimed 
to remember nothing about the case.
Nevertheless, it seems that the first port of call for the family following Fe-
reshta’s escape had been DOWA, who then evidently equipped Fereshta’s grand-
mother with the letter that asked for the authorities’ cooperation in retrieving her 
grandchild. The family, having discovered Fereshta’s whereabouts due to the inter-
vention of AIHRC, then got the police in Parwan to send a request to the police 
commander of the Kabul central zone to find her and bring her back to Parwan. 
Up to this point, the government had recognized the family’s claims on Fereshta by 
acting on their demand to bring her back to Parwan, but the events that followed 
showed that the state was an ambiguous guarantor of family claims over women. 
In the last phase of her life, government institutions sided with Fereshta. She was 
released from prison, and the court did not recognize the family’s absolute power 
over her. Finally, when she was killed, the court sentenced her granduncle to six-
teen years in prison for her murder.
In the other two cases—Siddiqa’s stoning in Kunduz and Nafisa’s elopement—
there were no calls on the government to assist the families in maintaining author-
ity over female relatives. There were several reasons for this. The district of Dasht-e 
Archi in Kunduz was outside government control, as illustrated by the govern-
ment’s inability to arrest anyone later on, despite the outrage that the stoning had 
produced. Nafisa’s family, by contrast, was living in an area with greater govern-
ment presence, but they were poor and probably unable to call on the government 
to retrieve Nafisa and return her to them in the way the much-better-connected 
family of Fereshta had done. Nevertheless, the offense against kinship prerogatives 
over female sexuality figured as the central violation in these two episodes too.
The case in Kunduz appeared, at first, to be framed as a different kind of viola-
tion: Abdul Qayam and Siddiqa were punished for the offense of zina, a crime 
against God. (The act of stoning, in turn, was what was considered as the main 
violation in Afghan and international media). But upon closer examination of the 
events surrounding the stoning, a more ambiguous picture emerges, a picture in 
which the family’s sovereign rights over their daughter also played a part. Once 
it was clear that Siddiqa had eloped with Qayam, two hundred men of her Turk-
men tribe surrounded his house, threatening to enter it and take away the women 
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inside unless Siddiqa was returned. In their view, by eloping with Siddiqa, Abdul 
Qayam had stolen a woman from her family and tribe, thereby launching a direct 
attack on their standing in the community.
And a lot was at stake. Siddiqa’s grandfather had been Mulla Quli, the name-
sake of the village itself. For such an important family to be seen as unable to keep 
their women under their protection and control, to appear vulnerable to unau-
thorized access, might have been nothing less than intolerable. Later on, when 
Taliban started to investigate the case, it was articulated in a different way, as the 
crime of zina, a crime against God, rather than an offence against Siddiqa’s fam-
ily. But the latter’s agenda proved not entirely different from that of the Taliban.21 
When Qayam and Siddiqa arrived back to Dasht-e Archi in Kunduz—begged to 
do so by Qayam’s family, who were under siege by Siddiqa’s tribesmen—Siddiqa’s 
family refused to let her stay under the protection of the former woleswal (district 
governor), who had given the couple a guarantee that they would be safe if they re-
turned. The former woleswal was from the same tribe as Qayam and was therefore 
not considered trustworthy by Siddiqa’s father, who insisted that she and Qayam 
stay with a village mullah while negotiations between the families took place. It 
was this mullah, considered a Taliban sympathizer, who opened the door for the 
Taliban to start investigating the case. Nothing suggests, however, that Siddiqa’s 
father opposed the intervention by the Taliban. A member of Qayam’s family later 
claimed that Siddiqa’s father had said, “I shall hand over my daughter to the Tali-
ban and will ask them to do what religion orders,” doubtlessly knowing that her 
execution might be the outcome.22 The local researcher who carried out the data 
collection in Kunduz (I could not travel there, since the area was under Taliban 
control) opined that to Siddiqa’s father, the preferable outcome was the couple’s 
death: “I believe that in our culture, this [an elopement] is a very big shame. It 
is about the honor of the tribe. Even if ten girls had been offered as reparation, I 
believe he would do the same [not accept a reconciliation agreement with Qayam’s 
family].”23
The events in Kunduz bring to the foreground how gender relations are forged 
out of contingent struggles and alliances. In terms of the end result, there appeared 
to be a convergence in how Siddiqa’s father and the Taliban sought to solve the 
case. This concurrence between family assertions over women and the regulation 
of sexuality by public authorities is not unusual. Historically, Islamic (and other) 
legal traditions have often incorporated ideologies that place great emphasis on 
controlling female sexuality and protecting paternity. Yet, as previous chapters 
have shown, this is not a given, since the arrangements sanctioned in Islamic legal 
practice have varied over time and in different places, including how official bod-
ies defined and enforced punishments for the crime of zina. Mir-Hosseini and 
Hamzić argue that in the early twentieth century, as Muslim countries modern-
ized their legal systems, the application of classical Islamic law generally became 
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confined to family law. Hadd punishments, including stoning and lashing for 
zina, while rarely explicitly abolished, became legally obsolete (Mir-Hosseini and 
Hamzić 2010: 21). However, with the resurgence of Islamist political movements 
toward the end of twentieth century, many countries saw attempts to “re-Islamize” 
criminal law, particularly as new leaders, who often had come to power through 
military coups, sought to derive political legitimacy from a declared project to re-
store the Islamic credentials of society. In this manner, a return to classical fiqh in 
penal law was presented as a purification of society, returning it to a stage of “pure 
Islam,” prior to Western contamination.
For instance, in Pakistan, Zia ul-Haq promulgated the infamous Hudood Ordi-
nances in 1979 after seizing power through a coup d’état. One of these, the Zina Or-
dinance, criminalized extramarital sex and instituted hadd punishments for those 
offenses under certain conditions (Lau 2007). It thus formed an important part of 
General Zia’s declared purpose of taking power: the need to cleanse Pakistani so-
ciety and make it more Islamic. But the divinely ordained regulation of sexuality, 
in turn, provided a vehicle for those who wanted to reinforce sovereign rights over 
daughters and wives. Khan finds that, in practice, the Zina laws in Pakistan became 
an instrument family members used against women who had married without their 
permission or otherwise defied the family’s claim over their bodies (S. Khan, 2006). 
More generally, Mir-Hosseini and Hamzić suggest that the criminalization of wom-
en’s sexuality enabled through the revival of zina laws “provided contemporary pa-
triarchs with an efficient and novel means to further assert their control” (2009: 12).
By and large, a similar pattern can be identified in Afghanistan. As the legal sys-
tem became codified and modernized, starting with the nizam-namas of Amanul-
lah in the 1920s (see chapter 1), hadd punishments were assigned a largely symbolic 
place in criminal law. Although literature on this question is scarce, it seems it was 
rare for government courts to use stoning and lashing as punishments for zina in 
the twentieth century. Only with the emergence of the mujahedin and then the 
Taliban came the call for the revival of such “Islamic” punishments. Again, there 
is little data on the degree to which hadd was actually implemented during the 
Islamist governments of the 1990s, and there is certainly little knowledge about the 
extent to which families concurred with physical punishments for adultery when 
these were ordered by government officials with explicit reference to sharia. The 
stoning in Kunduz, however, illustrates a similar dynamic to the cases found in 
Pakistan: the congruence between familial and Islamic injunctions against female 
sexual autonomy, through an alliance in which patriarchal claims and an aspiring 
sovereign power—the Taliban insurgents—found common ground. Because even 
if Siddiqa’s family approved of it, there could be no doubt that the stoning was not 
just about the transgression of Qayam and Siddiqa—it was also a strong political 
message that the Taliban was in charge in the area and that they were uncompro-
mising in implementing Islamic tenets.
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But this alliance of kinship with public power—through a public execution of 
an adulterous couple—had a fragile hold. The stoning horrified many Afghans. 
There were certainly several elements to this reaction. The fact that the stoning 
could take place, and the subsequent inability of the government to punish or even 
prosecute anyone for the act, had political implications. It showed the impotence 
of the Afghan state and the international coalition supporting it, and it starkly 
raised the specter of the reemergence of a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. But 
there was also a strong reaction to what appeared, at least at a distance, as a bru-
tal, impersonal imposition by a body outside the family, the village, and the local 
community. The killing of an adulterous daughter or wife (or one alleged to be so) 
by her family or husband was a fairly common occurrence in Afghanistan, but a 
public execution for adultery by a government body—in this case, rebels aspiring 
to state power—was not.
Yet paradoxically, even if the stoning in Kunduz generated strong reactions, 
few (if any) Afghans would publically denounce the principle of stoning adulter-
ers. The protests against the Kunduz stoning were on procedural grounds. The 
investigations had been too quick, the stones thrown at Siddiqa and Qayam had 
been too big, and the punishment had been carried out outside legal channels and 
by unauthorized actors. The reluctance to take a public stance against stoning per 
se testifies to the hegemonic position of classical fiqh in post-2001 Afghanistan. 
There was little political space to explicitly challenge the notion that the laws of 
Islam were immutable and that Afghanistan, as a Muslim country, had to uphold 
them. But even if it appeared politically impossible to repudiate stoning in prin-
ciple, there were no significant calls for the government to stage public stonings or 
lashings of adulterers.24
Thus the Afghan government formally recognized state-implemented  Islamic 
punishments for sexual transgressions, but in practice, it relegated to families 
much of the power to police sexuality in general and female sexuality in particular. 
A remarkable feature of government policy was how the moral regulation of wom-
en was subcontracted to families, given that women could commit a crime simply 
by inhabiting spaces outside familial supervision. In post-2001 Afghanistan, the 
mere sighting of a woman traveling without her family could, according to the 
Supreme Court directive, serve as a legal basis for arrest. In a sense, the Afghan 
government acted in a way that upheld a system in which no women could be “at 
large,” outside of family supervision, without valid reasons. As such, government 
complicity in facilitating family control over women was potentially even more 
significant than in Zina Ordinance–era Pakistan. In the latter, family members 
had to make an accusation of actual zina in order to have government institutions 
do their bidding (S. Khan, 2003).
At the same time, the government was far from coherent when it came to re-
inforcing family authority over women. Rather than a singular government policy, 
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what emerges from the three cases is an extremely fluid and contested field. In the 
case of Fereshta, the government paid only partial heed to the family. Against their 
wishes, the court refused to find Fereshta guilty of any offense, and it did not agree 
to send her back to her family, at least not directly. Instead, it was broader societal 
constraints that made Fereshta go to live with her family—the standard assumption 
by certain shelters and government officials was that women should be returned to 
live with their families if at all possible. And when Fereshta was murdered for hav-
ing refused to submit to her family’s wishes, the government promptly intervened 
to punish what was largely seen in her province of Parwan as a case of a family hav-
ing overstepped their prerogatives and conducting an illegitimate killing. Although 
many felt that the sentencing of only one family member for the deed was insuf-
ficient, since the murder appeared to have been a collective undertaking, the court 
verdict at least signaled that family claims over their women were far from absolute. 
Allegations that Fereshta had an immoral nature resurfaced in the trial, presumably 
to make her murder seem more justified. But the judge rejected this line of argument 
and sentenced the designated murderer to sixteen years in prison, which must be 
considered a clear statement that the killing of Fereshta had been a serious offence.
If the murder of women at the hands of their families was, in most instances, 
a clear transgression, forced marriage was not treated as a clear offense. Instead, 
legal practice and public discourse tended to treat it as a regrettable tradition. The 
EVAW law had made forced marriage, whether of an adult woman or underage 
girl a crime punishable by up to two years in prison. Before that, the 1976 Pe-
nal Code also stated that marrying an adult woman against her will was to be 
punished with a short-term prison sentence. But forced marriage appeared only 
marginally as a violation in the three cases discussed here. All of them contained 
instances, sometimes several, of marital unions that were coerced, yet there were 
no attempts to prosecute or punish anyone for this. If anything, forced marriage 
appeared as an unhealthy tradition, not as a punishable transgression. This was 
even the case regarding Fereshta, who was from Parwan, the most liberal of the 
three provinces. In Parwan, the fate of Fereshta was widely reported as a warning 
of the risks of forcing a daughter to marry someone against her will. Fereshta’s 
family was cast as ignorant of the principles of Islam, which prohibits forced mar-
riage (estevaj-e ikhbari).25 Talking about the case on radio, the chief prosecutor 
in the province reasoned that it was this ignorance and the failure to adhere to 
the rules of Islam that was to blame for the family arranging the marriage against 
Fereshta’s will, which, in turn, led to the dispute and eventually to Fereshta’s death. 
Similarly, Afghan legal experts speaking in the media about the case blamed the 
lack of legal awareness and called for workshops, especially in remote districts, to 
facilitate understanding that could prevent other women from becoming victims 
in the same way.26 Local mullahs also referred to the case as an example of how 
forced marriage was reprehensible.
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Thus, even if the EVAW law was in force by the time of Fereshta’s marriage, 
there was no suggestion of prosecuting Fereshta’s family for forced marriage. 
Nor was this a possibility in the other two cases. This fitted an overall pattern in 
 Afghanistan—any conflict that occurred because of a forced marriage was typi-
cally pursued, if at all, through the family courts, where requests for a divorce or 
an invalidation of the marriage were heard. Forced marriage was generally treated 
as an issue of civil law, not one involving a criminal act. The only case of criminal 
prosecution for forced marriage that I encountered in this period was from Herat 
Province—a father was accused of “selling” his four underage daughters to finance 
his drug addiction. AIHRC staff in Herat told me that they had come across this 
case and alerted the authorities, who had arrested the father and started to pros-
ecute the case. The head of the commission’s Herat office, echoing conservative 
MPs in Parliament, stated that the marriage of these four girls had been contrary 
to Islam: “So according to Islam, when a daughter has not reached the age of ma-
jority [puberty], there are two requirements if her father is to arrange her mar-
riage. There must be no objective of making money, and the father has to exercise 
kindness. He has the right to give away his daughter, but only if it is with kindness. 
In this case, the father did not show kindness. And he was a drug addict, so he was 
selling his daughters.”27
The question of financial motivation marked a fault line in the discourse on 
forced marriage. Marrying daughters off for overt financial profit amounted to 
a greater offence than simply marrying them off against their will. The latter was 
sometimes considered within the rightful prerogatives of fathers, who were pur-
ported to decide in the best interest of the girl. Indeed, during the debates over the 
EVAW law in Parliament, it was argued that fathers should have the right to marry 
off underage girls, even if the girls did not agree to the marriage. As described in 
chapter 2, in the revision of the law agreed upon by the parliamentary Joint Com-
mission, fathers were exempted from punishment for forced marriage. Marrying 
off a daughter purely for pecuniary gain, on the other hand, was denounced as a 
crude and self-interested act. The distinction carried an obvious class dimension, 
underlining the link between “honor” and status. Selling a daughter without any 
pretense was an act reserved for the destitute, something that those better posi-
tioned could afford to avoid.28
In the aftermath of both Nafisa’s and Siddiqa’s elopements, baad (or the pros-
pect of baad) featured as a means of reparation, even though it was widely ac-
knowledged that baad was not consonant with state law or Islamic law. In fact, 
since the time of Amir Abdul Rahman Khan, central governments had tried to 
eradicate the practice by explicitly outlawing it. Even the Taliban government 
had, in a short decree on women’s rights, made it an offense.29 Both the Penal 
Code of 1976 and the EVAW law made baad a separate crime with stricter punish-
ments than those for simple forced marriage. Yet while baad was not publically 
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condoned, it nevertheless surfaced as a standard “solution” to cases where women 
had been illegitimately appropriated. In the cases of Siddiqa’s and Nafisa’s elope-
ments, baad was used as the immediate restitution of the rights of those who were 
deemed to have been wronged: the family who had lost a bride. This illustrates the 
way in which marriage practices, to a large extent, were understood as transac-
tions between families. And in turn, this understanding of marriage shaped the 
ways in which gender violence was defined.
C ONCLUSIONS
The trajectories of the cases discussed in this chapter suggest that as cases of 
gender violence became public matters, they were predominantly articulated as 
violations of family and male “honor.” The gender relations that the Afghan gov-
ernment and other public institutions were called upon to sanction were often 
of a kind where kinship has recognized authority over women and, in particular, 
female sexuality. At the same time, public acknowledgment of these claims was 
by no means guaranteed, and individual cases often took the form of a tug of war, 
with highly unpredictable outcomes. The government might routinely arrest run-
away women at the behest of their families, but it did not necessarily pay heed to 
family claims over women in court. What these micro-struggles over the defini-
tions of gender violence and over the right (or obligation) to adjudicate and avenge 
these incidents tell us is that legal regimes are highly context specific. Although 
such regimes are cloaked in assertions of indisputable and unambiguous truth, 
they emerge out of temporal alliances and accommodations and are embedded in 
political relations. For instance, the case in Kunduz reminds us of the importance 
of Dina Siddiqi’s warning against “timeless, decontextualized Islam” that “does 
not bring into view the complex and historically specific ways in which national 
and international vectors of Islamization articulate with politically economy and 
rural structures of power” (Siddiqi 2011: 82). As the events surrounding the ston-
ing suggested, local patriarchs might find an ally in military actors contending 
for territorial control, whereas to the latter, the spectacular and brutal public dis-
play of “Islamic justice” was part of an active project to demonstrate power. At 
the same time, religion could be invoked very differently, to limit the power of 
families and husbands over women by appealing to the need to eradicate harmful 
traditions contrary to Islam. Objections to forced marriages like Fereshta’s were 
also framed in this way. In other words, even if gender violence was often defined 
in ways that subordinated women to male guardians, this must be considered an 
active accomplishment that needed maintenance and reinforcement through the 
forging of new articulations and the upholding of old ones. As the discussion in 
previous chapters shows, the idea that the state should be obligated to reinforce 
families’ authority over women by apprehending runaway women as criminals 
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was contested and tenuous, having surfaced as part of the political projects of the 
Taliban and the mujahedin.
On the other hand, even if women were not returned to their families by the di-
rect order of courts, legal and social practices nonetheless often combined to pro-
duce this effect anyway. As the case of Fereshta showed, there was a stigma linked 
to women traveling and living independently. This made it possible for authorities 
to arrest Fereshta at her family’s request and later to broker an agreement to send 
her to live with her family. The problematization of female autonomy through 
both state and non-state mechanisms worked against these three women from the 
outset. To Nafisa and Siddiqa, the most obvious—and perhaps the only—option 
they could see was to escape with another man. They both lived in conservative, 
insecure provinces where it would have been difficult for them to travel unnoticed 
on their own. Siddiqa and Nafisa might both have been truly in love with the men 
they escaped with, but it is easy to imagine that, in general, when the only option 
to escape abuse is to elope with a man, women are extremely vulnerable to exploi-
tation. Yet regardless of the women’s situations, many authorities were unforgiv-
ing about the fact that the women had run away or committed zina. Neither in 
these nor in other cases did the authorities or the courts see their circumstances 
as mitigating factors.30 As the local representative of AIHRC said about Siddiqa: 
“This girl was the granddaughter of Mulla Quli, yet she did not respect her grand-
father’s honor? Even if the Taliban was not right, she should have been punished 
in some way, by the courts.”31 Nafisa also met widespread condemnation, although 
one young justice official was more sympathetic: “I asked her if she had sexual 
intercourse with her fiancé, and she said ‘Yes, one or two times. And two or three 
times with Amin.’ Then she started to cry, and I realized she was just a child, and 
it was because of her age that she made those mistakes.”32 Through a combination 
of luck and strategy, Fereshta was able to stay clear of such pitfalls. Having gone 
straight to a shelter, admitting to no physical relations with her boyfriend, and be-
ing fortunate enough to have a committed lawyer and to encounter a sympathetic 
judge, she was released from prison.
The stories of these three women also provide an important additional indi-
cator as to why the EVAW law was so sketchily implemented and why so many 
cases that should have led to criminal convictions (according to the law) instead 
resulted in mediated solutions or withdrawal. The social and official landscape was 
stacked against female autonomy, reinforcing the idea that only under exceptional 
circumstances could women be permitted to live outside of family settings, and if 
so, they were mostly confined to shelters. A woman living on her own remained 
generally unheard-of in Afghanistan and normally invited rumors of her being 
of “questionable character” to the extent that her safety could be at risk.33 This left 
women with little bargaining power in cases of abuse, and it certainly discouraged 
them from pursuing claims against their families.
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INTRODUCTION
Given the strong legal and social regulation of women’s sexuality in Afghanistan, 
as well as how this issue has been tied up with social status and “honor,” it is un-
surprising that there has historically been a great reluctance to report cases of 
rape.1 Women themselves would risk being ostracized by both family and society, 
and they could also be charged with zina or other moral crimes. To families, going 
to the authorities with a complaint of rape could signal weakness—an admission 
that the family was incapable of settling its own affairs. The successful regulation 
of female sexuality has been considered a key locus of family and kinship power, 
to be jealously guarded against outside involvement. Extramarital sexual relations 
have been highly shameful for a woman and her family, often irrespective of the 
consent of the woman. Not only would her status as a wife or prospective wife 
be ruined or significantly diminished, but the public knowledge of such a crime 
would also severely taint a family’s reputation—it would be seen as unable to pro-
tect (or police) its women.
Yet over period of a few years, Afghanistan witnessed a number of high-profile 
rape cases in which public mobilization for government intervention led to asser-
tive state action. Around 2008, a number of families went on national television 
with demands that the government punish their daughters’ rapists. Harrowing 
television clips showed the young girls and their families wailing and weeping, 
crosscut with footage of male family members calling for justice. The cases at-
tracted considerable attention and support, and later, human rights workers and 
activists cited them when they campaigned for the EVAW law to contain strong 
provisions on rape. In the years that followed, popular mobilization took place 
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around several other cases of rape, protesting government indifference and forcing 
a response from the authorities. Perhaps the most compelling example was in late 
2014: in Paghman, a suburb of Kabul, a group of women had been forced out of 
their vehicle, separated from their menfolk at gunpoint, and subjected to multiple 
rapes. Once the event became publically known, growing outrage quickly led to 
the arrest of a group of suspects. In unusually speedy trials, five of the suspects 
were sentenced to death by three courts (the primary court and two rounds of 
appeals), and then executed by hanging, all within a time frame of less than two 
months.
At first glance, it would appear that these cases signified a dramatic redrawing 
of relations of gender and governance in Afghanistan, a redrawing brought upon 
a reluctant government by mobilization from below. Two sets of shifts seemed to 
be involved in this redrawing. First, the cases signaled that there was popular de-
mand for state protection of women against (some forms of) sexual violence, and 
that rape was no longer solely considered a private, shameful matter but instead 
a criminal violation against women. The prospect of such a shift, which essen-
tially positioned women as rights holders vis-à-vis the state, was underlined by 
the fact that some of the victims in these cases appeared in public and spoke about 
how they had been assaulted and how they wanted their perpetrators punished. In 
other words, in their public appearances, they appeared as citizens who had been 
subjected to a crime. Second, the public demands for state intervention seemingly 
entailed a shift in relations of governance in the sense that the government was 
being invited into a new domain, one that had previously been largely delegated to 
families—the regulation of sexuality. The potential long-term implication of this 
was the constitution of rape as site of state power, subject to the interventions of 
law and bureaucracy.
In this chapter, I discuss a handful of these high-profile cases in order to assess 
the extent and exact nature of these shifts. I ask whether the new “openness” sur-
rounding rape in Afghanistan meant a changed position for women, wherein rape 
meant a violation of their bodily integrity as opposed to an affront to their male 
relatives’ honor. I further ask whether we can gauge from these cases the contours 
of a stronger Afghan state. My answer to both questions is a qualified no.
“ THE PRESIDENT IS  SELLING PEOPLE’S  HONOR”
In the spring of 2008, Sayed Noorullah of Sarepul Province started a public cam-
paign to get the Afghan government to punish his niece’s rapists. His teenage niece, 
Bashira, had been tricked into a house and raped by two young men, one of them 
the son of Haji Payenda, a powerful former commander and currently an MP in 
the province. When attempting to report and pursue the case in Sarepul, Noorul-
lah had been beaten and intimidated by local government officials. However, he 
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was not one to give up easily. He appeared on national media, demanding that the 
government take action. The threats continued. Upon the intervention of local 
human rights workers, the case was eventually moved to Kabul, where Noorul-
lah again spoke on national television, cursing President Karzai, Parliamentary 
Speaker Qanooni, and other officials for failing to address the case:
I am the father2 of a thirteen-year-old girl who was kidnapped and then raped by 
the son of Haji Payenda, a member of Parliament. . . . Several times, through Aryana 
Television and other media, the issue has been made known to all the government 
officials and even President Karzai. . . . All the ministers, all the Parliament members 
are aware of the incident and know everything. . . .
I have just one question for Mr. Karzai: For the sake of God, if this had happened 
to your daughter, what would you have done? Then would you have felt my feelings? 
Only two days ago, you sacked the attorney general,3 and since then, all the offices 
that I approach reject me by saying that even your attorney general has been fired. 
Today in the public health office, even the prosecutor who is dealing with my case 
tells me to go away and that now that the attorney general is no more in office, “no 
one is going to listen to your stories anymore.” Was there justice only in the attorney 
general? By sacking him, did his office, his laws, and everything also vanish? Is there 
no system anymore? Should we just abandon our case and mind our own business? 
Once again I am repeating it: if this would have happened to your daughter, Mr. 
Karzai, Qanooni, Chief Justice, and Attorney General, would you have tolerated it? 
Would you have just watched?
If we are traitors, if our case is unfair, and if our accusations are false, Mr. Karzai, 
if you have any gheirat [honor, courage], then please kill us and drive over us. If 
you don’t have any gheirat, then may God’s curse be upon you and your whole clan, 
whoever you are.4
Meanwhile, another family from the same area also went on television, and in 
a disturbing television clip, recounted how their young daughter had been raped 
by five government officials. The cases were becoming a major embarrassment for 
the president, who swiftly fired senior police officials in the province and sum-
moned Noorullah for an audience, during which he promised to personally follow 
up the case. Eventually Payenda’s son was sentenced to twenty years in jail at the 
primary court in Kabul. The case, however, was not over. As it was coming up for 
appeal in the courts, Noorullah reported continuing intimidation and interfer-
ence, and he continued his media campaign. Eventually, senior parliamentarians 
and confidantes of the president brokered a deal. The families of the victim and 
the perpetrator were to reconcile. Declaring himself exhausted by the threats, and 
for the sake of his family’s safety, Noorullah agreed. In return, he would get a baad, 
a girl given in compensation, who would marry his son; a guarantee on his life 
signed by the elderly Sighbatullah Mujadiddi, a friend of Karzai and the former 
leader of the Upper House of Parliament;5 and, according to rumors, a substantial 
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amount of money. In return for this, the families would be declared reconciled, 
and Noorullah would stop pursuing the case. In the two following appeals—in the 
secondary court and at the Supreme Court—to the surprise of human rights advo-
cates and supporters who had involved themselves in the case, Noorullah was no 
longer present in court. The punishments were said to be reduced, and there were 
rumors that the son of MP Payenda went in and out of prison at his convenience. 
In Sarepul, Sayed Noorullah described himself as having been defeated: “We were 
fighting against injustice, and we lost.”6
The case in Sarepul was known all over the country. For some, the way that 
the family had spoken about the rape on national television was nothing less than 
shocking. Making such a violation public and openly appealing to the authorities 
for justice was a humiliating admission of weakness. Not only had the family been 
unable to prevent such an act—but also, in order to redress it, they evidently had 
no recourse other than to make public what should have remained private and to 
ask the government to act on their behalf. Yet in the media and in the accounts 
of the many human rights organizations and politicians who supported Sayed 
Noorullah, Bashira’s uncle, the way the family had chosen to make the rape public 
was described as a momentous development: “The girl is thirteen years old and she 
has been raped, and yet by Afghan standards she is one of the luckier ones. Her 
family has recognized her trauma and is trying to get her some sort of justice; in 
many families, she might be viewed as an object of shame and thrown out. The fact 
that her family members have chosen to stand by her, and that they even spoke out 
on Afghan national television last month, is an important change in how Afghans 
view the abuse of women” (Kargar 2008).
However, closer attention to the language used by Sayed Noorullah shows that 
the case was not framed exclusively as an offense against Bashira, who had suf-
fered the rape, but also—if, indeed, not primarily—as an offense against Noorul-
lah himself. For instance, when later recounting to me how he had been offered 
money to withdraw his complaint, he indignantly said: “We are Afghans. And in 
our custom, taking money in such cases is like selling your namus” (honor, those 
things belonging to a man which should be inviolable). The government and the 
president were denounced as associates to usurpers of people’s honor. They had 
allied with warlords and oppressors and, as a result, they were selling the namus 
of ordinary people. Noorullah recounted, with some embarrassment, how he had 
in anger hurled a great insult at the president even when called in for a personal 
audience, a meeting that had taken place following his denunciation of the coun-
try’s leaders on national television. After this rather strongly worded speech on 
television (“Mr. Karzai, . . . if you don’t have gheirat, then may God’s curse be upon 
you and your whole clan, whoever you are”), the president’s office had demanded 
that Noorullah be immediately brought in to speak to Hamid Karzai. There, the 
uncle continued to use strong language. The Taliban government might have been 
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brutal and unpopular, he had said, but they were not be-namus (without honor). 
They had not been selling people’s honor.7
Another indicator that Bashira’s rape was acted upon mainly as infringement 
on family honor was the fact that Noorullah had agreed to receive a baad from 
the family of the rapist, a young girl whom he married to his son. This he did even 
though he was well aware of the consternation with which giving and receiving 
baad was viewed among his backers in human rights circles. The brokers of the 
reconciliation between Noorullah and Payenda’s family were senior government 
officials and political leaders who also would have been conscious that baad was 
frowned upon in official circles. They had, according to Noorullah, suggested that 
there should be no mention of the baad in the document that stipulated the settle-
ment between the families and made a host of leading politicians who had signed 
the document the guarantors of the uncle’s life in return for his future silence 
about the rape. Instead, the document merely contained a vague statement to the 
effect that the families had agreed to strengthen their relations. The baad nonethe-
less took place, although, as will be shown later in the chapter, the identity of the 
girl who was given in baad meant that it fell short of expectations.
REPORTING R APE WITH UNCERTAIN AGENDAS
The rapes in Sarepul that took place around 2008 were among the first in a series of 
sexual violations that generated intense public attention in Afghanistan. One thing 
that all these cases had in common was that, although they featured victims who 
appeared in public, these appearances were under circumstances arranged—and 
sometimes even manipulated—by others. In general, instances in which women 
reported rape on their own initiative were extremely rare. One exception could be 
when women discovered that they were pregnant as a result of the rape, and the 
impossibility of life as the mother of a child of unknown paternity took precedence 
over the risks entailed in approaching the authorities with a rape charge. Lawyers 
also reported that they were able to gain acquittals for women arrested for zina or 
“attempted zina” when they were able to prove that the women had been raped or 
kidnapped (Boggio-Cosadia 2014). In these instances, the women were typically 
far away from their home areas when arrested, and authorities there made little 
attempt to indict anyone for the rape.
In most cases when a rape was reported or prosecuted, the families were 
strongly behind going the authorities. Yet sometimes the reasons for this support 
were very different from how it first appeared, as many of the cases in the special-
ized prosecution unit in Kabul (see chapter 3) suggested. Families might use rape 
charges as leverage to get the standard bride-price or a baad and then withdraw 
the complaint once such a settlement had been achieved. In some scenarios, wom-
en had eloped or engaged in sexual relations out of free will, but without family 
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sanction. Their relatives pressed rape charges in order to retrieve them, to obtain 
adequate compensation, or to repair their reputation.
Some cases showed with particular clarity how the intensity through which 
families or their supporters pursued rape claims did not center on the needs of the 
victims themselves. The public appearances of the women who had been raped 
could be unsettling, suggesting that they were pawns in other people’s agendas. I 
received an early indication of this myself when I was researching the Sarepul rape 
cases in 2010. Having set up a meeting with the judge who had presided over one 
of the cases from the province, I received an unusually warm welcome. Some time 
into the conversation it became clear why. In came a young girl, looking around 
twelve, who was introduced to me as the judge’s niece. The judge told me that his 
niece had been raped, but that the government had failed to arrest the perpetra-
tors. Now, he wanted to help the girl by broadcasting her story on television. A 
television crew was expected at any moment. He suggested that I, as an “interna-
tional expert on rape,” should take part in the broadcast and offer some general 
comments on rape as a phenomenon. While waiting for the cameras to be set up, 
he said that I should interview the niece and “feel free to ask her any of [my] ques-
tions.” Somewhat perplexed, I asked the girl if she wanted to sit with me in another 
room. I hesitantly asked her about what had happened to her, and she started to 
tell me a story of how she had been kidnapped from her home province in central 
Afghanistan and brought to Helmand, where a married man had kept her locked 
in a room and raped her several times. Soon she started to cry, and I decided to 
end the interview, feeling unsure about the setting and the girl’s real ability to con-
sent to being interviewed. As I prepared to leave, extracting myself from appearing 
on television, the girl was being placed before the television cameras.
I lost track of what happened to the girl or her legal case. When I called the 
judge again later, he was reluctant to speak, probably disappointed by my failure to 
involve myself in the case. But my memory of the girl lingered—the image of her 
in the room, unaccompanied but for the judge who claimed to be her uncle, being 
made to speak on camera to the group of male reporters and office staff, blink-
ing as the sharp television lights hit her face. It seemed a strong hint that the new 
“openness” around rape in Afghanistan did not necessarily take into account the 
needs of the victims themselves.
The case of Lal Bibi, referred to in the introduction of this book, suggested like-
wise. Lal Bibi, an eighteen-year-old nomad woman from the province of Kunduz, 
came forward in Afghan and international media recounting how, in May 2012, 
she had been seized by armed men as revenge for her cousin’s elopement with a 
woman of one of the kidnappers’ family. Five days later, after suffering multiple 
sexual assaults, she was returned to her family. A large group of people from her 
extended family subsequently went to the provincial government to complain. 
The incident was quickly picked up by the media. Lal Bibi was shown crying and 
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anxious, with her family declaring to journalists that unless justice was done, they 
would have no option but to kill her. Women activists in Kabul threw their sup-
port behind the woman and her family, and a few months later, an open trial in 
the capital sentenced four men to sixteen years in prison for the kidnapping and 
abuse of Lal Bibi.
Like the Sarepul cases discussed above, the fact that Lal Bibi and her family 
came forward to report the case and spoke publically about the crime was regarded 
as a sign of progress. Yet the way the young girl was shown on television, obviously 
distressed, raised questions about whether such openness about the discussion of 
rape represented a wholly positive development for the women involved. In the 
trial, Lal Bibi was subjected to further trauma, as one of the accused attempted to 
use her appearance as an argument for his innocence: “Unveil her and see her face 
and tell me if she deserves to get married with anyone,” he stated in court (Sukh-
anyar and Rubin 2012). The case was also made part of the political campaign to 
end government support for informal militias, with the episode quickly presented 
as yet another case of abuse visited upon the Afghan people by the controversial 
Afghan Local Police (ALP). Established by the U.S. military, the ALP program 
involved establishing local police units, trained by U.S. Special Forces, who would 
serve as a first line of defense against Taliban insurgents. The program had been 
under heavy criticism since its inception, with opponents arguing that it was a 
short-term measure adding to the country’s problems with armed, semiformal 
groups. A few days after the kidnapping became known, President Karzai, who 
had been ambiguous about his support of the ALP all along—if not outright op-
posed to them—personally intervened in the controversy by announcing that the 
entire ALP unit of the accused rapist would be disarmed.
STRONGER STATES OR CAPTURED STATES?
In Lal Bibi’s case, and many others, it was activist and popular mobilization, rather 
than the regular workings of the justice system, that ensured that the perpetrators 
were punished. Analyzing how “weak” states deal with cases of rape, Roychowd-
hury (2016) suggests that they can be momentarily captured by both feminist and 
nonfeminist groups. She contrasts “strong” states such as the United States, where 
feminist movements against sexual violence might be co-opted by state officials 
using legal regulations as a mechanism for social control, with “weak” states (for 
example, India), which can be overwhelmed by popular groups—but in ways that 
may or may not entail progress from a feminist point of view. Roychowdhury’s no-
tion of the law being occasionally overpowered by popular politics in weak states 
is an accurate description of the dynamics played out in high-profile rape cases in 
Afghanistan. These moments of popular politics might have espoused a concern 
for gender justice to one degree or another, but what they had in common was that 
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they did not represent the strengthening of the institutional power of the state. 
Rather, they were moments when the routine operation of law and legal institu-
tions were set aside and were replaced by emergency measures or were taken over 
by local groups.
Perhaps the most spectacular example of this was the aftermath of the rapes 
in Paghman, a suburb of Kabul, referred to in the introduction of this chapter. In 
this case, relatives did not initiate any public calls for justice—indeed, they did not 
even report that the crimes had taken place. Instead, rumors began to circulate in 
social media and in the capital of a heinous incident in Paghman. I was in Kabul at 
the time, and I remember first hearing that six women had been taken from their 
car at gunpoint when an Afghan colleague told me about it as we were driving 
home from the city center. To both of us, the idea that something like this could 
take place only a half-hour drive from where we were defied belief. It brought to 
mind chilling stories of the civil war, when the capital collapsed into lawlessness.
By the time the rumors reached us, the incident was already a week old. On 
August 23, 2014, a group of family members had been stopped on their way back 
from a wedding party by armed men dressed as police officers, who had tied up 
the men and taken the women to a nearby orchard, where they had been stripped 
of their jewelry and raped repeatedly. The incident became known only when ru-
mors spread from hospital where the women had been treated for their serious 
injuries. Growing public outrage that such an organized assault could take place 
on the highway right outside Kabul quickly led to the arrest of seven suspects. One 
week later, on the day of an announced demonstration in front of the Supreme 
Court—which activists said was guilty of arbitrarily releasing convicted rapists in 
the past—a two-hour trial took place. Five of the seven accused were sentenced 
to death, and the others to life imprisonment. The appeals proceeded at unusual 
speed. The five death sentences were confirmed both in the appeal court and in 
the Supreme Court and were signed by president Karzai on his last day in office, 
on September 24. The death sentences were carried out by hanging on October 8, 
during the first days of Ashraf Ghani’s presidency.
The most vocal parts of civil society and the women’s movement applauded 
the executions, seeing it as a sign that the government was taking a more resolute 
stand against rapists. But the diplomatic community in Kabul, as well as some 
local human rights advocates, protested that the trials had been far too swift. In 
addition, the government had been reluctant to disclose the details of the case, 
and in private, some people argued that this was because the assaults were part of 
personal vendetta between two feuding groups whose commanders had close ties 
to the government.8
The execution of rapists was unprecedented for post-2001 Afghanistan and 
was based on unclear legal foundations. Indeed, execution itself was relatively 
rare. Only thirty people had been executed during the thirteen years of Karzai’s 
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presidency. The death sentences in the Paghman case were not based on the 1976 
Penal Code, but on an obscure provision of Afghanistan’s communist-era 1987 
Law on Crimes against Internal and External Security, which makes banditry pun-
ishable by death (HRW 2014).
There were several other unusual features of these trials. The victims appeared 
to identify the suspects from a line-up consisting of no men other than the seven 
suspects, and this event was broadcast on national television, with the faces of 
the women clearly visible. However transformative or taboo breaking this might 
seem, critics argued that the government had staged the event only to repair its 
tarnished image, with little regard for the consequences to the women themselves 
(Samandary 2014). Likewise, some of the other features of the trials were also ir-
regular and appeared to be designed to placate the protesters rather than to closely 
follow the law. The rape charges in the primary court had been based on the Penal 
Code and were formulated as zina. When activists protested that the prosecution 
and the courts should have been using the EVAW law, which included rape as a 
distinct offense, the prosecutor in the appeal court simply replaced the indict-
ments so that they were was based on the EVAW law, and the defendants were 
subsequently sentenced on this basis. But to introduce a new charge at the appeal 
level like this was contrary to Afghan law.9 In any case, President Karzai had given 
little impression of judicial independence and due process. Instead, he signaled 
to the women activists that he was ready to see to it that their demands would be 
accommodated. On the evening of the first trial, he held a televised meeting with 
the activists and declared his wish to see the perpetrators executed: “I request the 
honorable chief justice to give them the death sentence” (HRW 2014).
All in all, the novel publicity of rape cases in this period appeared to involve 
few radical challenges to predominant gender ideologies. The kind of cases that 
entered the public domain and generated popular demands for government in-
tervention were all articulated within “stable categories of gender” (Kapur 2014). 
The assaulted women were beyond questioning in terms of their virtue. They were 
either young teenagers or had been kidnapped at gunpoint in front of witnesses. 
In some cases, the crimes were articulated as matters of male honor and status 
rather than as violations primarily against the women themselves. Nonetheless, 
within these limited parameters, the publicity generated by the cases produced 
results—with perpetrators in some of them receiving lengthy prison sentences or 
even the death sentence. Yet it would be difficult to argue that these individual 
cases indicated a strengthening of the institutional ability of the state to protect 
women from rape. Rather, government intervention in these cases was the result 
of popular politics overpowering legal institutions in the way that Roychowdhury 
(2016) points out. It was ad hoc and contingent on public pressure and sometimes 
involved the circumvention of legal procedures.
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Moreover, the force of popular mobilization could also be made to serve more 
directly political agendas. The fact that sexual transgressions were understood as 
matters that infringed on male status and authority potentially made them fac-
tors in ongoing political contests. This was particularly pronounced in the Sarepul 
case, in which the rape of Bashira became embroiled in a power struggle between 
competing factions in the province. It took me some time to detect these dynam-
ics. When starting to gather material on the case, I was constantly mindful of the 
need to proceed with caution, and only after many months did I actually travel to 
Sarepul. Human rights activists who were familiar with the Sarepul case had told 
me it was extremely complicated, with the government trying to pull all kinds of 
strings to protect MP Payenda, father of one of the men who had raped Bashira, 
from being compromised. As I consulted with various people along the way, I 
gained the impression that Bashira’s family, having been intimidated into silence 
by local power holders and the government, could be at great risk if they talked to 
outsiders about it. The unrelated case of the unexplained murder of Dilawar, the 
husband of Sarah, who had been raped by a government-allied commander in an-
other northern province (see introduction), was still less than a year old. I did not 
want to arrive in Sarepul and, by meeting Bashira’s family—or even just by asking 
around about the case—attract the attention of the local authorities and put the 
family in danger. It seemed that the only responsible thing to do was not to go to 
Sarepul until I could be sure that the family was prepared to meet and discuss the 
case, and even then, to travel discreetly and not stay too long.
Thus, after a series of reassuring introductions, I went, making the three-and-
a-half-hour journey from Mazar-e Sharif in a local taxi with my then–research 
assistant, Jawad, and without contacting many people in the provincial capital 
beforehand. I was somewhat surprised that when we met Bashira’s uncle, Sayed 
Noorullah, he appeared upbeat and even delighted by the opportunity to talk 
about the case, even though (upon his suggestion) we were meeting in the pro-
vincial council’s office for all to see. We sat together for many hours in one of the 
rooms as he told us about the events that had followed the rape of his niece. He 
spoke about the constant threats and harassment by government officials that he 
had experienced following his decision to make a complaint about the rape. Not 
only was he targeted, but so were his relatives. In the end, it was fear of losing fam-
ily members, Noorullah explained, that made him decide to give up pursuing the 
rape charge through government courts and instead agree to a reconciliation with 
the rapist’s family. As part of this settlement, in addition to the baad, Noorullah 
received a guarantee that his life would be safe on the condition that he would 
never talk about the case again. However, Noorullah contended that despite the 
promise, he had wanted to talk to me. I was a researcher, and he felt that it was 
important that what had happened to his family should be documented. His fight 
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against injustice and oppression should be recorded “so that future generations 
could learn from history.”
But there were certain cracks in this narrative, and as time passed, they were 
becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. I wondered why, if the case was as sensi-
tive as Noorullah claimed, and his position in the province so precarious, he had 
suggested to meet us at a government office, where his contact with a foreigner 
would no doubt be detected and raise suspicions that he was breaking his vow not 
to pursue the case. Noorullah’s acceptance of the baad from Payenda’s family also 
sat uneasily with his story of fighting injustice. Even if he felt too threatened to 
continue pursuing the case in government courts and wished to have a guarantee 
of his safety, what was the need for accepting the baad, something that discredited 
him among his liberal supporters in Kabul?10 Could he not have settled for just the 
guarantee?
When I returned to Kabul, other fractures appeared. The judge who had pre-
sided over the rape case in the primary court in Kabul contradicted Noorullah’s as-
sertion that the sentence of Payenda’s son had been decreased after an appeal. On 
the contrary, the twenty-year prison sentences for Payenda’s son, his bodyguard, 
and their female abettor had been confirmed in the appeal court and again in the 
Supreme Court. Details of this had been published in an edition of the Mizan Ga-
zette, a Supreme Court newsletter, of which I obtained a copy. If the government 
courts had applied the full force of the law, the local reconciliation and the baad 
made even less sense, as the justice Noorullah was calling for already appeared to 
have been served.
Eventually, through a series of conversations, an alternative version of the 
events following the rape of Bashira emerged. On important points, this version 
diverged from the way the case had become known to me through the media and 
the accounts of Noorullah and his backers. First, Bashira’s family background was 
not quite as powerless and poor as had been implied. They hailed from a lineage 
claiming holy descent. Moreover, members of Bashira’s family held important gov-
ernment positions in the province. It was partly through these positions that the 
family was able to gain access to the media and, doubtlessly, to mobilize some 
of their support among politicians and officials. Another dimension of the story, 
which had not featured in the national media coverage, in the calls for justice by 
human rights officials and activists, or in Noorullah’s account was the ethnicized 
politics that quickly became part of the aftermath of the case.
In order to understand how Bashira’s rape became enmeshed in Sarepul poli-
tics, it is necessary to relate some of the local history. Sarepul, like most parts of 
Afghanistan, has a recent history of frequently changing and contested control 
over territory, state institutions, and resources. Pashtun migrants had begun ar-
riving in Sarepul in the late nineteenth century as part of a larger, government-
supported Pashtun migration into northern Afghanistan. Backed by the central 
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state, the mainly nomadic Pashtuns seized land and lucrative government posts, 
establishing themselves as a dominant minority group in much of the province, 
where groups of Hazaras, Uzbeks, Aymaqs, and Arabs were also living (Tapper 
1991).
The advent of war altered the ethnic balance in the area. As armed resistance 
formed against the communist government that seized power in Kabul in 1978, 
mujahedin and pro-government militia groups emerged, and in the north, these 
often proved a vehicle for non-Pashtun groups to assert themselves. Arabs, who 
were previously a marginal group of pastoralists claiming descent from the Arab 
tribes that had been part of the original Islamic conquest, gained a new position 
in the province through this route. Four brothers, among them Haji Payenda, rose 
to prominence as members of a local self-defense unit mobilized by the Najibullah 
government. The brothers served under Abdul Rashid Dostum, the Uzbek military 
strongman who was to emerge as a key regional power broker in the decades that 
followed. With Dostum, the Uzbeks in the northern region also strengthened their 
position. Dostum initially worked with Najibullah but increasingly acted in defi-
ance to the Pashtun-dominated central government as he established a regional 
network consisting of both pro-government militias and mujahedin commanders 
and finally spectacularly defected from the government in 1992 (Giustozzi 2009). 
In the mountainous south of Sarepul, mainly Hazara groups formed armed resis-
tance factions against the communists, and in yet other districts, Tajik-dominated 
mujahedin emerged. These groups generally aligned with national-level mujahe-
din parties. In a pattern seen elsewhere in Afghanistan, local rivalries were fed by 
support from national party formations, which, in turn, led to a fragmentation of 
the local political landscape alongside party and ethnic lines. The importance of 
these fault lines lessened under the Taliban government, although many areas in 
Sarepul remained completely controlled by the mujahedin. With the overthrow 
of the Taliban government in 2001, the factions rooted in the mujahedin and mi-
litia groups of the pre-Taliban period again became dominant actors in Sarepul 
politics. Dostum’s network became the Junbesh party, an important political actor 
in Sarepul and in Afghanistan as a whole. In sum, the upheavals of the decades 
of conflict had created a fluid situation where previously enduring political and 
ethnic hierarchies were constantly up for renegotiation. The post-2001 period 
saw the new elites of the jihad era—and their broader, mostly ethnically defined 
 constituencies—vying for control over government posts, land, and influence.
It was this factional competition, some of my informants argued, that had been 
the driving force in the dynamics of the aftermath of Bashira’s rape. In a bid to 
weaken Haji Payenda and, by extension, Arab domination, two key groups in-
volved themselves in the case and threw their support behind Bashira’s family. 
One of these groups was the local Uzbek power holders belonging to the Junbesh 
party. Sometime earlier, Payenda had dropped his allegiance with Junbesh, the 
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Uzbek-dominated party headed by Dostum, who, in turn, was supporting Presi-
dent Karzai. Instead, Payenda and a number of other Arabs had established their 
own political group, which eventually supported the opposition candidate, Dr. 
Abdullah, in the 2009 presidential election. The case against Payenda’s son was 
also supported by Shia Hazara groups that wanted to strengthen their position in 
the province. Bashira was Hazara, and according one of my informants, the case 
became a way of unifying them: “When the case first came to the media, the Shia 
people got angry, and they united on how their honor had been insulted. They 
made it a big and very complicated case, in order to unite the Shias, make them 
one power.”11
In these accounts, Bashira’s young uncle, Noorullah, appeared less a self-driv-
en campaigner for justice and more a figurehead for these discontented groups, 
having been handpicked as a suitable front-person when Bashira’s father, who was 
in ill health, could not play that role. The pressure for Payenda to give a baad was 
not imposed from above as an attempt by powerful actors to make the case go 
away. Instead, the giving of baad had formed an integral demand of Noorullah’s 
campaign all along, a demand that, if successful, would have placed Payenda on 
par with his adversaries. Giving a daughter in these circumstances would have 
signaled that Payenda was not above other groups in the province, that he was 
a social equal to Bashira’s family; a daughter taken had to be compensated with 
a daughter given. On this matter, there was only a partial victory for Noorullah. 
The demand had been that Payenda give his own daughter, but he successfully 
refused this. Instead, a daughter of a poor man from Payenda’s tribe, reportedly 
paid by Payenda, was given as a baad to Bashira’s family. In the opinion of one 
of my informants, this showed how Payenda remained able to defy the obvious 
attempts to weaken him.12
Nonetheless, in versions that emphasize how the aftermath of Bashira’s rape 
became a vehicle for local politics, it was Haji Payenda who appeared as the com-
promised party. Despite spending a considerable amount of money to influence 
the courts, he had been unable to prevent his son from feeling the full force of 
the law. Having been exposed as less than all-powerful in the province, he lost his 
parliamentary seat in the next election, in 2010, although this could also have been 
due to his alliance with the Jamiat party, which had a weak position in the prov-
ince (Embassy of the United States Kabul 2009c). In the subsequent chapters of 
Sarepul politics, the groups that had supported Bashira’s family came to dominate 
the local government. And in a further reversal of positions, episodes of rape and 
the kidnapping of women were now being used by factions linked to Haji Payenda 
and his brothers to mobilize public opinion against the Hazara-dominated provin-
cial administration (Ruttig 2012). It seemed that public protestations against sex-
ual infractions had become a standard part of the political repertoire in Sarepul. 
In a sense, protests were directed against the impunity afforded by government 
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connections, impunity that was facilitated by access to government office and, in 
the next round of local politics, became the privilege of the new power holders.
If the unusual persistence of Bashira’s family in pursuing the rape case in public 
could be explained, partly or fully, by the interest of local groups in using the case 
to challenge the political position of Payenda and his allies, this, in turn, serves 
as a reminder that “the state,” as many scholars have reminded us, is a claim, a 
construct, not a thing or a fact. Bashira’s uncle might have called for government 
action in a sense that suggested that there existed a unitary, independent Afghan 
state capable of autonomous action in one direction or the other. Likewise, other 
actors invoked similar images when calling for the state’s responsibility to protect 
women against family abuses or, alternatively, to uphold kinship control over them. 
But these contending notions of state responsibility and justice are disputes over 
internal boundaries and personhood, the outcome of which has consequences for 
authority over domains and persons. They should not lead us to believe that there 
is such thing as a unitary, coherent state—“a person writ large” (T. Mitchell 1991: 
83), a judge-like character insulated from society as a whole. As Mitchell argues, 
the appearance of the state as a discreet and relatively autonomous social institu-
tion is itself a reification that is constituted through everyday social practices. In 
reality, claims to statehood—as well as the gradual emergence of government ap-
paratuses, armies, and bureaucracies—are always intertwined with struggles over 
resources and power.
This means that demands and counterdemands for state action, and claims to 
act on behalf of the state, must be situated in the local political economy—in other 
words, in conflicts between groups and classes over resources and influence. As the 
history of Sarepul clearly illustrates, access to government positions—and the as-
sociated ability to call upon bureaucratic and military enforcement mechanisms—
have served as a tool for appropriation and accumulation. The primary fault line, 
then, is not necessarily between kinship (or families) and the government (i.e., 
between society and the state); it can also be between competing factions, whose 
success in controlling and accessing state power has waxed and waned.
From this perspective, it looks as if the Sarepul case—instead of being one man’s 
thwarted campaign to secure a government reaction to the abuses visited upon his 
family—was locally understood, or at least seized upon, as an infraction against 
a larger collective by a rival group. The reaction to this violation had to assert the 
position of Payenda’s rivals; it had to be a reaction that showed that Payenda and 
his group were not above, but of equal standing to, other groups, and that simulta-
neously could undermine his grip on power. The “state” here features as a vehicle 
for intergroup competition, a competition where authority over women serves as 
a marker of position and status. In other words, the renegotiation of power hier-
archies in Sarepul—in which official positions constituted an important resource 
and which in the last decades had become increasingly open-ended as war offered 
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novel ways for previously marginal groups to assert themselves—took place, in 
part, through public contestations over claims over women. Government courts 
and the media provided new arenas for such claims, which should be understood 
as assertions of position and status, expressed through the idiom of honor. But in 
these new arenas, the claims were framed somewhat differently. When Bashira’s 
uncle appeared on national television, he did not ask President Karzai to arrange 
a baad from Payenda’s family (such a demand could not have been expressed or 
granted openly), but he asked for the government to see to it that the rapists would 
feel the full force of the law. The rape was still spoken of as a violation of family 
honor, but demands of government action were framed in the language of justice 
and punishment.
It was this kind of language that led many outsiders and national actors to be-
lieve that something novel was happening—that people were now bravely speak-
ing out against the violations visited upon their daughters by government allies, 
breaking a taboo in a desperate bid for some kind of reparation. Admittedly, the 
Bashira case and other episodes from Sarepul were novel in the way the victims’ 
families were willing to openly mobilize national public opinion for their case. 
Still, the exceptional intensity with which public redress was sought must be un-
derstood as an extension of factional political conflict, played out, in part, in the 
public arenas of the media and the courts, rather than as an attempt by families to 
rearticulate government obligations to its (male) citizens.
C ONCLUSIONS
The last decade has seen a significant amount of popular mobilization around rape 
cases in Afghanistan, and specifically around the state’s obligation to hold perpe-
trators accountable. In this chapter, I have explored the broader significance of 
these developments, asking whether they have entailed transformations in gender 
relations or in governance in Afghanistan. Did they signal a new status for women 
in which violations of their bodily integrity were considered a public matter, and 
did this, in turn, suggest an extension of the domains of state power? Feminist lit-
erature offers plenty of warnings for those tempted to equate strong state action or 
public reactions on rape with gender justice, showing how sanctions against sexual 
violence can be integral to or appropriated by a host of other projects ( Miller 2004; 
Halley et al. 2006; Bumiller 2008). Much of this literature has focused on so-called 
strong states, where legal interventions might be used as mechanisms of social con-
trol of marginalized groups or of women’s private lives. In Afghanistan, where—as 
in other weak states—legal interventions are less institutionalized, assertive state 
action is typically the result of the mobilization of social groups around specific 
incidents. As a result, state interventions can be less predictable and may or may 
not support feminist agendas (Roychowdhury 2016).
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As the cases in this chapter showed, intensified state regulation of gender vio-
lence and relations in Afghanistan did not necessarily lead to a more equal status 
for women. On the contrary, government regulation affirmed predominant gen-
der ideologies by limiting itself to women well within the category of the unques-
tionably virtuous. Moreover, public discourse often validated family control over 
female bodies and specifically notions of honor, whereby male family members 
could claim a stake in women’s sexuality.13 Likewise, public discourse did not nec-
essarily indicate a permanent increase in the government’s interest or ability in 
regulating and policing matters of sexuality (i.e., as a stronger state expanding its 
domain and control of kinship power). The case from Sarepul shows that what 
could appear as a question of government obligations to uphold citizen’s honor 
was perhaps better understood as a struggle for power between local groups. 
 Appreciating this requires a shift in our perspective on the state itself; the gov-
ernment was not acted upon as a coherent structure, but as a vehicle of factional 
struggle. Through this lens, gender violence as a governance issue (i.e., a site of 
government action and intervention) was but one chapter in an ongoing struggle 
over power and resources.
I believe that the Sarepul case also illustrates the pitfalls of regarding the lan-
guage of honor as somehow integral to a non-state logic of “kinship” society. 
According to the evolutionary perspectives often applied to Afghanistan (see 
introduction), honor (namus) is a “tribal” value, consonant with a pre-state so-
cial system based on kinship, egalitarianism, autonomy, and the strict seclusion 
of women. If such idioms make an appearance in state arenas, they are typically 
considered spillovers from the tribal system, where they properly belong, and it 
is assumed that they eventually will be eradicated by the modernizing touch of 
the state. The Sarepul case unsettles such binaries particularly well. It shows that 
honor, as a vocabulary of power and boundary marking, as a way of articulating 
violations and entitlements, can equally be employed in struggles over state power 
as employed in struggles against it. It is often those with a degree of influence and 
access to the state who can utilize official positions and public arenas to pursue 
gender violations—whether as a standalone issue or as a component of larger po-
litical projects—as was the case in Sarepul.
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On a beautiful Friday in April 2015, I was sitting in my garden in Kabul, relaxing 
and chatting with a friend. I cannot remember how it came up, but somehow the 
conversation turned to the murder of a woman named Farkhunda a month earlier. 
“You can see how it happened,” my male Afghan friend said. “There is this anger, 
a feeling that many women are being provocative on purpose. First, it was that girl 
who went around not far from here without pants and scarf. And then the other 
one who was protesting—the one who had that metal dress showing off her body. 
And finally Farkhunda—that was reaction to all of it. Some people think certain 
women are just going too far.” I remember feeling both perplexed and upset with 
my friend’s argument. “But these were three completely different things,” I pro-
tested. “It’s unfair to put them together like that. That girl who went around with 
bare legs—the one who was filmed and put on the internet—clearly she was in 
distress; she did not do it to protest. Maybe she had run away from some situation 
at her house—what do we know? It wasn’t the same as the girl who was protest-
ing sexual harassment with that metal thing.” This woman, a performance artist 
named Kubra Khademi had dressed up in self-designed body armor emphasiz-
ing her breasts and bottom, and braved a short walk through Kot-e Sangi, a busy 
suburb not far from Kabul University. She had been mobbed by male pedestrians 
and had gone into hiding after pictures and videos of her performance act had 
circulated in social media. “And Farkhunda,” I continued. “That was something 
different again. She . . . well, doesn’t it scare you, people being killed on the streets 
of Kabul just because someone shouts that they are infidels? It could happen to 
one of us, too.” I wasn’t very articulate that day, but I was trying to appeal to my 
friend’s deep antipathy to religious fanaticism, trying to somehow induce him to 
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show more solidarity, to see Farkhunda’s murder as a danger to us all, not as some 
understandable or at least explainable reaction to women “going too far.”
But, of course, there were stark gendered dimensions to what had happened to 
Farkhunda. To the mob that had killed her at Kabul’s Shah-e Do Shamshira shrine, 
she represented everything that had to be opposed—a woman trespassing in pub-
lic space, questioning male authority on religious issues, who then quickly turned 
into an infidel, burning the Quran, probably on the instruction of the Americans. 
I had been in Norway at the time of the murder, and I found myself on national 
television struggling to explain how it was possible that a woman could be lynched 
in the center of Kabul in front of a large group of people, with nobody—not even 
the police observing the crowd—intervening to stop it. I felt that the interviewer 
wanted me to paint a picture in which Afghan society was hopelessly primitive, 
captive to misogyny and backwardness beyond  redemption—to confirm that 
Western efforts to modernize it and to save its women had been misguided from 
the start. In the few seconds available to me, it was difficult to communicate that 
while the radicalized politics of the last decades had made the murder possible, 
it was far from an ordinary occurrence somehow in line with traditional Afghan 
culture. To most Kabulis, the public murder of a woman by strangers was abhor-
rent and shocking.
What happened afterward was also remarkable, again suggesting that many 
Afghans had found the killing abhorrent. At Farkhunda’s burial, a small group of 
women carried her coffin. It was a highly symbolic act in Afghanistan, where, as 
a rule, this is a task performed by men. At the time of her funeral, so soon after 
her death, it was still not clear exactly what had taken place at the shrine. The 
prevailing story was still that Farkhunda had burnt the Quran. Thus, the women 
who carried her coffin did so with considerable bravery, given the fact that they 
could easily fall prey to the same hateful and dangerous rhetoric and be painted as 
the accomplices of an infidel. By and large, they were not part of the more estab-
lished women’s rights networks that have featured prominently in this book—the 
groups that were running shelters, advocating for the EVAW law, and taking part 
in the many policy and advocacy events in Kabul. The women in those groups 
typically had a background in NGO work in Peshawar (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam 
2006) or had held government positions during the communist era. Instead, the 
women who carried Farkhunda’s coffin and took part in her burial were mostly 
of a younger generation, with various professional backgrounds and were not en-
gaged in full-time women’s rights work. They were also more radical. Many were 
self-declared feminists and appeared less intimidated by the prospect of being la-
beled by the mujahedin or the religious establishment. However, a few days later, 
thousands gathered for the largest demonstration seen in Kabul since the 1980s. 
At that point, it had been clearly established that Farkhunda had not burnt the 
Quran. She was, in fact, a deeply religious woman who had challenged the shrine 
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keepers for what she considered an un-Islamic practice—profiting from selling 
tawiz—amulets containing pieces of holy scripture.
Although some of the perpetrators of the murder were quickly arrested, the 
legal case was complicated and remains inconclusive as I write this. It is not my 
intention to probe into the details of the case here. Rather, I bring it up as an il-
lustration of two things. First, the murder of Farkhunda showed with terrifying 
clarity how potent the mix of gendered and religious denunciation could be. To 
her raging attackers, Farkhunda embodied all that was subversive, dangerous, and 
insulting in the post-2001 order—a woman asserting herself in public, attacking 
religion, instigated by foreigners. As my friend had detected, they felt justified in 
reining in a woman who had gone too far. Their reaction was given divine sanc-
tion by the now-routine framing of women who stepped out of line as religious 
detractors. But second, the aftermath of the killing hinted at something that has 
been largely absent in the processes covered in this book: a broad, popular mobi-
lization confronting its adversaries head on. There had been small street demon-
strations in Kabul on a few occasions, but nothing remotely close to the scale of 
what happened on March 24, 2015, when thousands of people marched to protest 
the killing of Farkhunda. It was as if the demonstrators’ realization that their worst 
fears had become true prompted a determination to take a more direct and open 
stand against conservative forces. The large demonstration and—before that—the 
women carrying Farkhunda’s coffin at her burial, represented a stark contrast to 
the more discreet, cautious, and often donor-dependent approaches featuring cen-
trally in the processes discussed in this book.
My purpose in this book has been to explore the effects, limits, and politics 
of the focus on gender violence in post-2001 Afghanistan. My starting point was 
the fact that attempts to define and regulate acts of gender violence offer a win-
dow into shifting relations of gender, power, and governance. I set out to explore 
concrete processes and strategies through which definitions of gender violence 
have been articulated and renegotiated, and sovereign domains and jurisdictions 
claimed, affirmed, or disputed. The trajectory of the EVAW law has been central 
to my investigations. Derived in parts from the global VAW discourse, it defined 
violence against women in terms of violations of their bodily integrity (e.g., rape, 
forced marriage, and beating) as well as their civil rights (e.g., deprivation of in-
heritance and denial of access to education, work, and health care). As the EVAW 
law was reviewed in Parliament, there was a clear tendency toward reinstating 
some of the authority of fathers and husbands over their daughters and wives. For 
instance, fathers were exempted for punishment in cases of forced marriage, since 
it was argued that they were better placed to determine what was in their underage 
daughter’s interest. But there were also attempts to ensure women their part of the 
deal; for instance, the nonpayment of wives’ maintenance was inserted as a form 
of violence against women. Had the process in Parliament been completed and the 
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EVAW law ratified there, it is conceivable that the law would have defined gen-
der violence in ways that partly constituted women as independent legal persons 
whose bodily integrity and sexual autonomy was inviolable and partly as gendered 
beings who, by virtue of being women, could call upon certain male obligations, 
such as maintenance. The latter would have amounted to a public regulation of 
patriarchy, curbing male and family excesses and guaranteeing women their part 
of the Afghan “patriarchal bargain” (Kandiyoti 1988). Instead, the law was kept as a 
decree and in the form that it was enacted as such. In other words, the compromis-
es that a broader national settlement would have entailed were avoided through 
the ability to mobilize executive power, partly by international pressure.
Having explored battles unfolding on Afghanistan’s legal terrain, I turned to 
two key parts of the institutional infrastructure that had been erected through 
similar dynamics as the EVAW law: the specialized prosecution units for crimes of 
violence against women and the women’s shelters. The prosecution units were es-
tablished through donor funds and initiatives. It was hoped that these units would 
provide a space where acts of gender violence could be pursued in insulation from 
the challenges affecting the overall justice system—a kind of ring-fenced site of 
intervention where reform could be fast-tracked. However, my analysis of the spe-
cialized unit in Kabul showed the limits of the kind of top-down change that the 
coalition behind the EVAW law was trying to bring about. As long as broader 
relations reinforcing women’s dependence within the family remained intact, the 
unit was poised to do little more than to serve as a recourse for marital difficulties, 
as opposed to an institution enforcing the law. Yet even if this was not the kind of 
purpose the backers of the unit had envisaged, it still provided many women with 
a curtailed kind of empowerment. The shelters, on the other hand, were able to 
function as autonomous spaces, out of reach of the restraining power of conser-
vative national actors. This enabled them to avoid the kind of concessions that a 
stronger national anchoring would have entailed, such as a more rigid screening of 
residents based on chastity. At the same time, the shelters were dependent on for-
eign funding and entangled in geopolitical tropes about saving Afghan women. In 
turn, their residents became reliant on the shelters for their survival, as they often 
had few prospects of being reintegrated back into broader society.
I started this research by posing the question of whether gender violence was 
becoming a governance or state matter in Afghanistan. Taking my cue from the 
literature on expanding state regulation over family and kinship, I wondered what 
such a shift would mean for gender relations and state power—a shift in which 
the state assumed a larger responsibility for intervening in acts of gender violence. 
However, as became evident fairly quickly, I could also have asked if gender vio-
lence in Afghanistan was becoming a global governance issue. The book has drawn 
upon insights of the literature on global governmentality and transnational gender 
activism to demonstrate how this has indeed been the case. The promotion and 
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implementation of the EVAW law, the specialized prosecution units, and the in-
stitution of shelters came about through transnationally constituted assemblages 
and only to some extent were routed through the Afghan state. These efforts were 
certainly not driven by the centralizing impulses of an Afghan ruler seeking to 
expand the power of government by drawing women into the circle of govern-
ment justice, wresting away the autonomy of their male relatives. In fact, President 
Karzai’s strategy on violence against women was much more opportunistic and ap-
peared primarily informed by his efforts to create and maintain personal alliances. 
As one activist suggested to me, unlike King Amanullah or the PDPA, “Karzai is 
not personally committed to women’s rights, but he is committed to the interna-
tional funding that comes with it.”1 Neither were there any signs that the Afghan 
president attempted to use government courts to achieve tighter state regulation 
of family and kinship in order to centralize power. As the Sarepul case shows, the 
government’s response to issues such as rape was reactive and entangled in patri-
monial politics. Whether by effect or intent, the EVAW law, the shelters, and, to 
some extent, the special prosecution units instead constructed a globalized zone of 
protection for Afghan women, dependent on external funds and political pressure.
My argument that the specific shape that formal sanctions of gender relations 
takes is not preordained by religion, culture, or other fixed societal attributes, but 
contingent on situated politics, resonates with academic literature on gender in the 
Middle East and beyond. Research on women and legal protection in the Middle 
East has documented the importance of the state’s local power bases (Kandiyoti 
1991; Molyneux 1995; Joseph 2000; Charrad 2001) for how women’s rights are en-
shrined and enforced in government frameworks. This book has added another 
dimension to this literature by underlining the importance of zooming out beyond 
national borders when mapping the political constituencies shaping government 
policies. By pointing to the many and sometimes contradictory ways in which 
international pressure and funding shaped interventions into gender violence in 
Afghanistan, I have highlighted how transnational coalitions and political agendas 
can be as important for outcomes as national constituencies. An important part of 
this historicized perspective has been to unsettle the national state as the ultimate, 
self-contained unit of reference and guarantor of claims. As Kim-Puri notes, the 
theorization of the state in line with recent insights understanding it as a contin-
gent set of institutions and relations (as opposed to a monolithic structure) has 
largely been absent in feminist sociology (Kim-Puri 2005: 144). Moreover, trans-
national feminist studies, while attending to the asymmetries and inequalities pro-
duced by the flows of global capital and geopolitics, have not explored in detail 
how the state has been reconfigured as a consequence of such flows.
The book has set up an analytical frame that sees state institutions as immersed 
in and partly expressive of transnational processes. It has done this by drawing 
upon the work of Sassen and others, demonstrating how the very notion of the 
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Afghan state, as a nationally contained, unitary, sovereign body makes little sense 
in the context of interventions into gender violence in Afghanistan. I have shown, 
for instance, how in the case of the EVAW law and in the push to end impunity for 
gender violence, certain state capabilities were reoriented toward more global proj-
ects (Sassen 2008). National institutions—courts, prosecutors, and the legislative 
bodies—became part of a globalized sovereign regime, in which Afghan women’s 
security was made a global concern and ultimately guaranteed by external funds 
and pressure. In other words, the Afghan state was denationalized, in the sense of 
being reassembled as a vehicle for the operation of global sovereign claims.
However, if there was a global EVAW law assemblage working through national 
institutions, it should also be said that this assemblage was in no sense a totaliz-
ing, unidirectional force. National institutions did not simply seamlessly facilitate 
a global order. Rather, global templates intersected with local dynamics in ways 
that produced outcomes distinct to Afghanistan. The processes traced in chapter 2 
show that rather than being two contradictory forces, personalized politics and 
external reform attempts often reinforced each other in particular ways. Executive 
power was strengthened as Western diplomats, looking for swift results, preferred 
to deal with the cabinet and the president rather than the unwieldy and capricious 
Parliament. But this strategy also enabled President Karzai to strengthen his per-
sonal power base through the granting of favors in an exchange of offerings and 
loyalty. He gifted the EVAW law to two of his constituencies—women activists 
and Western supporters. At the same time, he also bestowed on other of his con-
stituencies a gift that, in some ways, cancelled out the EVAW law—the Shia law. 
Similarly, the emphasis placed on output and fundraising by the “NGO-ization” of 
women’s activism also fed into personalized and patron-client politics, reflecting 
the link between development brokerage and patron-client systems pointed out by 
Olivier de Sardan (2005: 174). Overall, the force of the EVAW law assemblage was 
paradoxically both enabled and constrained by its dependence on the diplomatic 
and financial leverage of NATO countries. The short plenary debate about the law 
in Parliament in May 2013 served to underline the partial nature of its reach and its 
ambiguous status. And by 2015, it seemed possible that the entire law, so central to 
both local and donor-driven gender activism for almost a decade, could be turned 
into a historical footnote by the creation of comprehensive new penal code.
Nor was the EVAW law assemblage the only transnationally constituted sov-
ereign claim in the field of gender violence. There was a significant difference be-
tween the more technocratic and international coalition that formed around the 
EVAW law and the more directly geopolitical agendas of NATO military victory 
being mobilized around the shelters. If, as Lisa Hajjar and others argue, struggles 
over women’s rights are also struggles over authority, and if increased regulation 
of gender violence is also about expanding power, this book underlines the need 
to be open-minded about exactly what forms of authority and power are being 
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expanded. We cannot meaningfully limit ourselves to predetermined templates 
(such as the state or global governance). Instead, we must map and dissect the ac-
tual constellations (or assemblages) that define and adjudicate gender violence in 
practice. The overall picture that emerges from subjecting the landscape of gender 
and violence in post-2001 Afghanistan to such a survey is one of fragmentation 
and partial-ness. And this is to say nothing of the shrinking control exercised over 
territory within Afghanistan’s borders by either government officials or the inter-
national military—even within the contracting space that they operated in, there 
was no singular policy, institution, or sovereign power. The political and legal or-
ders enforcing claims and counterclaims, the moral universes that gender relations 
were inserted into, and the bureaucratic machineries through which problems were 
delineated and remedied were multiple and evolving, appearing in historically spe-
cific configurations. Afghanistan in the first two decades of the new millennium 
revealed a thin but not inconsequential constellation of women’s activists and pro-
gressive justice officials and diplomats, boosted by international funding and alli-
ances. Sometimes entangled in orientalist tropes of saving Afghan women, its reach 
was compromised by its top-down mode of operation, but also by the dynamics of 
patronage politics and the war that was engulfing most of the country. The war-
ring parties also launched their own attempts at rule through justice—the Taliban 
insurgents with their ostensibly pure sharia and (as I have discussed elsewhere in 
more detail) the foreign military with their experiments in tribal and traditional 
governance (Wimpelmann 2013). I problematized the notions of total, determinate 
logics further by showing how discourses of honor can function as a vocabulary of 
demands and assertions in struggles over access to state power. The cases discussed 
in chapter 5 and 6 demonstrated that gender ideologies where women were sub-
sumed under family sovereignty operated across the social field and were not in 
any sense reducible to non-state, “tribal” structures or worlds.
From the perspective of feminist politics, the fragmentation characterizing the 
field of gender violence appeared both as an opportunity and a problem. It en-
abled forms of intervention that were somewhat autonomous from the conserva-
tive gender ideologies espoused by important power holders. But at the same time, 
these interventions were dependent on problematic, sometimes overtly imperial 
alliances. Moreover, in practice, they were constantly compromised by legal and 
social practices that castigated female autonomy, sexual and otherwise. The indi-
vidual cases analyzed in part 3 of the book illustrated that what was often at stake 
in the contestations regarding the definitions of, interventions into, and protective 
measures against violence against women was the degree to which kin—in partic-
ular, male relatives and husbands—could claim legitimate interest in and authority 
over female sexuality. Runaway girls, safe houses for women, and government-
mandated punishments for forced marriage or honor killings all potentially chal-
lenged or renegotiated notions and assertions that subordinated women to their 
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families. Yet the totality of legal practices and the social relations underpinning 
them mostly went in the other direction. As chapter 4 showed, the legal apparatus 
operated with an extremely broad definition of female moral transgression. Not 
only was zina—sexual intercourse outside of or prior to marriage—a criminal act, 
but also, women’s very presence outside of government or family surveillance was 
made into an offense, suggesting that what was at stake was the prospect of female 
autonomy per se. Similarly, the problematization of women’s existence outside of 
the family unit had ramifications for the degree to which justice institutions were 
able (or inclined) to punish gender violence. Because women’s prospects for sur-
vival outside of family settings were so limited, both justice officials and women 
themselves often preferred reconciliation with their abusers or their families rather 
than criminal sanctions. To some, this was an unproblematic and culturally appro-
priate solution—MOWA, for instance, in its 2014 report on the implementation of 
the EVAW law, had stated, “Mediation . . . has emerged as the most preferred and 
commonly used method of resolution of cases of violence against women because 
it respects the sanctity of ‘family’ as a unit and is in consonance with cultural tradi-
tions” (MOWA 2014: 12).
However, this conservative and ahistorical statement was, in fact, a symptom 
that the post-2001 focus on gender violence had left much of the structural re-
lations that underpinned women’s vulnerability to family violence unquestioned 
and intact. Kapur, analyzing the Indian women’s movement, suggests that there is 
an inherent tension between attempts to delineate an indigenous, “culturally ap-
propriate” feminism and pursuing equality between the sexes. She is worth quot-
ing at some length.
[Feminism in India] has been charged with being a product of “decadent Western 
capitalism”  .  .  . based on a foreign culture of no relevance to women in the Third 
World. Therefore, feminists have adamantly denied allegations of being Western and 
have sought to establish a distinctively Indian feminism, based on the notion of an 
authentic Indian woman, one who is routinely a victim of oppression and violence. 
Any discussion of female choice, especially in sexual matters, has been muted. Sexual 
pleasure per se has been regarded by many within the women’s movement as a foreign 
contaminant and something that distinguishes Indian women and culture from the 
“West.” Thus the women’s movement in India has remained simultaneously tied to a 
revolutionary and a nonrevolutionary sensibility. It continues to invest in an essen-
tialist and conservative notion of Indian culture and womanhood while pursuing the 
revolutionary enterprise of achieving equality between men and women. This ten-
sion continues to inform feminists’ engagements with the law, which have focused 
on securing formal equal rights with men without disrupting the dominant cultural, 
familial and sexual norms that define Indian womanhood. (Kapur 2012: 336)
While Kapur is far from the first scholar to point to the complicated relation-
ship between postcolonial feminism and nationalism (Chatterjee 1993; Yuval 
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Davis 1997; Parker et al. 1992), she goes on to argue that the focus on the “authen-
tic women” has enabled an alliance between third-world feminism and a certain 
strand of Western feminism. For this alliance, a joint focus on violence against 
women has been a natural common ground. This focus disrupts neither gender 
nor global hierarchies, instead it reinforces at all levels the notion of the women 
of the Global South affected by gender violence as a “victim-subject” in need of 
protectionist intervention. In post-2001 Afghanistan, the dynamics underpinning 
this protectionist logic were unusually pronounced. There was constant slippage 
between women’s general ability to live, move, and support themselves outside of 
family settings and their morality and chastity. In turn, women’s chastity—or mere 
non-deference—was routinely translated into questions of religious adherence, 
intertwined with notions of national resistance to Western impositions. Thus, all 
kinds of female defiance—escaping the family home, living in a shelter, setting up 
an independent household, attempting to marry a man of one’s choice, arguing for 
women’s civil rights, questioning male religious authority—could be constructed 
as defiance against Islam. This would cause a woman to enter a perilous terrain 
where charges of ultimate betrayal—being a nonbeliever—could be easily invoked.
Of course, religion, as elsewhere, did not appear in a “pure” form, and so there 
were competing ways of envisioning women’s positions, interwoven with ideolo-
gies of conservative nationalism (in the articulation of the jihadis) or modernist 
enlightenment (in the articulation of Afghan feminists and liberal religious schol-
ars). However, as witnessed, for instance, in the parliamentary debate over the 
EVAW law, the jihadi version tended to prevail. This was based on a number of 
contingent factors, among which were the former mujahedin’s powers of intimida-
tion, their ability to mobilize around the need for national and religious assertion 
in the midst of a political order underwritten by Western infidels, and their appeal 
to patriarchal sentiments. The broader backdrop was a constant tension between 
three key aspects of the post-2001 order: foreign military operations, the reha-
bilitation of the mujahedin, and external attempts to promote Afghan women’s 
rights. In a setting where many power holders evidently owed much of their cur-
rent positions to Western funds and armed support, taking a conservative position 
on women’s rights became a valuable way of demonstrating one’s nationalist and 
Islamic credentials.
In this landscape, there were few attempts to directly confront the gender ide-
ologies that placed an absolute premium on female propriety. Discussions about 
forced marriage or the shelters emphasized women’s right to choose their own hus-
bands and to be free of family violence, but they did not attempt to dethrone the 
imperative of female chastity. Thus, the validity of a distinguishing line between 
“good” and “bad” women, between those deserving protection and those beyond 
the pale of respectability, was not fundamentally disrupted. Instead, the line was 
merely pushed back and forth. Perhaps, for Afghan women, who only a decade 
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earlier had been banned from the public domain altogether, and for whom public 
presence was still extremely tenuous, this was far too risky a topic. Most already 
felt the need to carefully maintain a virtuous public persona. To enter into a debate 
that would put them in solidarity with non-chaste women would almost certainly 
taint them as “bad women” or outcasts. Neither did international actors challenge 
the distinction per se. Although U.N. staff and others were supportive of the efforts 
to distinguish zina from running away and from rape, they did not challenge the 
criminalization of zina, which could have been framed as interfering in religious 
issues. All things considered, the interest, whether genuine or strategic, that many 
Western governments held in promoting women’s rights in Afghanistan constantly 
clashed with other objectives, such as stability and force protection and a general 
wish not to add to a local image of occupiers unduly interfering in religious and 
social life. Moreover, the dominant aid modality in Afghanistan—project delivery 
through private contractors and NGOs—tended to favor measurable outputs and 
individual achievements over broader and more political mobilization.
It was no wonder then that Western support to Afghan women’s rights mainly 
took the form of narrow, targeted interventions rather than investment in more 
transformative change, reinforcing the overall “protect and rescue” approach that 
characterized efforts against gender violence in the decade and half following the 
2001 invasion. The shelters were, in many ways, a prime example of this narrow 
approach. They were able to evade local binaries between chaste and unchaste 
women by partly exiting national regulatory mechanisms. But this reinforced 
their dependence on external backers, and shelter residents themselves were 
often unable to move out of the shelters, because of the strong social sanctions 
against women living on their own. In this sense, they were also left in a state of 
 dependence—on the continued support of the shelters.
I would suggest that in many ways, Afghan women and feminists were facing 
the choice of two models of protection. Protection, as a number of feminist writ-
ers have pointed out is a hierarchical, often gendered concept, entailing a bargain 
of material and physical protection against loyalty, propriety, and subordination 
(Kandiyoti 1988; Kapur 2002; Young 2003; Miller 2004). Familial, national, and 
transnational bargains of protection in return for “propriety” should be placed in 
the same analytical frame; all entail demands for loyalty, dependence, and submis-
sion. The book has shown how protection, whether extended to Afghan women by 
male guardians, by government courts, or by the shelters, routinely came with de-
mands to conform to certain normative ideals. Exactly what these ideals comprised 
was somewhat contentious—women could be deemed unworthy of protection (or 
deserving of violent punishment) for defying husbands’ authority, for unauthor-
ized public forays, or for being in the company of unrelated men, although sexual 
indiscretions were a fairly agreed-upon disqualifier. In other words, and as many 
Afghan feminists complained, women were asked to renounce their autonomy, 
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sexually and otherwise, in return for protection. But there was also a price to be 
paid for the protection afforded by the laws and institutions that, in part, were 
realized through transnational actors. The price for the EVAW law was to bypass 
the parliamentary process and thus the opportunity for the politics of women’s 
rights to be anchored in broader local constituencies. Instead, the law was quietly 
promoted through informal Kabul-based networks, reinforcing a political mode 
bearing more resemblance to court politics than any kind of broad-based women’s 
movement. This made gains dependent on good relations with the presidential 
palace, which, in turn, differentiated between women politically affiliated with the 
executive and those closer to the opposition. And a tenuous local anchoring was 
not the only price to pay for transnationally derived protection. The NGOs run-
ning the shelters, and the transnational alliances they were part of, often mobilized 
orientalist tropes of saving Afghan women in a way that rendered them dependent 
on salvation by NATO. In this sense, renegotiating one hierarchy often meant get-
ting entangled in another. The shelters, while out of familial and government su-
pervision, became beholden to Western good will—and even military force.
Yet to what extent would it be realistic to expect Afghan women to negotiate a 
position independent from all of these sets of relations? One must be alert to the 
danger that the notion of “pure” or autonomous women’s movements becomes an 
ideal that holds practical feminist gains hostage (Roy 2011). Understanding the 
definitions of and jurisdiction over gender violence as forged out of historicized 
struggles also brings into view the fact that possibilities mostly come attached with 
some accommodations and trade-offs. For instance, the alternative to keeping the 
EVAW law as a presidential decree was a modified version in Parliament—where 
it looked fated to become subject to problematic amendments, or where it could 
even have been rejected altogether. To many of the supporters of the EVAW law, 
the opportunity to have, for the first time in history, a law that directly addressed 
abuses against Afghan women was too important to let pass, even if the way it was 
obtained was far from perfect. Many of them saw no prospects or time to engage 
in broader mobilization and coalition building. Although the victory of getting the 
EVAW law decreed seemed to bring with it some kind of external dependence, as 
many Afghan feminist pointed out, the price of gaining the “protection” of one’s 
family or husband could also be very high. And so could submitting to the de-
mands of government and their conservative constituencies, as the attempts to 
establish a screening regime of the shelters testified to.
Perhaps the uncomfortable truth is that we must abandon the ideal of total 
autonomy; all guarantees have to be negotiated with someone. Afghanistan during 
the first decade and a half after the 2001 invasion is a particular stark reminder of 
this. Carefully laying out the nature and background of such compromises, which 
is what this book has attempted to do, is therefore not the same as condemning 
those who make them. It must also be kept in mind that the terms of these kind 
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of bargains are never set in stone. It is too early to say what will be the long-term 
legacy of the struggles over gender violence in Afghanistan during the last fifteen 
years. Maybe, as many women rights advocates hope, the infrastructure erected 
with international support will gradually consolidate and expand, slowly washing 




1. In Afghanistan, where government registers often do not exist and war has caused 
displacement, it may be possible for someone to falsely deny an actually existing family 
relationship, for instance, to a sister or a sister-in-law.
2. In most Afghan communities, bride-price (walwar) has long been an integral part 
of weddings, with large sums and assets being transferred to the bride’s family (primarily 
her father) from the groom and his family. Bride-price is widely spoken of as a social ill 
that impoverishes young men and because corrupt fathers marry their daughters to old or 
otherwise unsuitable husbands, yet it has proven difficult to curtail.
3. The term mujahed (plural, mujahedin) means “one engaged in jihad,” but mujahedin 
usually refers to the resistance fighters who fought the pro-Soviet government of Afghani-
stan during the Cold War. After the Taliban was removed from power in 2001, many former 
mujahedin commanders (some of whom had been partners to the American-led invasion) 
gained important positions in government, the security apparatus, and Parliament. See 
chapter 1 for more details on their post-2001 rehabilitation to power.
4. Interview with a human rights official, Mazar-e Sharif, March 2010.
5. Schueller (2011) points out that critiques of colonial rescue binaries also comes from 
“within,” from Western accounts that do not problematize the U.S.-led invasion but none-
theless seek to rehabilitate Afghan women’s agency. Statements such as “Afghan women can 
save themselves, and I need to be saved too” (7) invite an individualized crosscultural soli-
darity without attending to different positions inhabited by Afghan and Western women.
6. In his 1996 book Heroes of the Age, David Edwards introduces his hypothesis that 
Afghanistan’s troubles over the last decade in the last instance can be explained by “certain 
deep-seated moral contradictions that press against each other like tectonic plates at geo-
logical fault lines below the surface of events” (3). Honor, Islam, and the rule of the state are 
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to Edwards distinct moral orders that are in many respects “incompatible with one another” 
(4). However in his 2002 sequel, Edwards appears open to a revision of this hypothesis 
observing that by the mid-twentieth century, “old divisions” were breaking down and divi-
sions (e.g., between tribe and state) were becoming blurred, opening up possibilities for 
new hybrid orders. (Edwards 2002: 102–3).
7. Kamali’s (1985) discussion of family law is a partial exception, although this detailed 
discussion on Afghan family law, constitutions, and the judiciary is a conventional legal 
study that does not explicitly consider how law is productive of gender and power.
8. This is particularly the case with rape and sexual violence. But see work on Otto-
man Egypt (Sonbol 1997; Kozma 2004) and Pakistan (Quraishi 2000; Zia 1994; Lau 2007). 
“Honor killings” as a state sanctioning of relatives’ claim over female family members have 
received somewhat more attention.
9. Given this dearth of earlier scholarly work, this book contains a rather extensive dis-
cussion on the evolvement of the Afghan legal system (see chapter 1).
CHAPTER 1 .  INTRUSIONS,  INVASIONS,  AND INTERVENTIONS
1. Field notes, Kabul, July 23, 2009.
2. In Muslim countries, the basis of law has been the will of God, as revealed in the 
Quran and in the exemplary sayings and actions of the Prophet (the Sunnah). Sharia is 
defined as “The rules given by God to His servants” (Peters 2003: 82) and covers both what 
is considered the field of law in the West and other areas of life, such as prayer and fasting. 
Fiqh, on the other hand, refers to the methodology of ascertaining legal conclusions from 
divine sources (the Quran and the Sunnah). Thus “if sharia is God’s law, fiqh is the scholarly 
discourse aimed at formulating the prescriptions of the sharia on the basis of the revealed 
texts and using various hermeneutic devices.” (Peters 2003: 84) There are five major such 
established fiqh schools; Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali (all Sunni) and Jafari (Shia). 
Fiqh texts are not law codes, but scholarly discussions where different perspectives are jux-
taposed. Such texts do not contain unequivocal or authoritative provisions. Instead, issuing 
legal rulings have historically been at the discretion of religiously trained scholars, by virtue 
of their knowledge of fiqh as a scholarly discourse. However, contemporary Muslim states 
(with the exception of Saudi Arabia) have codified laws in most domains, depriving the 
ulema of their legal monopoly in the process.
3. Nawid points out that “although British sources refer consistently to Amanullah’s ap-
athy towards religious groups, other sources indicate that he cultivated excellent personal 
relations with eminent religious leaders in Kabul long before ascending the throne” (Nawid 
1999: 57).
4. For an overview of Amanullah’s nizam-namas, see Polluda 1973: 66–91.
5. The category hadd (plural, hudood) includes crimes for which there are immutable 
punishments (punishments believed to have been set by God: amputation, stoning, or lash-
ing); qisas includes crimes for which relatives or victims were allowed retaliation; diat refers 
to crimes that can be settled by compensation or “blood money”; and tazir applies to crimes 
for which punishments were discretionary (determined by a judge) and for purposes of 
prevention and deterrence.
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6. Even if hadd crimes are crimes for which punishments are regarded as immutable, 
scholars and Islamic judges have nonetheless understood the evidential requirements and 
exact definitions of and punishments for these crimes differently. Crimes normally catego-
rized as hadd include zina (adultery), sariq (theft), harida (violent theft), qazf (false accusa-
tion of zina), ridda (apostasy), and shurb kamr (consumption of alcohol) (Peters 2005: 53).
7. Eastern tribes, who were facing the abolishment of existing privileges in conscription 
and taxation, were the other main group behind this rebellion, called the 1924 Khost rebel-
lion (Polluda 1973).
8. This Constitution was a relatively liberal document, but “in reality the King had more 
powers than any other head of a constitutional monarchy could dream of enjoying” (Saikal 
2004: 146). Article 15 of the Constitution stated, “The King is not accountable to anyone and 
shall be respected by all.”
9. Interview with female judge at the Supreme Court, Kabul, March 2015. According to 
this judge, there were around thirty female judges in Kabul at the time. They were generally 
placed in the family courts and were not considered for promotion.
10. Like in many other Muslim countries, the Civil Code actually drew upon Maliki fiqh 
on the issue of divorce, since this school were more detailed in this question (Kamali 1985).
11. Hudood is the plural form of hadd, qassas is an alternate spelling of qisas. On hadd, 
see note 5 in this chapter, for hadd, tazir, qisas, and diat, see note 4.
12. For a more detailed discussion about the content of these two codes and the gender 
relations they sanctioned, see chapter 2.
13. Interview with a former PDPA official, Kabul, February 2015.
14. Interview with a former female judge, Kabul, March 2015.
15. Interview with a female prosecutor, Herat, May 2015.
16. Cited in Nawid 2007.
17. The Sharia Ordinances on Veiling (Fatawa-ye shara’i –ye mawrad-e hijab), issued by 
the Afghan Supreme Court, 1994.
18. Nancy Dupree reports that these restrictions were first enforced in a haphazard 
manner, varying from region to region and dependent on personalities, the degree of ac-
commodation with aid agencies, and the level of administrative control (Dupree 1998). 
Restrictions became progressively harsher, particularly in the cities. Dupree also suggests 
that the written rules and regulations were mostly directed toward the U.N. aid groups 
and NGOs. “The general populace is informed of regulations over Radio Shariat” (156, 
n. 41).
19. Interview with a religious leader, Herat, March 2015.
20. According to a recent compilation of public executions during the Taliban period, 
there were at least seven executions, most of them by stoning, for adultery. The majority 
of these executions were of women (Strick 2015). The actual number, however, is probably 
somewhat higher. In addition, lashing (for premarital sex) was a frequent occurrence, as 
was amputation for theft.
21. Interview with a former female judge, Kabul, February 2015.
22. Although nationwide consultations were organized, the tight time schedule and the 
fact that the draft of the Constitution was not made available in advance meant that this 
exercise appeared mostly as symbolic window dressing (Suhrke 2011). The United States, 
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Interim President Karzai, and a bloc of military commanders dominated the subsequent 
Constitutional Jirga assembled in the capital to review and approve the document.
23. Article 130 reads, “The courts in the cases under their consideration shall apply the 
provisions of this Constitution and other laws. Whenever no provision exits in the Consti-
tution or the laws for a case under consideration, the court shall follow the provisions of 
the Hanafi jurisprudence and within the provisions set forth in this Constitution render a 
decision that secures justice in the best possible way.”
24. For instance, Hartmann reports that Assadullah Sarwari, intelligence chief under 
the communist government, was sentenced to death with reference to this article, although 
the sentence was later changed to eighteen years in prison. His trial is the only case of pros-
ecution for war crimes in Afghanistan to date. (Hartmann 2011: 187).
25. Article 83 states that from each province, two of the elected members to the Lower 
House shall be females. Article 84 states that one-third of members of the Upper House will 
be presidential appointments, and half of them must be women.
26. However, the Supreme Court was the institution authorized to interpret the 
 Constitution.
27. Royce Wiles, Finding Aid for Afghanistan Legislation and Translations, Afghanistan 
Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) (unpublished overview).
28. A stage course is post-degree training program leading to a qualification to serve as 
a judge, prosecutor, or lawyer. A French term, its usage in Afghanistan reflects similarities 
with the French legal system—both countries have civil law systems.
29. A 2008 presidential decree further strengthened the Supreme Court, authorizing it 
to increase or decrease punishments. Prior to this, the Supreme Court had only been only 
allowed to check cases for legal accuracy. These sessions were also attended by the repre-
sentatives from the Attorney General’s Office, but neither the accused nor defense lawyers 
were allowed to attend.
30. For example, Abdul Rahman, indicted under article 130 for apostasy, was eventually de-
clared mentally ill and taken to Italy. Sayed Pervez Kambash, found guilty under article 130 for 
blasphemy, was first given the death penalty, which was later reduced to the maximum prison 
sentence. He was pardoned by the president and repatriated to Norway. Two people charged 
with blasphemy were sentenced to twenty years in prison under article 130. See Hartmann 2011.
31. Personal communication with IDLO staff, March 2015.
32. One of the mujahedin parties receiving Western and Pakistani support during the 
1980s.
33. Interview with USAID Rule of Law official, Kabul, July 2010.
CHAPTER 2 .  “GO OD WOMEN HAVE NO NEED FOR THIS L AW ”
1. An earlier version of the first part of this chapter was published in Women’s Studies 
International Forum 51 (2015): 101–9.
2. UNAMA Human Rights, Concerns on Shi’a Personal Status Law, August 18, 2009. On 
file with author.
3. Ali Reza Rohani, presentation at seminar on the EVAW law, Kateb University, Kabul, 
December 16, 2009; interview with Huma Alizoi, judge, juvenile court, Kabul, February 8, 2010.
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4. Dari is a gender-neutral language; it does not distinguish between gender in personal 
pronouns. The article could equally be translated: “A person, defending her honor, who sees 
her spouse.” However, the article was understood to refer to men only. A woman who killed 
her adulterous husband or a male relative claiming defense of honor would make little 
sense, since male relatives’ sexual behavior did not reflect on women in this way. Moreover, 
as one of my informants stated, to kill a man caught in adulterous behavior on the spot was 
perilous, because men had to right to enter into polygamous marriages, and one could not 
know if the man had not recently married the woman he had been found with. Interview 
with Qazi Ahmed Nazir Hanafi, Kabul, January 2010.
5. This title in the original is Zina, lawat va hatke namus. The term lawat, here trans-
lated as “sodomy,” is often translated as “pederasty” or “ ‘active’ sodomy,” but also some-
times as “homosexuality.” My research does not cover the theme of how homosexual 
practices are regulated by the Afghan government—a field that would benefit from future 
research. Some prosecutors suggested to me that they would pursue cases of lawat only 
if one person was a minor and that they would consider only the older party liable for 
prosecution.
6. Neither the hadd punishments for zina (stoning or lashing) nor the evidentiary con-
ditions (normally held to be four witnesses to the act of penetration or a voluntary confes-
sion) required to apply such punishments was spelt out in the code. It should also be added 
that in theory, premarital and extramarital sex were only classified as zina when these evi-
dentiary conditions were fulfilled. However, in everyday speak, many Afghans refer to all 
extramarital sex as zina, and the Penal Code also refers to adultery as zina also when the 
evidence to punish it as a hadd crime is not in existence.
7. The Penal Code contains six “Principal Punishments”: (1) execution; (2) continued 
imprisonment (16–18 years); (3) long-term imprisonment (5–15 years); (4) medium-term 
imprisonment (1–5 years); (5) short-term imprisonment (24 hours–1 year); and (6) the pay-
ment of a fine.
8. Taqnin literally means “making a code” (qanun).
9. However, the MOWA’s offices in the provinces; the Department of Women’s Affairs 
(DOWA) sometimes played a role in helping women who were in conflict with their fami-
lies or had other problems. The effectiveness of DOWA in such situations was generally 
determined by personalities and the local security situation (see chapters 5 and 6).
10. Interview with an Afghan staff member at international women’s rights organiza-
tion, Kabul, August 2009.
11. According to the Afghan Constitution, only the government (including ministers) 
or the Parliament could submit laws to the Taqnin.
12. Interview with Qadria Yazanpardast, Kabul, October 2009.
13. Interview with a female MP, Kabul, March 2012.
14. Interviews with UNODC staff members, Kabul, September 2009.
15. Interview with Qazi Nazir Ahmed Hanafi, Kabul, January 2010.
16. Interviews with Western diplomats, Kabul, December 2009.
17. The name of the legislation commission in Parliament is Taqnin, but to distinguish 
it from the Taqnin in the Ministry of Justice, this book calls it the legislation commission.
18. Interview with an Afghan women’s rights activist, Kabul, June 2015.
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19. In a meeting at Kabul University arranged in April 2010 to disseminate the EVAW 
law, several students at the faculty of sharia reportedly expressed the opinion that rape 
( tajavoz-e jinsi), unlike zina, was not known to Islamic societies. Instead, rape was “brought” 
to Afghanistan by “foreigners” and to accept the difference between rape and zina would be 
to open up for changing the basic provisions of Islam. Interview with an international staff 
member at IDLO, Kabul, May 2010.
20. Article 426 merely states that if hadd conditions are not fulfilled, perpetrators 
should be punished according to this chapter [of the Penal Code]. Article 427 (1) then states 
that “a person who commits adultery (zina) or pederasty [sodomy] (lawat) shall be sen-
tenced to long-term imprisonment” (i.e., no less than five years and no more than fifteen).
21. Article 86 of the Civil Code reads, “Polygamy can take place after the following con-
ditions are fulfilled: 1. When there is no fear of injustice between the wives. 2. When the 
person has financial sufficiency to sustain the wives. That is, when he can provide food, 
clothes, suitable house, and medical treatment. 3. When there is legal expediency, that 
is when the first wife is childless or when she suffers from diseases which are hard to be 
 treated.” Whereas conditions 1 and 2 are also standard conditions in Islamic fiqh, condition 
3 is more restrictive than what is found in classic fiqh.
22. Despite my best efforts, I have not succeed in obtaining the first MOWA draft, which 
truncates the analysis in this section somewhat.
23. Draft of the Law on Prevention of Violence against Women. Drafted by the Afghan 
Women’s Network, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, Rights and De-
mocracy, Humanitarian Assistance for the Women and Children of Afghanistan Ministry 
of Women’s Affairs. On file with author (Dari).
24. The accusation that a woman had not been a virgin was a fairly common occurance 
in Afghanistan, often grounded in the mistaken belief that a virgin bride will always bleed 
on her wedding night. Such accusations could result in a new bride being sent home in 
shame to her parents and could expose her to serious sanctions by her kin or in-laws. The 
hadd punishment for slander (qazf) is lashing. See chapter 1 for an explanation.
25. Interview with the head of the legal department at MOWA, Kabul, March 2010.
26. Review of the EVAW law by UNODC et al., April 2009. On file with author.
27. One senior U.N. official later complained to me, “This language must have been put 
there by somebody who has never worked in a court. How do you prove ‘forced’ prostitu-
tion? Do pimps use guns? No. It should be facilitation (of prostitution). And how do you 
prove ‘forced suicide’?” Interview with UNAMA official, Kabul, June 2015.
28. Explanatory Note on Proposed Amendments to Draft EVAW Law. UNODC and 
UNAMA, October 1, 2009. On file with author.
29. Review of EVAW law by UNODC et al., April 2009. On file with author.
30. Sayed Yusuf Halim, who was appointed the chief justice in Afghanistan in July 2015.
31. Interview with Sayed Yusuf Halim, Kabul, January 2010.
32. Interview with an Afghan staff member at international women’s rights organiza-
tion, Kabul, August 2009.
33. Technical Advisory Group meeting, September 29, 2009. Meeting notes on file with 
author.
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34. I attended four of the seven sessions in the Joint Commission where the EVAW law 
was debated, whereas my research assistant also attended the last session. I also conducted 
interviews with the key participants in the debate as well as parliamentary staff. My analysis 
of the parliamentary process is based on the Dari transcripts of the proceedings by my assis-
tant, the television footage of the plenary debate in 2013, as well as press reports, interviews, 
and the written amendments submitted by various commissions.
35. Interview with a female MP from Kabul, Kabul, October 2010.
36. At the center of this group were (apart from Qazi Nazir Ahmed Hanafi): Haji Ni-
yaz Mohammad Amiry, Commission for Telecommunication; engineer Mohammad Asim, 
Commission for Martyrs and Disabled Persons; and Ataullah Ludin, Commission for Jus-
tice and Legal Affairs.
37. Amendments to Law on Elimination of Violence against Women. Legislation 
(Taqnin) Commission of Parliament. Undated document. On file with author.
38. Second Joint Commission meeting on the EVAW law, November 3, 2009.
39. Amendments to Law on Elimination of Violence against Women. Legislation 
(Taqnin) Commission of Parliament. Undated document, page 2. On file with author.
40. Second Joint Commission meeting on the EVAW law, November 3, 2009.
41. Amendments to Law on Elimination of Violence against Women. Legislation 
(Taqnin) Commission of Parliament.
42. Fifth Joint Commission meeting on the EVAW law, November 15, 2009.
43. Amendments to Law on Elimination of Violence against Women. Legislation 
(Taqnin) Commission of Parliament. Undated.
44. Joint Session’s Amendment Concerning Law on Elimination of Violence against 
Women (undated). On file with author.
45. Seventh Joint Commission meeting on the EVAW law, November 19, 2009.
46. Seventh Joint Commission meeting on the EVAW law, November 19, 2009.
47. As one of the other conservatives MPs later stated, “MOWA was offending a fellow 
mujahed, and we are not going to the debate anymore.” Interview with Qazi Hanafi, Kabul, 
January 2010.
48. Personal communication, Fawzia Koofi, November 2013. I was out of the country 
and did not attend these sessions. The Parliament does not produce transcripts of meetings 
in the joint mission.
49. Mahram originally means “unmarriagable kin,” with whom intercourse would be 
considered incestuous. In current usage, it also refers to a male escort without whom a 
woman cannot travel or leave the house, such as her husband or a close relative. The Tali-
ban government enforced this on a universal basis, meaning that no Afghan woman was 
permitted outside without a mahram. Many Afghan families still uphold the practice of 
mahram in this sense, especially when their female members travel some distance.
50. Amendments to Law on Elimination of Violence against Women. Legislation 
(Taqnin) Commission of Parliament. 05.06.1390 (August 27, 2011), page 5. On file with 
 author.
51. Jafari fiqh is Shia; Hanafi fiqh is Sunni. Second Joint Commission meeting on the 
EVAW law, November 3, 2009.
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52. This quote and the following were transcribed and translated by the author from a 
television broadcast of the plenary debate in Parliament on May 18, 2013.
53. Sixth Joint Commission meeting on the EVAW law, November 17, 2009.
54. Fifth Joint Commission meeting on the EVAW law, November 15, 2009.
55. Personal communication with an Afghan staff member at international NGO, 
 November 2009.
56. Personal communication with a law student, Kabul, December 2009.
57. Sixth Joint Commission meeting on the EVAW law, November 17, 2009.
58. Interview with a shelter manager, Herat, January 2010.
59. Interview with an Afghan staff member at international NGO, November 2009. In 
chapters 4 and 5, I explore in greater detail how “leaving the house” constituted a testing 
ground for clashing gender orders.
60. Interview with Qadria Yazanpardast, Kabul, October 2009.
61. I was given a taste of the intensity of this competition when, in the middle of one 
of the meetings in the Joint Commission, I was asked to come outside by one of the female 
MPs, whom I had interviewed a few weeks earlier. She told me that she needed to inform 
me about the personal life of some of the other women in the room. It was their illicit af-
fairs with married men, she said, that caused them to push for polygamy to be made more 
difficult by the EVAW law. This would lead their lovers to divorce their first wives instead of 
taking them as co-wives. The circulation of these kinds of rumors about the personal lives 
of female politicians was common.
62. Personal communication, former UNODC staff, March 2012.
63. See embassy cables: Embassy of the United States Kabul, 2009a; Embassy of the 
United States Kabul 2009b.
64. See chapter 1 for a description of the mujahedin and the rise of Islamism in 
 Afghanistan.
65. Some years later, the public killing of a woman named Farkhunda, who had been 
accused of burning a copy of the Quran, was understood by many Afghans as a horrifying 
sign of the hostility against women who “went too far” and could be labeled immoral wom-
en, infidels, and Western agents. I write more about this case in the conclusion of this book.
66. Personal communication with a women’s rights activist, September 2009.
67. Some civil society activists thought the speaker, who was not a particularly influ-
ential MP, had agreed to this because he wished to remain on good terms with Western 
embassies. Interview with a women’s rights activist, Kabul, June 2015. See also Larson 2016.
68. Interviews with a senior U.N. official, June 2015, and an Afghan lawyer, Kabul, April 
2015.
69. Interview with a senior U.N. official, Kabul, June 2015
70. Interview with a senior U.N. official, Kabul, June 2015.
71. The U.S. government alone allocated around US$700 million to women’s rights ac-
tivities in Afghanistan in the period 2001–2014 (SIGAR 2014).
72. Personal communication, IDLO staff member, February 2015.
73. Phone interviews with judges in the primary court of Kabul, March 2010.
74. Government of Afghanistan’s Hard Deliverables no. 7 [out of 17 in total]: “MOWA, 
MOI [Ministry of Interior] and the AGO [attorney general’s office] coordinate to produce 
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a detailed report on the application of the EVAW law in each province. The report should 
include: the number of VAW [violence against women] cases brought to the police, disposi-
tion of each case (whether prosecuted or not) and the outcome of the prosecuted cases. The 
data collected should be made public and serve as a baseline for future analyses of EVAW 
law implementation.”
75. The Afghan year of 1391 (March 2012–March 2013).
76. A smaller number of cases were “solved” by the courts by granting a divorce or 
referring the victim to a shelter.
CHAPTER 3 .  BROKERS OF JUSTICE
1. In provinces that did not have a special unit, cases were processed by the normal 
prosecution.
2. There was, however, some methodological unclarity about the number of cases reg-
istered with the prosecution, meaning that the actual rate of prosecution and conviction 
could be lower. See Shahabi and Wimpelmann, 2015.
3. Badahkshan, Baghlan, Bamiyan, Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, Khost, and Nangarhar.
4. For details on the methodology and data collection for this chapter, see the section 
“Research Trajectories” in the introduction.
5. The Penal Code (1976) does not list the acts considered felonies, but article 24 states, 
“Felony is a crime whose doer is sentenced to death or continued imprisonment or long 
imprisonment.” The EVAW law (2009) implies that rape, forced prostitution, recording and 
publishing the identity of the victim, burning or using chemical substances, forced self-
immolation, and forced suicide are crimes that must be investigated independently of a 
petition.
6. Rural prosecutors were more likely to require physical marks as a minimum require-
ment for registering a complaint, although there were few signs of consistency on this 
 question.
7. Both forced and consensual anal intercourse (lawat) are crimes under Afghan law, 
even when involving a man and woman married to each other.
8. According to Afghan family law (in the 1977 Civil Code), women can ask for divorce 
to be granted by the courts under certain conditions, such as harm inflicted by the husband, 
impotence, or long-term abandonment. A divorce granted by the court on these grounds 
is called tafreeq, and the woman retains the right to her mahr (dowry), which should have 
been paid upon marriage (though, in practice, it is often paid only in the case of divorce). 
She also keeps her mahr if her husband unilaterally divorces her (such a divorce is called 
talaaq). In both scenarios, she is also due alimony for a transition period of three months 
(this transition period is called iddat). However, if she does not have valid grounds for di-
vorce, she can obtain it only if her husband consents, and in that case, he can then ask for 
financial compensation, such as requiring her to give up her mahr (either by returning it, if 
it had been paid upon marriage, or by forfeiting it, if the payment had been deferred). Such 
a “consensual” divorce is called khula.
9. The EVAW Law (article 23) provides for imprisonment for no more than three months 
for beating (not resulting in injury or disability), whereas the equivalent article in the Penal 
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Code (article 409) provides for imprisonment not exceeding six months,  although article 
409 is somewhat unclear about whether beating that doesn’t result in long-term injury is 
punishable at all.
10. The prosecutors frequently used government-issued business licenses as a form of 
bail—either the license of the suspect/defendant or that of an acquaintance. If the condi-
tions of bail or the conditions in the guarantee were breached, the prosecutors could see to 
it that the license was revoked.
11. Article 250 states that the court can extend this custody for up to two years, and 
article 251 states that the court can grant custody to another person (other than the custody 
holder) if it is to the benefit of the child.
12. See note 6 above.
13. The instruction about the misuse of a cell phone probably meant that the wife should 
refrain from conversations with men she was not related to over the phone.
14. In India, conviction rates under section 498 of the Penal Code, which deals with 
domestic violence, are reported to be 2 percent or less. It is thought that a main reason for 
this is that a woman effectively loses her access to her matrimonial home by filing a com-
plaint (Basu 2006).
CHAPTER 4 .  WITH A LIT TLE HELP FROM THE WAR ON TERROR
1. Huma Sultani, former staff at the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, 
Kankash, Tolo Television, February 19, 2011.
2. Qazi Ahmed Nazir Hanafi, MP, Kankash, Tolo Television, February 19, 2011.
3. Interview with head of juvenile detention center, Herat, January 2010.
4. The government would generally not release disaggregated data on women incarcer-
ated for “running away” but, instead, lumped together female prisoners charged with or 
convicted for all “moral crimes”: running away, zina, and “attempted zina.” This number 
stayed fairly stable throughout the Karzai period (2001–2014) ranging from four hundred 
to seven hundred nationwide (HRW 2012).
5. Personal communication, U.N. official, Herat, January 2010.
6. Articles 426–29 of the 1976 Penal Code.
7. Personal communication with staff at UNAMA, IDLO, and Afghan legal aid organi-
zations, 2010–11.
8. Approval 572, dated August 24, 2010, of High Council of Supreme Court. English 
translation by UNODC, Kabul. On file with author.
9. Qazi Ahmed Nazir Hanafi, MP, Kankash, Tolo Television, February 19, 2011.
10. Interview with Soraya Parlika, Kabul, March 2015.
11. Interview with Mary Akrami, Kabul, March 2015.
12. In Kabul, there were four shelters, run by Women for Afghan Women (WAW), 
 Humanitarian Assistance for Women and Children (HAWCA), and Afghan Women’s Skills 
Development Center (AWSDC). In addition, there was one shelter each in several other 
cities: Herat (run by Voice of Women), Mazar-e Sharif (Cooperation Center for Afghani-
stan [CCA]), Bamiyan (Shuhada organization), Jalalabad (UNIFEM), and Charikar (also 
 UNIFEM). The number of shelters proliferated significantly between 2010 and 2015.
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13. Interview with shelter manager, Jalalabad, February 2010.
14. Interview with MOWA staff, Jalalabad, February 2010.
15. Interview with shelter manager and NGO staff, Kabul, April 2010 and May 2011.
16. Personal communication with former shelter manager and staff at an international 
legal development organization, February 2011 and March 2015.
17. Aryn Baker, “Afghan Women and the Return of the Taliban,” Time, August 9, 2010.
18. Personal communication with former shelter manager, February 2011.
19. Afghan Women, Security and United States Strategy, WAW press release, December 
1, 2009.
20. Jamiat-e Islami (Society of Islam) was one of the mujahedin parties during the jihad 
years and was registered as a political party after 2001. It was led by Burhanuddin Rabbani 
until his assassination in September 2011.
21. Interview with Nasto Naderi, Kabul, May 2011.
22. Interview with Nasto Naderi.
23. Interview with women’s right activist, Kabul, May 2011.
24. Interview with Nasto Naderi.
25. After the fall of the communist government in 1992, Afghanistan was for the first 
time declared an Islamic republic by the victorious mujahedin, although the new govern-
ment soon collapsed into infighting. The 2004 Constitution also named Afghanistan an 
Islamic republic.
26. Interview with Nasto Naderi.
27. This group had also reviewed the EVAW law (see chapter 2).
28. Interviews with Afghan human rights official, Kabul, May 2011; Afghan human 
rights activist, Kabul, May 2011; Afghan staff member of Women for Afghan Women, Ka-
bul, May 2011.
29. Draft Regulation on Women’s Protection Centers. On file with author.
30. Interview with the head of the legal department, MOWA, Kabul, May 2010.
31. Interview with an Afghan human rights official, Kabul, May 2010.
32. “Afghan Government Seeking to Take Control of Women’s Shelters” Canadian 
Women for Women in Afghanistan, February 1, 2011, www.cw4wafghan.ca/news/2011/02/01/
afghan-government-seeking-take-control-womens-shelters.
33. A version of the regulations with all of the concerns of shelters incorporated was 
developed by the CLRWG, dated February 9, 2011. On file with author.
34. Entitled “Afghan Proposal Would Clamp Down on Women’s Shelters,” an article 
about the regulations appeared in the New York Times on February 10, 2011.
35. Interview with Western diplomat, Kabul, May 2011.
36. Interviews with Afghan human rights official Kabul, May 2011; Afghan human 
rights activist, Kabul, May 2011; and Afghan staff member of Women for Afghan Women, 
Kabul, May 2011.
37. Well-known women activists who had established shelters included Mary Akra-
mi, director of the Afghan Women Skills Development Center (AWSDC); Orzala Ashraf 
Nemat, previous director of Humanitarian Assistance for Women and Children of Afghani-
stan (HAWCA); Suraya Pakzad, director of Voice of Women Organization; and Manizha 
Naderi, national director of Women for Afghan Women (WAW).
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38. The letter of the Afghan Women’s Network can be seen here: www.aiwr.org/files/
The_Gatekeepers_of_Women.pdf. The letters of the U.S. senators and the statement of the 
assistant secretary of state are discussed here: U. Moore, “Afghan Shelter Crackdown Sparks 
International Advocacy,” U.N. Dispatch, February 19, 2011, www.undispatch.com/afghan-
shelter-crackdown-sparks-international-advocacy.
39. Interviews with Afghan human rights official, Kabul, May 2011; Afghan human 
rights activist, Kabul, May 2011; and Afghan staff member of Women for Afghan Women, 
Kabul, May 2011.
40. Interview with Afghan human rights official, Kabul, May 2011.
41. Interview with U.S. diplomat, Kabul, May 2011.
42. A version of the regulations with all of the concerns of shelters incorporated was 
developed by the CLRWG, dated February 9, 2011. But when the international press broke 
the story on February 10, they referred to the regulations in their original form, and fronts 
subsequently hardened, with MOWA also reverting to the original version in its press con-
ference on February 15.
CHAPTER 5 .  RUNAWAY WOMEN
1. The material in this chapter is based on around one hundred interviews in Afghani-
stan with family members, government officials, religious and community leaders, shelter 
personnel, human rights workers, lawyers, and journalists, mostly in the period from 2010 
to 2011. Some details have been changed or omitted for confidentiality purposes. I have 
referred to specific interviews in the notes only when I have directly cited someone.
2. Jirga is a Pashto word referring to a local gathering for the purpose of decision mak-
ing or dispute settlement (Wardak 2004). In its ideal form, a jirga is conducted by a group 
of respected male elders who collectively reach decisions—and is an embodiment of the 
egalitarian and autonomous ideology of Pashtun tribal society (Wimpelmann 2013).
3. Interview with a judge, Central Afghanistan, April 2010.
4. It has become quite common for the nikah ceremony to take place at this point—at 
the time of the formal engagement—so that, from the perspective of Islamic law, the couple 
is already married. But until the wedding feast has taken place and the bride has moved to 
her husband’s house, they are spoken of as only engaged, and they cannot socially be con-
sidered a married couple.
5. Interview with juvenile prosecutor, central Afghanistan, June 2010.
6. Interview with prison attorney, central Afghanistan, June 2010.
7. Article 17 of the EVAW law concerns rape: “If a person commits rape with an adult 
woman, the offender shall be sentenced to continued imprisonment in accordance with 
the provision of Article (426) of the Penal Code, and if it results in the death of victim, the 
perpetrator shall be sentenced to death penalty.”
8. This was a rather complicated procedure, requiring the signature of the deputy min-
ister of justice and the head of the National Prison Directorate. The process was made more 
complicated since I was not a journalist but a researcher, for which no category existed. 
Eventually the authorities issued me the permit without a press card.
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9. A U.N. employee whom I spoke with said that the last time he had tried to get the 
lawyer to take a stronger interest in the case, the lawyer claimed to have lost the file (Kabul, 
June 2010). I was asked to mention this to the head of the Afghan bar association, which I 
did.
10. Interview with the head of the provincial council, central Afghanistan, June 2010.
11. Interview with Nafisa’s fiancé’s brother, central Afghanistan, June 2010.
12. Interview with local jirga expert 1, central Afghanistan, June 2010.
13. Interview with local jirga expert 2, central Afghanistan, June 2010.
14. Interview with female member of the provincial council, central Afghanistan, June 
2010.
15. Interview with former head of DOWA, central Afghanistan, June 2010.
16. Interview with staff at AIHRC, Kabul, June 2010.
17. Due to staff shortage, the primary and appeal courts were presided over by the same 
judge.
18. Interview with Fereshta’s mother, Radio Azadi March 19, 2010.
19. As I started to piece together the event a few weeks later, I was offered a chance to 
buy the video, filmed by someone in the crowd, for a few hundred dollars. I declined. Some 
months later, the video appeared in the media and was posted on YouTube.
20. Edwards (2002) recounts a story from the 1980s of a young woman who denounces 
her husband as he goes to complete his military services with the communist government, 
in an area where all other young men are supporting the jihad against the Soviet-backed 
regime. She convinces her male cousin to escape with her, but they are caught by Hizb-e 
Islami, one of the mujahedin parties, and she is sentenced to death by stoning by a  religious 
judge, recently returned from Saudi Arabia, even though the local community widely 
 endorsed her elopement. To the narrator in Edwards’ book, this imposition symbolized 
the rising power of mullahs in Afghan society. Previously dependent on tribal leaders, they 
were now asserting their power more independently.
21. Siddiqa, like Fereshta, had been engaged to her cousin, so (unlike in Nafisa’s case) 
there was no question of answering to an external family. It was Siddiqa’s family, not her 
fiancé, who played the leading act in the aftermath of her escape.
22. Interview with relative of Qayam, Kunduz, August 2010.
23. Personal communication with researcher based in Kunduz, May 2011.
24. As work on a new, comprehensive penal code began in 2012, the then minister of 
justice Habibullah Ghalib took the initiative to codify hadd punishments for zina, theft, 
alcohol consumption, and so on, and the task of codification was given to the Afghan Bar 
Association. Information about the existence of this draft was leaked to the press two years 
later and caused strong international reactions. At the time of writing (2015), it was not clear 
whether a codification of hadd punishments would be included in the full draft of the penal 
code. Some Afghans argued for it on the basis that such a codification would actually spell 
out that the conditions for imposing such physical punishments could never be fulfilled in 
practice. Others argued that the Afghan Constitution of 2004 deemed such punishments 
illegal.
25. Radio Azadi, March 19, 2010.
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26. Mohammad Omar Omarzada, legal scholar, speaking on Radio Azadi, March 19, 
2010.
27. Interview with head of AIHRC, Herat, January 2010.
28. According to mostly anecdotal reports, large networks for trafficking and selling of 
women and children for prostitution exist in Afghanistan, both for domestic markets and 
abroad.
29. Decree Number 104, dated May 17, 1419 H.Q. [Islamic lunar year] of the Islamic 
Emirate of Afghanistan regarding women’s rights in society.
30. Medica Mondiale, in a review of the cases that their lawyers have worked on, found 
a similar pattern. Judges and prosecutors would convict women of premarital or extramari-
tal intercourse regardless of the abusive circumstances that women had found themselves 
in (Boggio-Cosadia 2014).
31. Interview with AIHRC official, Kunduz, August 2010.
32. Interview with juvenile attorney, central Afghanistan, June 2010.
33. In 2012 three single women who had rented a room with a family in a relatively lib-
eral part of Kabul (Kart-e Se) were attacked by a mob when attempting to move to another 
location. One of the women was killed, and the others went into hiding. Police and others 
accused them of being prostitutes, since they could not see how else they could make a liv-
ing on their own (Graham-Harrison 2012).
CHAPTER 6 .  UPHOLDING CITIZEN HONOR?
1. In the Afghan year of 1391 (March 2012–March 2013), statistics compiled by the 
 Ministry of Women’s Affairs in twenty-five of Afghanistan’s thirty-four provinces found 
188 cases of reported rape or sexual violence (against women). This would suggest around 
0.5 rapes reported per 100,000 population (MOWA 2014).
2. Although he was, in fact, the girl’s uncle, he often referred to himself as her father, 
since Bashira’s actual father was ill and could not represent her.
3. In an unrelated event, President Karzai had dismissed the attorney general, Abdul 
Jabar Sabet, on July 17, 2008.
4. Tolo Television, July 19, 2008.
5. Sighbatullah Mujadiddi was a former mujahedin fighter and a personal friend of 
President Karzai. He held a number of high-level official positions during the post-2001 
period.
6. Interview with Sayed Noorullah, Sarepul, March 2010.
7. This face-to-face denunciation of the president as basically a man without morality, a 
purveyor of honor, must have taken him back, but to the relief of Bashira’s uncle, the presi-
dent reacted calmly and expressed his sympathy for his plight.
8. Author’s personal communication in Kabul, September 2014.
9. Author’s interview with U.N. legal official, June 2015.
10. Noorullah lightheartedly recalled how Sima Samar, the head of the AIHRC, had 
declared that she would never talk to him again should she come to hear that the uncle 
would pursue a baad.
11. Interview with Afghan human rights official, Mazar-e Sharif, April 2010.
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12. Interview with Afghan human rights official, Mazar-e Sharif, April 2010.
13. Kogacioglu (2004) makes a similar argument for Turkey, where she points out that 
the legal and institutional accommodation of “honor killings” makes questionable these 
same institutions’ presentation of them as acts of tradition.
C ONCLUSIONS
1. Interview with a male women’s rights activist, Kabul, March 2012.
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